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INTRODUCTION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided
108 government contract cases in 1997.' In comparison, the Federal
Circuit issued twenty-three government contract decisions in 1996,
1. Although this figure at first seems high, it represents the total number of government
contract cases decided by the Federal Circuit, including those cases from the Court of Federal
Claims and the various Boards of Contract Appeals. These figures were originally obtained
from the Clerk's Office of the Federal Circuit. They were then compared with the figures
available at the test Web site <http://www.sittingbull.com/fedcir/97.htm>.
2. See C. Stanley Dees & David A. Churchill, Government Contract Cases in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: 1996 in Review, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 1807, 1808 (1997).
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fifty-seven in 1995," twenty-two in 1994,' forty in 1993,5 twenty-one in
1992,6 thirty-one in 1991, 7 and more than thirty decisions in 1990. 8
Thirty of the 108 decisions in 1997 were appeals from the Court of
Federal Claims;9 seventy-six came from the Boards of Contract Ap-
peals.'" By a substantial margin, most (forty-nine) of the appeals
from agency boards were from the Armed Services Board of Contract
3. See Thomas F. Williamson et al., Government Contract Cases in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit: 1995 in Review, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1657, 1658 (1996).
4. See David R. Johnson et al., A Surey of Government Contract Cases Decided by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1994,44 AM. U. L. REV. 2115, 2116 (1995).
5. See Richard B. Clifford,Jr. et al., Government Contract Cases Before the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1417, 1418 (1994).
6. See VictorJ. Zupa & BrianJ. Siebel, Government Contracts: 1992 Analysis and Summary,
42 AM. U. L. REV. 1109,1110 (1993).
7. See Lynda Troutman O'Sullivan & Martin P. Willard, Government Contracts: 1991 Analy-
sis and Summary, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 911, 912 (1992).
8. See Giovanna M. Cinelli, The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Govern-
ment Contracts 1990 Summary, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1117, 1118 (1991).
9. See Bareback Kraft AB & Empresa Nacional Del Uranio SA. v. United States, 121 F.3d
1475 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Neal & Co. v. United States, 121 F.3d 683 (Fed. Cir. 1997); New Valley
Corp. v. United States, 119 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1997); National Sur. Corp. v. United States, 118
F.3d 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1997);Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States, 112 F.3d 1569 (Fed. Cir.
1997); San Carlos Irrigation & Drainage Dist. v. United States, 111 F.3d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1997);
Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth. v. United States, 109 F.3d 746 (Fed. Cir. 1997); United Int'l
Investigative Serv. v. United States, 109 F.3d 734 (Fed. Cir. 1997); National Leased Hous. Ass'n
v. United States; 105 F.3d 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Trauma Serv. Group v. United States, 104 F.3d
1321 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Total Med. Management v. United States, 104 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 156 (1997); Courthouse Square Dev. Corp. v. United States No. 97-
5025, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 35421 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 25, 1997) (unpublished table decision); Az-
ure v. United States, No. 96-5054, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 29365 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 24, 1997) (un-
published table decision); Day & Zimmerman Serv. v. United States, No. 97-5147, 1997 U.S.
App. LEXIS 31815 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 15, 1997) (unpublished table decision); Brother's Cleaning
Serv. v. United States, No. 97-5109, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 28027 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 24, 1997) (un-
published table decision); Ampetrol, Inc. v. United States, No. 97-5078, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS
23872 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 20, 1997) (unpublished table decision); K & S Constr. v. United States,
No. 97-5029, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 22474 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 7, 1997); Roy v. United States, No. 97-
5073, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 21684 (Fed. Cir. July 10, 1997) (unpublished table decision);
Hubsch Industrieanlagen Spezialbau, Gmbh v. United States, No. 96-5119, 1997 U.S. App.
LEXIS 15004 (Fed. Cir. June 20, 1997) (unpublished table decision); St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. v. United States, No. 96-5129, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 20350 (Fed. Cir.June 12, 1997)
(unpublished table decision); Athens Gardens Ltd. v. United States No. 95-5135, 1997 U.S.
App. LEXIS 16941 (Fed. Cir. May 30, 1997) (unpublished table decision); First Interstate Bank
of Billings v. United States, No. 96-5105, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 12062 (Fed. Cir. May 27, 1997)
(unpublished table decision); Heathman, Inc. v. United States, No. 96-5032, 1997 U.S. App.
LEXIS 17641 (Fed. Cir. May 13, 1997) (unpublished table decision); Desciose v. United States,
No. 96-5072, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 6921 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 9, 1997) (unpublished table decision);
Hydro Eng'g, Inc. v. United States, No. 97-5024, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 10012 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 8,
1997) (unpublished table decision); Seville Constr., Inc. v. United States, No. 96-5101, 1997
U.S. App. LEXIS 5155 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 13, 1997) (unpublished table decision); KMS Fusion, Inc.
v. United States, No. 96-5117, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 4833 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 6, 1997) (unpub-
lished table decision); Amertex Enters. v. United States, No. 96-5070, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS
9915 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 24, 1997) (unpublished table decision), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 851 (1998);
American Sports Kids Ass'n v. United States, No. 97-5016, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 1329 (Fed. Cir.
Jan. 10, 1997) (unpublished table decision).
10. See infra notes 11-18 (listing government contract cases before agency boards of con-
tract appeals).
1396 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITYLAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1393
Appeals ("ASBCA")," while fourteen came from the General Services
Board of Contract Appeals ("GSBCA") 2 three from the Corps of En-
11. See ITT Fed. Servs. Corp. v. Widnall, 132 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1997); AAA Eng'g &
Drafting, Inc. v. Widnall, 129 F.3d 602 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Dalton, 126 F.3d
1442 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Motorola, Inc. v. West, 125 F.3d 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Whittaker Elec.
Sys. v. Dalton, 124 F.3d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Dalton v. Southwest Marine, Inc., 120 F.3d 1249
(Fed. Cir. 1997); Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Dalton, 119 F.3d 972 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Delta
Constr. Co. v. Widnall, 114 F.3d 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Lockheed Corp. v. Widnall, 113 F.3d
1225 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. Widnal, 109 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Lock-
heed Martin IR Imaging Sys., Inc. v. West, 108 F.3d 319 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Advanced Materials,
Inc. v. Perry, 108 F.3d 307 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Burnside-Ott Aviation Training Ctr. v. Dalton, 107
F.3d 854 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Satellite Elec. Co. v. Dalton, 105 F.3d 1418 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Preci-
sion Std., Inc. v. Widnall, No. 97-1096, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 36490 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 30, 1997);
Black River Ltd. v. West, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 38119 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 22, 1997); Saf Eng'g, Inc.
v. Cohen, No. 97-1579, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 36193 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 4, 1997); Triax Pacific, Inc.
v. West, No. 97-1067, 1997 U.S. App LEXIS 33963 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 3, 1997); Titan Corp. v. West,
No. 97-1299, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 33333 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 24, 1997); McCoy, Inc. v. West, No.
96-1228, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 35422 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 24, 1997); Caesar Constr. Co. v. West, No.
97-1312, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 33302 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 10, 1997); Mac's Cleaning & Repair Serv.
v. Dalton, No. 97-1293, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 30468 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 7, 1997); D.E.W., Inc. v.
West, No. 97-1142, 1997 LEXIS 32209 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 8, 1997) (unpublished table decision);
Swanson Group v. West, No. 98-1040, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 28003 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 22, 1997);
West v. Red Samm Constr., Inc., No. 97-1032, 1997 LEXIS 22466 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 25, 1997) (un-
published table decision); Aydin Corp. v. Widnall, No. 96-1267, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 18959
(Fed. Cir.July 24, 1997); Coastal Gov't Servs., Inc. v. Cohen, No. 97-1359, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS
22553 (Fed. Cir.July 21, 1997); McDonnell Douglas Elecs. Sys. Co. v. West, No. 96-1517, 1997
U.S. App. LEXIS 21661 (Fed. Cir. July 18, 1997); Gramoll Constr. Co. v. West, No. 96-1216,
1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 19827 (Fed. Cir.July 15, 1997); Planned Sys. Int'l Inc. v. Widnall, No. 97-
1319, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 19185 (Fed. Cir.June 26, 1997) (unpublished table decision); Piz-
zagalli Constr. Co. v. Dalton, No. 97-1336, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 19177 (Fed. Cir. June 20,
1997) (unpublished table decision); Monde Constr. Co. v. Dalton, No. 96-1505, 1997 LEXIS
14822 (Fed. Cir.June 19, 1997) (unpublished table decision); McRae Indus. v. Cohen, No. 97-
1034, 1997 LEXIS 15551 (Fed. Cir.June 9, 1997) (unpublished table decision); Honig Indus.
Diamond Wheel, Inc. v. West, No. 96-1241, 1997 LEXIS 12659 (Fed. Cir. May 21, 1997) (un-
published table decision); Rosinka Joint Venture v. Albright, No. 97-1216, 1997 U.S. App.
LEXIS 12256 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 29, 1997) (unpublished table decision); Rehabilitation Servs. v.
Perry, No. 96-1530, 1997 LEXIS 12257 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 28, 1997) (unpublished table decision);
Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Dalton, No. 96-1546, 1997 LEXIS 8569 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 25, 1997) (un-
published table decision); Phoenix Petroleum Co. v. Department of Defense, No. 96-1487,
1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 7575 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 11, 1997); Strand Hunt Constr., Inc. v. West, No. 96-
1323, 1997 LEXIS 5424 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 21, 1997) (unpublished table decision); Union Boiler
Works v. West, No. 96-1542, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 7688 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 20, 1997); Turner-Mak
(jV) v. West, No. 96-1412, 1997 LEXIS 4857 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 25, 1997) (unpublished table deci-
sion); Dalton v. Gaffny Corp., No. 96-1331, 1997 LEXIS 2387 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 13, 1997) (unpub-
lished table decision); Orbas & Assocs. v. Widnall, No. 96-1363, 1997 LEXIS 2658 (Fed. Cir.
Feb. 10, 1997) (unpublished table decision); Tempo, Inc. v. West, No. 95-1429, 1997 LEXIS
2201 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 6, 1997) (unpublished table decision), cert. denied, U.S. LEXIS 6336 (Oct.
20, 1997); Libby Corp. v. Dalton, No. 96-1351, 1997 LEXIS 2043 (Fed. Cir.Jan 29, 1997) (un-
published table decision); GKS Inc. v. Perry, No. 96-1269, 1997 LEXIS 2042 (Fed. Cir.Jan. 29,
1997) (unpublished table decision); Contact Int'l, Inc. v. Widnall No. 96-1133, 1997 LEXIS 548
(Fed. Cir. Jan. 15, 1997) (unpublished table decision); International Gunnery Range Servs. v.
Widnall, No. 94-1444, 1995 LEXIS 24158 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 24, 1995) (unpublished table deci-
sion).
12. See Levitt v. 7 World Trade Co., 135 F.3d 775 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Michael Weller, Inc. v.
Bavasi, 132 F.3d 53 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Cafritz Co. v. Barram, 129 F.3d 134 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Ed A.
Wilson, Inc. v. GSA, 126 F.3d 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Barram v. KMS Dev. Co., 124 F.3d 224
(Fed. Cir. 1997); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Barram, 119 F.3d 16 (Fed. Cir. 1997); GDE Sys., Inc. v.
GSA, 119 F.3d 16 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision); Environmental Data v. GSA,
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gineers Board of Contract Appeals ("ENGBCA") ,' two from the De-
partment of Agriculture Board of Contract Appeals ("AGBCA"),14
three from the Postal Service Board of Contract Appeals ("PSBCA"),'5
two each from the Department of Veterans Affairs Board of Contract
Appeals C' ABCA")' 6 and the Department of Transportation Board
of Contract Appeals ("TRANSBCA"),' 7 and one from the Department
of Interior Board of Contract Appeals ("DOIBCA"). 8 The Federal
Circuit reversed, in whole or in part, twenty-two percent of the lower-
court decisions. 9 Furthermore, well over half (fifty-eight percent) of
the decisions were nonprecedenial.2 0
This Article presents an analysis of the significant 1997 preceden-
tial cases decided by the Federal Circuit as well as a summary of the
more significant unpublished cases. A summary of the precedential
cases spans Parts IV. Part I presents the cases in which jurisdiction
was the principal issue. Part II discusses the appeals dealing with the
formation of contracts. Similarly, Part III examines the appeals con-
cerning the administration of contracts. Part IV addresses cases in-
volving cost and pricing issues. Part V analyzes the cases resolving is-
sues dealing with damages. Part VI summarizes many of the
significant unpublished decisions issued in 1997. In conclusion, the
Article summarizes the one government contract case decided in
1997 by the United States Supreme Court. In addition, this section
provides a summary overview of the most significant government
119 F.3d 15 (Fed. Cir. 1997); GLR Constructors, Inc. v. West, 114 F.3d 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1997);
Omni Contractors, Inc. v. Barram, 116 F.3d 1496 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table deci-
sion); A. S. McGaughan Co. Inc. v. Barram, 113 F.3d 1256 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table
decision); 9th & D Joint Venture v. GSA, 108 F.3d 1394 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table
decision); Rincon Ctr. Assocs. v. Johnson, 108 F.3d 1393 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table
decision); LA Sys. v. West, 106 F.3d 426 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
13. See D. L. Braughler Co. v. West, 127 F.3d 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1997); ACMAT Corp. v.
Rhode, No. 95-1466, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 31466 (Fed Cir. Nov. 10, 1997), reh'g denied, 1997
U.S. App. LEXIS 35661 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 8, 1997); Reddy-Buffaloes Pump, Inc. v. West, No. 96-
1219, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 7657 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 7, 1997).
14. See LDG Timber Enters. v. Glickman, 114 F.3d 1140 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 1997
U.S. LEXIS 6078 (Oct. 14, 1997); PLB Grain Storage Corp. v. Glickman, No. 95-1169, 1997 U.S.
App. LEXIS 17639 (Fed. Cir. May 12, 1997).
15. See Diamond Plaza, Inc. v. Runyon, No. 97-1395, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 31827 (Fed.
Cir. Oct. 22, 1997); Roach v. Runyon, No. 97-1330, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 23874 (Fed. Cir. Aug.
20, 1997); Hendlish v. United States Postal Serv., No. 96-1474, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 7573 (Fed.
Cir. Apr. 14, 1997).
16. See Penn Envtl. Control, Inc. v. Brown, No. 96-1289, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 11114 (Fed.
Cir. May 14, 1997); Conner Bros. Constr. Co. v. Brown, Nos. 95-1336, 96-1154, 1997 U.S. App.
LEXIS 10100 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 30, 1997).
17. See T. Brown Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 132 F.3d 724 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Dick Enters.,
Inc. v. Reno, No. 97-1019, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 15548 (Fed. Cir.June 5, 1997).
18. See Phoenix Control Sys., Inc. v. Babbitt, 113 F.3d 1255 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
1997 U.S. LEXIS 5522 (Oct. 6, 1997).
19. See generally htp://unw.sittingbulltcom/fedcir/9Zhtm. (visited Aug. 1, 1998).
20. See id.
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contract decisions issued by the Federal Circuit in 1997. Finally, in a
prospective, the Article provides some comments and recommenda-
tions for government contract practitioners before the Federal Cir-
cuit.
I. JURISDICTION
To obtain administrative redress before a Board of Contract Ap-
peals ("BCA") orjudicial redress before the Court of Federal Claims
("CFC") for a government contract matter, either the administrative
board or the court must have legal authority to adjudicate the dis-
.... 21
pute. In other words, the court must have jurisdiction. In the realm
of government procurement, however, there is a unique wrinkle to
jurisdiction because the request for redress is against the United
States Government, or more simply, against the United States.2 Pur-
suant to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the United States may
not be sued unless it has specifically agreed to be subject to suit by
statutory provision.23 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit generally ex-
amines jurisdictional issues with much scrutiny.
A. Waiver of Sovereign Immunity
Since 1887, the Tucker Act has provided the statutory basis for ju-
risdiction to sue the government for any claim against the federal
government to recover damages founded on the Constitution, a stat-
ute, a regulation, or an express or implied-in-fact contract.24 For a
suit in the CFC under the Tucker Act, the government has waived
21. See United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399-401 (1976) (stating that the Tucker Act
merely confers jurisdiction upon the court, but does not create a substantive right against the
United States).
22. See William R. Hard, Note, Sovereign Immunity: An Outdated Doctrine Faces Demise in a
Changing Judicial Arena, 69 N.D. L. REV. 401, 404-05 (1993) (discussing the role of sovereign
immunity in American judicial history).
23. See generally ROBERT D. WATKINS, THE STATE AS A PARTY LITIGANT 7 (1927). As gener-
ally understood, sovereign immunity in the American tradition follows the English monarchial
convention that the King can do no wrong. Id. The tenet behind the English theory main-
tained that, as the King created the courts and as the courts acted subject to the King, the King
could not be subject to the courts. SeeWilliam S. Holdsworth, The History of Remedies Against the
Crown, 38 L. Q. REV. 141, 142 (1922).
24. In 1855, Congress first created a court in which a party could sue the United States
based on contract claims. SeeAct of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 1222, 10 Star. 612 (1855) (creating the
Court of Claims); see also 2 WILSON COWEN Er AL, THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS: A
HISTORY 2 (1979) (describing development of Court of Claims and its jurisdiction, one of the
two predecessor courts of the Federal Circuit). In 1887, Congress passed the Tucker Act, which
today still represents the statutory authorization to sue the United States for a contract claim.
SeeThe Tucker Act, ch. 359,24 Stat. 505 (1887) ("[T]he Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction
to hear and determine the following matters .... All claims founded upon ... any contract,
expressed or implied, with the Government of the United States"); see also COWEN, supra, at 39-
40 (discussing history of Tucker Act).
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sovereign immunity and agreed to be sued in that forum.2 5 However,
the Tucker Act generally limits the CFC's jurisdiction to cases in
which the court's judgments are paid from appropriated funds.26
In Lee v. United States, 7 the Federal Circuit considered the jurisdic-
tion of the CFC over a claim that the government asserted inured
from a nonappropriated fund instrumentality ("NAFI"). Megan Han
Lee was a two-year-old child who was injured while under the care of
28the Family Child Care ("FCC") program of the United States Army.
Pursuant to the FCC program, Lee and her mother filed a complaint
in district court against the individuals responsible for the injuries
sustained by Lee, Sergeant and Mrs. Garner. The Garners re-
sponded that the U.S. Army's Risk Management Program ("RIMP")
was responsible for the damages pursuant to an insurance agreement
under the FCC programY The court rejected the defense and found
the Garners liable for more than $700,000.'
The Garners subsequently assigned their rights under the RIMP to
the Lees, and the Lees then brought suit in the CFC32 The govern-
ment argued that the CFC lacked jurisdiction because the RIMP was
a NAFI, but the court rejected this contention.3  The CFC did, how-
ever, grant summary judgment to the government. 34
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reconsidered the jurisdictional is-
sue regarding the NAFI. 5 Although the court recognized that the
RIMP was a NAFI, it also noted that, under the authority of National
Defense Authorization Act of 1990 and 1991, the Department of De-
fense was authorized to use appropriated funds for military child care
programs pursuant to the Military Child Care Act of 1989
25. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1994) (The Tucker Act).
26. See United States v. General Elec. Corp., 727 F.2d 1567, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (noting
limitations on jurisdiction). "Appropriated funds" simply refer to funds that have been appro-
priated for disbursement by Congress. See id.
27. 124 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
28. See id. at 1292. At the time of the injury, Lee was under the care of Sgt and Mrs. Boyce
Garner. Mrs. Garner was a child care provider for the FCC program. See id.
29. See id. at 1293. While Mrs. Garner was away, Sgt. Garner was bathing Lee. He held the
child in hot bathwater which resulted in injuries to the child. See id. Sgt. Garner was not
authorized under the FCC program to care for children. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id. The insurance coverage under the RIMP included $500,000 per claim based on
the death or injury of a child under the care of a FCC program provider. See id. (including por-
tions of the Garners' statement of understanding).
32. See id.
33. See id. (indicating that CFC found the United States was not immune from suit on that
ground).
34. See id. at 1294. The CFC granted summaryjudgment because "Sgt. Garner's criminal
act was 'an intervening event' that caused the injury, 'thereby superseding [any] original negli-
gence.'" Id. (internal citation omitted).
35. See id.
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("MCCA") .36 Thus, because payments made to satisfy FCC claims may
derive, at least in part, from appropriated funds, the Federal Circuit
concluded that the RIMP was not entirely a NAFI. 7 Nevertheless, the
government asserted that, because any payment to Lee would be
based on a claim preceding the MCCA, the "bona fide needs" rule
would render the MCCA inapplicable.38 The Federal Circuit noted
the relevance of the bona fide needs rule, but found the rule out of
context for purposes of satisfying ajudgment of the CFC.59
Explaining that any such judgment must be reimbursed by ongo-
ing programs, the court held that the reimbursement provision of
the Contract Disputes Act ("CDA") shifts the source of funds to cur-
rent appropriations and thus renders the bona fide needs rule inap-
plicable. ° It is worth noting that despite this rather lengthy jurisdic-
tional analysis, the Federal Circuit still affirmed the CFC's ruling that
the Lees were not entitled to recovery under the FCC program.4'
In its motion for reconsideration, the government again con-
tended that the CFC had no jurisdiction over a claim based on a
NAFI. In particular, the government alleged that the Federal Cir-
cuit had erred by referencing section 612(c) of the CDA because the
36. See id. (citing the Military Child Care Act of 1989, 103 Stat. 1352, 1590, and acknowl-
edging that the Department of Defense is authorized to use appropriated funds in this situa-
tion).
37. See id. at 1294, 1295. The court emphasized that "[t]he government acknowledges that
if an agency is authorized to use both appropriated funds and nonappropriated funds to sup-
port its activities, the NAFI doctrine precluding Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction does not
apply." Id. at 1294-95.
38. See id. at 1295. In regard to the FCC program, the "bona fide needs rule" provides that
.any liability arising from an FCC insurance agreement may not be discharged with funds ap-
propriated in a fiscal year other than the fiscal year in which the agreement was entered into
and performed." Id.
39. See id. The court explained that "[t]he 'bona fide needs' rule stands for the proposi-
tion that appropriations for a particular year are to be obligated by an agency only to meet le-
gitimate needs arising in the year of appropriation" and further noted that "the rule is in-
tended to 'prevent agencies which do not have funds on hand for a particular purpose from
committing the Government to make payments at some future time and thereby, in effect, co-
ercing the Congress into making an appropriation to cover the commitment.'" Id. (quoting
Matter of GSA - Multiple Award Schedule Multiyear Contracting, 63 COMP. GEN. 129, 130-31
(1983)).
40. See id. If a party recovers a claim for contract damages against the United States, the
judgment is paid from the "judgment fund." See generally Lopez v. A.C. & S., Inc., 858 F.2d 712,
716 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (describing the general "judgment fund" from which contract damages
are paid). According to the Contract Disputes Act, however, "'the agency whose appropriations
were used for the contract' must reimburse the judgment fund either out of available funds or
by obtaining additional appropriations to cover the reimbursement expense.'" Lse, 124 F.3d at
1295 (quoting 41 U.S.C. § 612(c)). The purpose of this reimbursement requirement is to in-
duce the agency to resolve disputes. See id. (citing the legislative history of reimbursement re-
quirement).
41. See Lee, 124 F.3d at 1297. As previously held by the CFC, the Federal Circuit found
there was no liability under the FCC program resulting from the negligence of Mrs. Garner in
allowing her husband, Sgt. Garner, to care for Lee. See id. at 1297.
42. SeeLee v. United States, 129 F.3d 1482 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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contract at issue was not subject to the Act.43  The Federal Circuit
granted rehearing for the limited purpose of issuing a supplemental
opinion, explaining that the CDA was indeed not applicable. 44 The
court, however, denied the motion as to the jurisdictional issue.4
Because the 'judgment fund" is available to pay judgments awarded
by the CFC, the court concluded that "[t]he government has not
pointed us to any authority holding that the judgment fund could
not be used to pay ajudgment arising from a contract that the RIMP
entered into before appropriated funds became available to supporti ,,4t.
Therefore, in a significant limitation of its initial decision, the Fed-
eral Circuit specifically affirmed the jurisdiction of the CFC based on
a very strict, and limited application of the NAFI exception to the
Tucker Act.
47
B. Claim as Jurisdictional Prerequisite
In Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton,48 the Federal Circuit explained that a fi-
nal decision by a contracting officer on a claim is a prerequisite for
jurisdiction before a BCA or in the CFC 9 In so holding, the Federal
Circuit overruled Dawco Construction, Inc. v. United States,-° which es-
tablished a dispute requirement for any claim submitted to a con-
tracting officer.5' The claim requirement persists, however, and in-
cludes "(1) a written demand, (2) seeking, as a matter of right,
43. See id. at 1484.
44. See id. at 1483.
45. See id. at 1484.
46. Id.
47. See id. On reconsideration, the Federal Circuit noted: "[t]he 'non-appropriated fund
instrumentality' exception to Tucker Act jurisdiction is a narrow one." Id. The court of ap-
peals confirmed: "As our predecessor court explained, 'U]urisdiction under the Tucker Act
must be exercised absent a firm indication from Congress that it intended to absolve the ap-
propriated funds of the United States from liability' for acts of the alleged non-appropriated
fund instrumentality." Id. (quoting L'Enfant Plaza Properties, Inc. v. United States, 668 F.2d
1211, 1212 (Ct. Cl. 1982)). The court then concluded: "'[t]he non-appropriated funds doc-
trine applies only if the activity was specifically intended to operate without using appropriated
funds.'" Id. (quoting United States v. General Elec. Corp., 727 F.2d 1567, 1570 (Fed. Cir.
1984)).
48. 60 F.3d 1572, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
49. See41 U.S.C. § 605(a) (1994) (stating that "[a]ll claims by a contractor against the gov-
ernment relating to a contract shall be in writing and shall be submitted to the contracting offi-
cer for a decision").
50. 930 F.2d 872 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The Federal Circuit overruled Dawco based on a belief
that it improperly reasoned that a CDA claim, as defined by FAR 33.201, required the amount
of the written demand to be in dispute. See Reflecton4 60 F.3d at 1575.
51. The court in Dawco believed that the FAR clearly "mandates that... a claim must seek
payment of a sum certain as to which a dispute exists at the time of submission." Dawco Constr.,
Inc., 930 F.2d at 878.
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(3) the payment of money in a sum certain."52 Thus, in many ways
like the old dispute requirement, the claim requirement allows the
government to entangle unwary contractors in a mass jurisdictional
web.
In D.L. Braughler Co. v. West,53 a contractor demonstrated that it is
not only the government that attempts to use the claim requirements
of Reflectone to its benefit. Braughler had contracted with the Army
Corps of Engineers ("Corps") to perform remedial work on a dam in
West Virginia." During the performance of the contract, Braughler
asserted that the Corps unreasonably delayed the approval of certain
shop drawings. 5 Although the Corps had extended the term for con-
tract performance, it refused to pay for the delay costs.-
Braughler subsequently submitted a certified claim to the resident
engineer, who was the authorized representative of the contracting
officer, but the resident engineer denied the claim and informed
Braughler of his appeal rights. 7 Braughler then contacted the con-
tracting officer, who also denied the claim and again informed
Braughler of his appeal rights." After Braughler failed to appeal
within the allotted time,5 9 the Corps requested that he close the con-
tract. ° Braughler refused, noting that he had not submitted a proper
claim to the contracting officer, and therefore, the contracting offi-
cer's denial was not valid.6' Braughler then requested that the con-
tracting officer issue a final decision based on a "proper claim. '62
The contracting officer refused and Braughler brought suit before
the ENGBCAi6
Before the ENGBCA, the Corps filed a motion to dismiss, arguing
that Braughler had submitted an untimely appeal of the contracting
officer's final decision.64 The ENGBCA agreed with the Corps and
52. Reflectone, 60 F.3d at 1575-76.
53. 127 F.3d 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
54. See id. at 1477.
55. See id. at 1478.
56. See id. The Corps approved an extension of the term of the contract by 180 days. See
id.
57. See id. Braughler had submitted a claim in the amount of $137,648.04. See id.
58. See id. at 1479.
59. Pursuant to the CDA, a contractor may appeal the final decision of a contracting offi-
cer to the respective board of contract appeals within ninety days or to the CFC within twelve
months. See41 U.S.C. § 606 (1994).
60. See Braughler, 127 F.3d at 1479.
61. See id. at 1479.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id. (citing the Corps' argument that ENGBCA lacked jurisdiction because the ap-
peal was untimely).
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granted the motion.s As to Braughler's argument that he had not
submitted a valid claim to the contracting officer, the Board stated
that "it offends logic if [Braughler's] specific request for a [contract-
ing officer's decision] following its certified claim [to the resident
engineer] did not establish a CDA claim."6 Braughler appealed the
dismissal to the Federal Circuit. 7
On appeal, Braughler argued that (1) the submission to the resi-
dent engineer did not constitute a claim submitted to the contracting
officer and (2) that the submission of the same claim to the contract-
ing officer was improper because it had a defective certification.6 As
to the latter, Braughler alleged that a proper certification required
execution contemporaneous with the claim.0
The Federal Circuit agreed as to the first contention."° The court
noted that because Braughler did not request that the claim submit-
ted to the project engineer be forwarded to the contracting officer,
the claim did not satisfy the requirements of the CDA.7' The court,
however, disagreed with Braughler's second argument.7 In rejecting
his argument, the court concluded that, because Braughler had not
altered the claim between its submission to the project engineer and
its submission to the contracting officer, no new certification was
needed." The court distinguished Santa Fe Engineers, Inc. v. Garrett,74
noting that that case involved a claim that had been altered between
the initial submission and a later submission . 75 Accordingly, the Fed-
65. See id. (finding lack ofjurisdiction due to failure to file timely appeal). If an appeal is
not made, a contracting officer's decision "shall be final and conclusive and not subject to re-
view by any forum, tribunal, or Government agency." 41 U.S.C. § 605(b) (1994). Therefore, if
an appeal is not made to the board within ninety days, the board has nojurisdiction. See gener-
ally Cosmic Constr. Co. v. United States, 697 F.2d 1389, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (discussing the
ninety day limit).
66. Braugher, 127 F.3d at 1479.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 1481.
69. See id. (noting Braughler's arguments on appeal). For the relevant time period, al-
though currently not a strict requirement, the CDA had also required that any claim to the
contracting officer be "certified." Id. at 1480. The certification requirement mandated that
the contractor "certify that the claim is made in good faith, that the supporting data are accu-
rate and complete to the best of his knowledge and belief, and that the amount requested ac-
curately reflects the contract adjustment for which the contractor believes the government is
liable." Id. (citing 41 U.S.C. § 605(c) (1) (1988)).
70. Seeid.at 1481.
71. See id. The Federal Circuit explained that "the letter [submitted to the project engi-
neer] gave no indication that Braughler was seeking a final decision from the contracting offi-
cer, and the letter was not forwarded to the contracting officer." Id. at 1481-82.
72. See id. at 1482.
73. See id.
74. 991 F.2d 1579, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
75. See Braughler, 127 F.3d at 1482-83. The Federal Circuit explained: "[In Santa Fe] after
making its claim submission, the contractor submitted additional supporting data for which it
provided no certification, thus violating the requirement that 'to properly certify a claim a con-
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eral Circuit affirmed the decision of the ENGBCA.
C. Privity of Contract
For jurisdiction over a government contract, privity of contract
must exist between the party seeking jurisdiction and the United
76States. In National Leased Housing Ass'n v. United States," the Federal
Circuit considered the scope of the privity of contract requirement.
The National Leased Housing Association ("NLHA"), comprising of
a group of developers and present and former owners of rental hous-
ing projects,7 8 sued the United States in the CFC under section 8 of
the United States Housing Act of 1937 ("USHA"),7 which provides
for government rent subsidies for low income individuals and fami-
lies living in non-government-owned housing.s° The members of the
NLHA and the other plaintiffs had all entered into long-term Hous-
ing Assistance Payment contracts ("HAP contracts") to provide subsi-
dized housing to low-income tenants pursuant to the USHA. Signifi-
cantly, some plaintiffs had contracted with the Department of
Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") directly, while other
plaintiffs contracted directly with the local public housing agency
("PHA"), which was subject to other obligations.8
The USHA requires that the government make "automatic annual
adjustments" ("AAAs") to the quantum of the rent based on "auto-
matic annual adjustment factors" ("AAAFs").2 Eventually, HUD real-
ized that the AAAs were resulting in overvaluation of the rental hous-
ing projects and attempted to limit the AAAs based on the AAAFs by
the use of comparability studies." Before the CFC, the plaintiffs ar-
gued that these comparability studies were improper based on the
Due Process Clause of the Constitution, the Administrative Proce-
dures Act ("APA") and the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"),
tractor must make a statement which simultaneously makes all the assertions required by' [the
certification statute]." Id. at 1483 (quoting 41 U.S.C. § 605(c) (1) (1988)).
76. See United States v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 713 F.2d 1541, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (de-
fining privity of contract as simply "evidence of the existence of some type of contract between
the party and the United States"); JOHN CIBINIC, JR. & RALPH C. NASH, JR., FORMATION OF
GOVERNMENT CONTRAcTS 963 (2d ed. 1986) (describing privity of contract requirement for
subcontractor claim).
77. 105 F.3d 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
78. See id. at 1425. The plaintiffs in the case consisted of not only the membership of the
NLHA but also 189 other individuals, who owned rental housing properties. See id.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1437(f) (1994).
80. See National Leased Housing Ass'n., 105 F.3d at 1425.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 1426 (describing HUD's attempts to bring contract rents back in line with
comparable unassisted units).
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and that use of such studies constituted a breach of contract.84 The
government, in contrast, argued that the CFC lacked jurisdiction
over the plaintiffs who had contracted with the PHAs, absent a show-
ing of privity of contract with the United States, and denied liability
as to the other plaintiffs.5 In a series of four decisions, the CFC ruled
for the government.8
On appeal, the Federal Circuit addressed six issues from the four
CFC decisions,87 five of which concerned the contract dispute.8 The
Supreme Court had previously addressed many of these issues in Cis-
neros v. Alpine Ridge Group, 9 however, the Federal Circuit found no
merit in the contract-based arguments." The sixth issue involved
privity of contract, namely, "whether the Court of Federal Claims had
jurisdiction over those owners who entered into HAP contracts with
84. See id. In at least one case, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has ruled that
the limitation of AAAs based on comparability studies was improper. See Rainier View Assocs. v.
United States, 848 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the limitation provision was a limita-
tion on calculation of a formula employed to determine rent and not an independent basis for
determining annual rent adjustments).
85. See National Leased Housing Ass'n, 105 F.3d at 1428-29.
86. See National Leased Housing Ass'n v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 762 (1995), affd, 105
F.3d 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (NLHA IV); National Leased Housing Ass'n v. United States, 32 Fed.
Cl. 454 (1994) (NLHA III) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider claims by
plaintiffs who did not enter into HAP contracts directly with HUD and that the overall limita-
tion provision in the HAP contract allows HUD to employ comparability studies to decrease
contract rents to eliminate any material differences between rents charged for assisted and
comparable unassisted units); National Leased Housing Ass'n v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 647
(1991) (NLHA II) (holding that court lacked jurisdiction over APA and FOIA claims except to
extent that such claims involved a breach of contract and that pursuant to overall limitation
provision, rent adjustments may not lead to differences in rents charged for comparable unas-
sisted units); National Leased Housing Ass'n v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 649 (1991) (NLHA I)
(holding that the provision of HUD Reform Act establishing a formula for calculating rent ad-
justments did not repeal CFC'sjurisdiction under the Tucker Act over challenges to the calcu-
lation of rent adjustments and that the overall limitation provision of HAP contracts permitted
HUD to use comparability studies and then modify the period rent adjustments accordingly).
87. See National Leased HousingAss'n I, 105 F.3d at 1430. The issues included:
whether their due process rights were violated by the way the Government proceeded
to make these periodic rent adjustments; (2) in making them, whether the Govern-
ment was obligated to comply with the APA and FOIA; (3) whether the Government,
under any theory of the contract provisions, in making an annual adjustment could
lower rents below that of the preceding year;, (4) whether the 'differences' that must
be maintained under the proviso in section 1.8d of the contracts is measured in dol-
lars or in a percentage; (5) the proper measure of damages for the Government's
breaches; and (6) whether there is privity of contract with the Government for those
who contracted through a PHA.
Id. The Federal Circuit addressed all but the fifth issue. See id.
88. See id.
89. 508 U.S. 10 (1993) (holding that respondents did not have contractual rights to for-
mula-based rent adjustments and that comparability studies are permitted).
90. See National Leased Housing Ass'n IV, 105 F.3d at 1429-31 (citing the Supreme Court's
holding that HUD's use of comparability studies was contractually authorized). The Federal
Circuit also determined that no violation had occurred pertaining to the APA or the FOLA. See
id. at 1431-33. In addition, the court concluded that HUD had properly computed the "initial
difference" for purposes of the AAAF. See id. at 1434-35.
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the PHAs rather than with HUD directly."9' As grounds for jurisdic-
tion over the PHA plaintiffs, appellants argued that the PHAs were
"agents" of the United States and that the PHAs were third-party
beneficiaries of the contracts between the PHAs and HUDY.
As to the agency argument, the Federal Circuit applied the same
law used when subcontractors have privity of contract with the gov-
emnmente 3 and concluded that the HAP contracts did not contain
"the type of direct, unavoidable contractual liability necessary to trig-
ger a waiver of sovereign immunity."94 The court also rejected plain-
tiffs third-party beneficiary argument,9 5 suggesting that if any party
had claim to third-party beneficiary status, that party would be the
96group of low-income tenants. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit af-
firmed the rulings of the CFC.9'
In National Surety Corp. v. United States,98 the Federal Circuit revis-
ited the issue of whether a third-party beneficiary has justiciable
rights in a government contract." National Surety had issued a per-
formance and payment bond to Dugdale Construction Company for
a contract with the Department of Veteran Affairs ("VA") for the con-
struction of a water distribution system.'0° The contract required that
the VA retain ten percent of all progress payments, unless Dugdale
submitted a project arrow diagram.'0 ' Although Dugdale never sub-
91. See id. at 1435.
92. See id. at 1436.
93. For an "agent" to have privity of contract with the government (usually considered in
terms of a subcontractor having privity of contract with the government), three prerequisites
must be satisfied: (1) the prime contractor "act[ed] as a purchasing agent for the government;
(2) the agency relationship between the government and the prime contractor was established
by clear contractual consent; and (3) the contract stated that the government would be directly
liable to the vendors for the purchase price." Id. (quoting United States v. Johnson Controls,
Inc., 713 F.2d 1541, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). The Federal Circuit rejected plaintiffs' "agent" ar-
gument, explaining that the PHA plaintiffs could not satisfy the third prerequisite. See id.
94. Id. The Federal Circuit explained:
In the case before us, the liability of the United States, if any, is contingent upon their
acquiescence. This is not the direct, uncontested liability that is required to fit within
this narrow exception to the general rule that the CFC does not have jurisdiction over
sub-contractor's claims against the United States.
Id. at 1436-37.
95. See id. at 1436-37.
96. Seeid. at 1436.
97. See id. at 1437.
98. 118 F.3d 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
99. For the benchmark case on the jurisdiction of a third-party beneficiary status under a
government contract, see Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. United States, 909 F.2d 495, 499 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (explaining that in order to attain third-party beneficiary status, a third-party must
establish the existence of an independent contract between the government and third-party).
100. See National Sur. Corp., 118 F.3d at 1543.
101. See id. A project arrow diagram is a detailed schedule of the critical path for perform-
ing a contract. See id.
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mitted the diagram, the VA released the retainage.12 When Dugdale
abandoned the project, National Surety completed the project pur-
suant to the bond and sued the VA for the wrongful release of the re-
tainage"'0 When the VA refused to act on the claim, National Surety
brought suit in the CFC. On a motion for summary judgment, the
court concluded that National Surety was a third-party beneficiary of
the contract.0 4 Based on its third-party beneficiary status, the CFC
held the government liable to National Surety for the release of the
retainage.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit considered the capacity of a surety
to litigate a contract between a contractor and the government.' °
With a split panel, the majority affirmed but concluded that surety
law, not third-party beneficiary law, controlled in the case. 7 Looking
to the sources of surety law, the court of appeals referenced the Re-
statement (Third) of Suretyship & Guarantee, which states that the surety
has a contractual right against the parties to the bond for any retain-
age provided in the bond.'08 On the basis of surety law, and subroga-
tion,'09 the Federal Circuit affirmed the ruling of the CFC." ° How-
102. See id. at 1543-44.
103. See id. at 1544. The amount of the retainage claim totaled $126,333, less the liquidated
damages. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id. The Federal Circuit awarded the amount that should have been retained,
$97,742, plus interest. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id.; see also Balboa Ins. Co. v. United States, 775 F.2d 1158, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(noting that "suretyship is the result of a three-party agreement").
108. See National Sur. Corp., 118 F.3d at 1544-45 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
SURETYSHIP & GUARANTEE § 37 (1996)).
109. See id. at 1544-48 The CFC had rejected a subrogation argument based on Fireman's
Fund, which held that "the government as obligee owes no equitable duty to a surety... unless
the surety notifies the government that the principle has defaulted under the bond." Id. at
1547. Courts have cited this requirement from Fireman s Fund as limiting the availability of sub-
rogation by sureties. See Transamerica Premier Ins. Co. v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 308, 314
(1994) (rejecting defendant's argument that Fireman's Fund defines the rule applicable to all
subrogation actions and holding that the decision in Fireman s Fund was intended to address the
specifics of that case); National Sur. Corp. v. United States, 31 Fed. CI. 565, 570-76 (1994) (stat-
ing that Fireman's Fund indicates that "the scope of the government's discretion to promote
performance depends on the terms the government has contracted for"). However, the Fed-
eral Circuit majority in National Surety directly limits the effect of Fireman's Fund, by noting that
"[t] he holding in Fireman's Fund did not change the rules of subrogation, but simply dealt with
the rights and obligations of the parties on the conditions of the case." NationalSur. Corp., 118
F.3d at 1547. Thus, although National Surety did not notify the government of Dugdale's de-
fault, the Federal Circuit allowed the surety to avail itself of remedies through subrogation. See
id. at 1547-48.
110. See id. at 1548. The government had argued that Dugdale and the VA had agreed to
the release of the retainage and that the agreement resulted in a modification of the contract.
See id. at 1546. The Federal Circuit rejected this contention, because the contract required a
written change order for modifications, and no written change order was issued. See id. at 1546-
47. The court emphasized: "Surety bonds are integral to the government contracting proc-
ess .... Contract terms that provide security for the bonded performance can not be ignored,
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ever, because subrogation entails equitable considerations, the court
remanded the case to determine if any mitigating circumstances ex-
isted that should offset recovery."
D. Contracting AwayJurisdiction.
As explained above, in order for the CFC or a board of contract
appeals to have jurisdiction over a contract dispute between a con-
tractor and the government, the contractor must generally first sub-
mit the contract dispute to the appropriate agency (via the contract-
ing officer), after which the contractor may appeal an adverse
decision pursuant to the CDA."2 For the appeal stage, the CDA states
that the findings of fact by the agency "shall not be binding in any
subsequent proceeding""' and that the subsequent proceeding "shall
proceed de novo in accordance with the rules of the appropriate
court."'
4
In Burnside-Ott Aviation Training Center v. Dalton,' the Federal Cir-
cuit considered the scope of a contractor's rights to appeal an agency
decision under the CDA. Burnside-Ott had entered into a cost-plus-
award-fee ("CPAF") contract with the Navy for aircraft maintenance,
repair, and overhaul at six naval air stations."6 The CPAF contract
provided that Burnside-Ott would receive all its costs plus an award
fee based on performance, but the contract failed to specify the
manner for computing the fee."7  During the performance of the
contract, the Navy computed the fee amounts based on a perform-
ance conversion chart, but Burnside-Ott argued that the Navy had to
waived, or modified without consideration of the surety's interests." Id. at 1547; see also Decisions
in Brief, 68 Fed. Cont. Rep. 166, 166 (August 18, 1997) (citing the opinion for the proposition
that "the surety bond embodies the contract principle that any material change in the bonded
contract that increases the surety's risk or obligation without the surety's consent affects the
surety relationship").
111. See National Sur. Corp., 118 F.3d at 1548. In the dissent, Chief Judge (now Senior
Judge) Archer asserted that the majority had confused two areas of the law, subrogation and
discharge. See id. at 1548-49 (Archer, C.J., dissenting). With regard to subrogation, Chief'Judge
Archer argued that there is indeed a requirement that surety give notice before a liability may
arise, thus advocating the Fireman's Fund rule. See id. at 1550-51. With regard to discharge,
Chief'Judge Archer contended that the government had effectively waived the requirement of
a progress arrow diagram. See id. at 1552-53. It should be noted that the dispute among the
members of this panel over the Fireman's Fund rule may present an issue eventually requiring
resolution by an en banc proceeding.
112. See Contract Disputes Act of 1978, 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (1994) (setting out require-
ments for filing complaints and seeking ADR, judicial review of decisions, and payment of
claims).
113. Seeid. § 605(a).
114. See id. §609(a) (3).
115. 107 F.3d 854 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
116. See id. at 856.
117. See id.
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award a fee based on a one-to-one ratio."8 The Navy refused, and
Burnside-Ott appealed." 9
Before the ASBCA, the government argued that no jurisdiction ex-
isted over the dispute, because the CPAF contract specified that the
fee award "is not subject to the 'DISPUTES' clause."'20 In contrast,
Burnside-Ott asserted that a contract clause could not destroy juris-
diction under the CDA and contended further that the Board had to
review the dispute under the CDA's de novo standard of review.
121
The ASBCA rejected both positions and held that it had jurisdiction,
but concluded that it would review the dispute under the arbitrary
and capricious standard of review.'22 Based on that standard, the
ASBCA denied the claim.1
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the government seemingly with-
drew its jurisdictional argument. 24  Further, the government con-
tended that the Board indeed had de novo review of the dispute and
sought a ruling on the merits pursuant to that standard of review.
Nevertheless, because parties cannot consent to jurisdiction, the Fed-
eral Circuit considered the jurisdictional issue. 26 In so doing, the
court of appeals concluded that contracting parties may not agree to
avoid the jurisdiction of the CDA: "Thus, any attempt to deprive the
Board of power to hear a contract dispute that otherwise falls under
the CDA conflicts with the normal de novo review mandated by the
CDA and subverts the purpose of the CDA.",
27
118. See id. Under a 1-to-1 calculation, the award fee would range from zero to 100 percent
of the award pool, as determined by the spread of performance ratings of zero to 100; thus, a
performance rating of ten would result in a award fee of ten percent of the award pool. See id.
at 856-57. Burnside-Ott had received performance rating of 93.65 but only received 84.15 per-
cent of the available award pool. See id. at 857.
119. See Burnside-Ott Aviation Training Ctr., ASBCA No. 43,184, 96-1 B.C.A. 1 28,102 (Dec.
14, 1995).
120. Burnside-Ott Aviation Training Ctr., 107 F.3d at 856 (quoting FAR 16.404-2(a)). Con-
tract clause H-21 stated the award fee would be determined according to FAR 16.404-2(a),
which states that "[t]he amount of the award fee to be paid is determined by the Government's
judgmental evaluation of the contractor's performance in terms of the criteria stated in the
contract. This determination is made unilaterally by the Government and is not subject to the
Disputes clause." Id. (quoting FAR 16.404-2(a)).
121. Seeid.at857.
122. See id. (explaining that ASBCA adopted the Wunderlich Act standard of review for in-
stances in which parties seem to have contracted away their full CDA de novo review rights).
123. See id.
124. See id. at 858. The court noted that, while the government asserted ajurisdictional ar-
gument in its brief, the government no longer maintained the argument during oral argument
before the court. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. Id. at 858; see also Michael W. Clancy, Contract Disputes Act Jurisdiction: Contract Clause
Does Not Divest ASBCA ofJurisdiction Over Award Fee Determination, 7 FED. CIR. BJ. 77, 78 (1997)
(commenting that contract provisions cannot remove appeals jurisdiction of boards such as
ASBCA). The Federal Circuit also considered a related jurisdictional argument in Emerald
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After deciding the jurisdictional issue, the Federal Circuit consid-
ered the question of which standard of review to apply: de novo or
arbitrary and capricious.'28 The court determined that both applied,
but because the contract had made the fee award final, the contract
required deference to the fee award decision, except in the instance
of arbitrary and capricious conduct.' Based on this standard of re-
view, which the ASBCA had applied (albeit for the wrong reasons),
the Federal Circuit found that the Board had ruled properly because
the contract granted the government unilateral discretion in the de-
termination of the award fee and because no evidence existed that
the agency had acted arbitrarily or capriciously in computing the
fee. ° Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the ASBCA's rul-
ing.'5 '
E. Venue
In government procurement cases, the venue or forum issue fre-
quently arises if the government argues that one of two fora has ju-
risdiction.12 If a case is brought in the wrong forum, there is no ju-
risdiction for that court or board to adjudicate the issue.'" In the
most frequent (and frustrating) of these circumstances, the govern-
ment plays a game of 'jurisdictional ping-pong" between the district
court and the CFC.'14  National Center for Manufacturing Sciences v.
Maintenance, Inc. v. United States, 925 F.2d 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1991). In that case, the Federal Cir-
cuit had determined that the CDA did not apply to labor disputes covered by the Davis-Beacon
Act. See Burnside-OH Aviation Training Ctr., 107 F.3d at 859. The Federal Circuit explained:
"[ijt is certainly true that a specific act of Congress may trump a more general act of Congress,
as in Emerald Maintenance." Id. However, because no other Act of Congress trumped the CPAF
contract, the Federal Circuit determined that Emerald Maintenance did not apply. See id.; see also
Contract Provision Cannot Deprive Board ofJurisdiction, GOV'T CONT. REP., May 7, 1997, at I ("Ac-
cording to the court, although it was true that a specific act of Congress could 'trump' a more
general act, such as the CDA, in this case, the contract provision depriving the court ofjurisdic-
tion was not a matter of statute primacy.").
128. See Burnside-OH Aviation Training Ctr., 107 F.3d at 859.
129. See id. at 859-60. The Federal Circuit recognized that the Board had given deference
to the agency's decision based on analogous cases, but found error in this analysis. See id. at
859. Instead, the court noted that the contract determined the proper standard of review. See
id. at 860.
130. See id. at 860.
131. See id. (holding that Board's deference to award fee determination, although errone-
ous, did not warrant reversal).
132. See CIBINIC & NASH, supra note 76, at 1003 (describing venue issue with regard to gov-
ernment procurement issues).
133. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. O'Leary, 117 F.3d 538, 541 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding
that the Federal Circuit Court does indeed have jurisdiction over cases arising under the Eco-
nomic Stabilization Act).
134. See, e.g., Hulsey v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 75, 77 (1993) (sympathizing with plaintiffs
while refusing to extend its jurisdiction); Doko Farms v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 696, 699
(1990), revWd, 956 F.2d 1136 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (finding district court erred in acceptingjurisdic-
tion after determining that suit was time barred); American Lifestyle Homes, Inc. v. United
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United States' 5 illustrates this all too common government litigation
tactic. National Center for Manufacturing Sciences ("NCMS") en-
tered into a cooperative agreement with the Air Force for a research
and development project. Under the agreement, although the
government's share totaled $40 million, only $24,125,000 was allot-
ted for award.'37 When the Air Force refused to distribute the re-
maining $15,875,000, NCMS sued in federal district court based on
the authority of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for
Fiscal Year 1 9 9 4 .'-" The Air Force moved to dismiss the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction, because the suit constituted a claim against the
government in excess of $10,000."9 The district court granted the
motion, transferring the suit to the CFC.'
40
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, both parties seemed to agree that
the CFC had jurisdiction over the suit.4 In fact, the government
even supported jurisdiction on the ground that a claim based on the
Appropriations Act constituted a suit seeking monetary relief under a
money-mandating statute, thus placing the claim within the jurisdic-
tion of the CFC.' 42 The Federal Circuit, however, recognized that if it
granted jurisdiction, the government fully intended to present a con-
trary argument on remand. The argument on remand would be
made pursuant to a motion for summary judgment based on the fail-
ure to state a claim, asserting that the Appropriations Act is not a
money-mandating statute. 43 Pointing out the possibility of creating a
'Jurisprudential Flying Dutchman,' 4 the Federal Circuit quickly re-
solved that the CFC lacked jurisdiction over the suit.4' Reasoning
States, 17 CI. Ct. 711,716 (1989) (explaining thatjustice warrants a retransfer to district court if
CFC lacksjurisdiction).
135. 114 F.3d 196 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
136. See id. at 198.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 197-98. The amended complaint cited four counts: (1) mandamus, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1361; (2) declaratoryjudgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201; (3) judicial review
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706; and (4) specific per-
formance. See id. at 198.
139. See id. at 198. Under the Tucker Act, the CFC has exclusive jurisdiction over all claims
against the government in excess of $10,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1994).
140. See National Cr. for Mfg. Sciences, 114 F.3d at 198. The district court transferred the case
pursuant to the federal transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1631. See id.
141. See id. at 199 (focusing on two possible obstacles to district court review). As described
herein with regard to Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Maco Bancorp, Inc., although interlocutory
rulings are generally not appealable, the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over a transfer order
made under 28 U.S.C. § 1631 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d) (4) (A). See infra notes 160-70
and accompanying text.
142. See National Ctr.for Mfg. Sciences, 114 F.3d at 199.
143. See id.
144. See id. If the CFC granted the motion for summaryjudgment, then NCMS would have
to return to the district court and begin suit once again in that forum. See id.
145. See id. at 198. The Federal Circuit noted that the first three counts of the complaint
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that an injunction would be necessary to effect a remedy under the
Appropriations Act, the court held that the complaint was not seek-
ing a "naked money judgment."146 Notably, despite the favorable rul-
ing for the government, the Federal Circuit provided a strong com-
mentary on the government's distinctive and unusual litigation tactic
regarding jurisdiction: "[N]othing is more wasteful than litigation
about where to litigate, especially when all the options are courts
within the same legal system that will apply the same law.'
47
Not surprisingly, such aggressive litigation tactics by the govern-
ment are not limited merely to suits involving the CFC. For example,
Dalton v. Southwest Marine, Inc., illustrates how this tactic is also used
in cases before the BCAs. Northwest Marine had contracted with the
Navy to repair the USS Duluth.49 After performance of the contract,
Northwest Marine filed for bankruptcy and was subsequently ac-
quired by Southwest Marine. 15° The Navy later determined that it had
overpaid Northwest Marine approximately $2.2 million, based on
certain debt concessions pursuant to the acquisition by Southwest
Marine.' Southwest Marine appealed this overpayment decision to
the ASBCA, and the ASBCA granted summary judgment in favor of
Southwest Marine.' 52
On appeal, however, the government asserted the issue ofjurisdic-
tion, arguing that only a district court has jurisdiction over a mari-
time contract.' 53  The Federal Circuit concluded that there was no
question that the contract was maritime, but proceeded to analyze
whether a transfer to the district court was proper.5 4 As an initial
matter, the Federal Circuit determined that such a maritime case
could properly be transferred from a court of appeals to a district
court.55
were not contract claims and were thus outside the jurisdiction of the court. See id. As for the
last count, pertaining to specific performance, the Federal Circuit noted that the CFC lacked
authority to grant such a remedy against the government. See id.
146. See id. at 201. The Federal Circuit noted that due to restrictions on allocation and use,
it "seems reasonably clear that a simple money judgment issued by the Court of Federal Claims
would not be an appropriate remedy." Id.
147. Id. at 197 (quoting Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 930 (1988) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting)).
148. 120 F.3d 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
149. See id. at 1249.
150. See id. at 1249-50.
151. See id. at 1250.
152. See id.
153. See id. The government argued that under 28 U.S.C. § 1631, the matter should be
transferred to district court for want ofjurisdiction. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id. The Federal Circuit emphasized that "[t]he language of section 1631 draws no
distinction between civil actions and appeals or between district courts and courts of appeal."
Id.
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The Federal Circuit next considered Southwest Marine's argument
concerning the two-year statute of limitations under the Suits in Ad-
miralty Act ("SIAA").-6 Southwest Marine argued that, if the Federal
Circuit granted the transfer to the district court, the two-year statute
of limitations would bar the claim under the CDA.57 The Federal
Circuit disagreed, noting that the contract claim arose under the
CDA and that a transfer of the CDA claim to the district court would
be consistent with the SIAA.s Significantly, the Federal Circuit ex-
plained that the two-year statute of limitations under the SIAA would
not apply to claims brought under the CDA, stating that any other in-
terpretation would turn the CDA "on its head. '59 Accordingly, the
Federal Circuit granted the motion to transfer the case to the district
court.
As demonstrated in National Center and Southwest Marine, the Fed-
eral Circuit will apply the jurisdictional statutes, despite the seem-
ingly unfair (and even unjust) efforts of the government to use these
laws to its advantage. In contrast to many contractors, the govern-
ment has relatively unlimited resources and can cause litigation to
linger endlessly. Consequently, the only refuge available for the liti-
gant is to ensure that any claim against the government is indeed
brought in the proper forum.
Fortunately, however, all jurisdictional issues regarding venue are
not based on government chicanery. In Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.
v. Maco Bancorp, Inc., 60 for example, the Federal Circuit considered
whether the court of appeals has jurisdiction over an interlocutory
ruling by a district court transferring a matter to the CFC. The FDIC
sued Maco in district court, alleging breach of contract for failure to
make good faith attempts to invest in and acquire a failing thrift sav-
ings bank. 6' Soon after the filing of this suit, Maco filed a suit in the
CFC, asserting a "Winstar claim" for breach of contract and a tak-
156. See id. at 1250-51 (citing 46 U.S.CA. App. § 745 (West Supp. 1997)). The Suits in Ad-
miralty Act, section 5, 46 U.S.CA App. § 745 (West Supp. 1997) ("SIAA) applies to all mari-
time cases. See id.
157. See id. at 1250-51.
158. See id. at 1251.
159. See id. at 1252. The Federal Circuit stated:
If the court were to hold that the Suits in Admiralty Act's two-year statute of limitations
accrues at the time a dispute arises, a party receiving an adverse decision would almost
always lose the opportunity to file a civil action while the case was winding its way
though the required administrative process. Application of the limitations period in
this manner would clearly be inconsistent with the Contract Disputes Act and its pro-
cedures allowing for and governing review of ASBCA decisions.
Id.; see also CDA Rather Than Admiralty Act Statute of Limitations Governs Suits Involving Maritime
Contract Disputes, 39 GOV'T CONTRACTOR 1546, at 14, 15 (Nov. 12, 1997).
160. 125 F.3d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
161. Seeid.at1447.
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ing.'62 Subsequently, Maco filed a motion to transfer the district
court case to the CFC.' The district court granted the motion, bas-
ing its decision on comity and the orderly administration ofjustice. 4
The FDIC appealed the transfer order&5
On appeal, the Federal Circuit immediately examined its jurisdic-
tion over the interlocutory transfer order, for which the court gener-
ally lacks jurisdiction.'6 The Federal Circuit explained that, only if
the transfer were made under 28 U.S.C. § 1631, would the court of
appeals have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (d) (4) (A). 7
28 U.S.C. § 1631 provides that "[w]henever a civil action is filed in a
court .... and that court finds there is a want of jurisdiction, the
court shall, if it is in the interest ofjustice, transfer such action or ap-
peal to any other court in which the action or appeal could have
been brought."'68 However, because the district court granted the
transfer for reasons of comity and the orderly administration ofjus-
tice, and thus not for want of jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit con-
cluded that the transfer was not made pursuant to § 1631.6 Accord-
ingly, the Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal, concluding that the
162. See id. A "Winstar claim" describes a claim that certain provisions of the Financial Insti-
tution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA") effected a breach of con-
tract or a constitutional taking of property. See United States v. Winstar, 518 U.S. 839, 870
(1996) (holding that government breached "goodwill" agreements when its regulatory agen-
cies barred the use of special accounting provisions, which negatively affected the net worth
and capital of three financial institutions, and further exacerbated this breach by seizing and
liquidating, for regulatory non-compliance, thrifts that three financial institutions had ac-
quired).
163. See Maco Bancorp, Inc., 125 F.3d at 1447.
164. See id. ("considerations of comity and orderly administration of justice dictat[e] that
only one court hear the cases."). The district court originally denied the motion to transfer,
but on a motion for reconsideration, the district court agreed to the transfer. See id.
165. See id. It is unclear from the Federal Circuit decision whether the FDIC had agreed to
the transfer order in the district court action. See id. If it had agreed to the transfer, however,
then this case would again demonstrate the government's litigation tactic of playing "jurisdic-
tional ping-pong" by agreeing to the transfer, and then after the transfer is made, appealing the
transfer.
166. See id. The Federal Circuit explained that "[g]enerally, a transfer order is interlocu-
tory and thus not immediately appealable, but appealable only incident to a final judgment in a
case." Id.; see also Katz v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 909 F.2d 1459, 1460-61 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating that
"change of venue is not an appealable action"), cited in Maco Bancorp, Inc., 125 F.3d at 1447.
167. See Maco Bancorp., Inc., 125 F.3d at 1447-48. As recognized by the Federal Circuit, 28
U.S.C. § 1292(d) (4) (A) provides:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive juris-
diction of an appeal from an interlocutory order of a district court of the United
States... granting or denying, in whole or in part, a motion to transfer an action to
the United States CFC under [28 U.S.C.] section 1631 ....
Id. at 1447.
168. 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (1994).
169. See Maco Bancorp, Inc., 125 F.3d at 1448. The Federal Circuit explained, "because the
district court was not purporting to transfer the case on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction, it
was not acting pursuant to section 1631 and therefore there is no jurisdiction for this court to
review the district court's decision at thisjuncture." Id.
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change in venue order was not subject to an interlocutory appeal.'70
F. Statute of Limitations
If a party seeks to pursue a claim after the statute of limitations has
expired, the claim is considered time-barred and nonjusticiable.'
7 1
Thus, if a claim accrues outside the scope of the statute of limitations,
there would be no jurisdiction for a court to adjudicate the issue.1
In Brown Park Estates-Fairfield Development Co. v. United States,'73 the
Federal Circuit considered a common case where the contractor
waited too long to seek judicial redress.' 74 Brown, along with a num-
ber of other plaintiff entities, owned and operated rental apartment
facilities subsidized by contracts made pursuant to the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974' 7" ("HCDA"), known as the
"Section 8" program.' 76 Under the HAP contracts, HUD provided
rent subsidies for low-income persons who lived in privately-owned
dwellings.'" According to the HAP contracts, HUD was to adjust the
rental rates at least on an annual basis.'78 However, Brown alleged
that between 1986 and 1988 and again in 1991, HUD failed to make
the proper rent adjustments. '7 In 1994, Brown brought suit in the
CFC, alleging a breach of the HAP contracts.'s
170. See id. Although not specified by the district court, the Federal Circuit noted that the
transfer was most likely made pursuant to either 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), "for convenience of par-
ties and witnesses," or 28 U.S.C. § 1406, to cure wrong venue. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404,
1406 (1994)).
171. See Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 278-74 (1957) (deciding that the statute cre-
ating the Court of Claims created a strict six-year limitation). The Federal Circuit has ex-
plained that the statute of limitations is an express limitation on the Tucker Act's waiver of sov-
ereign immunity. See Hart v. United States, 910 F.2d 815, 817 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that
conditions to waive sovereign immunity must be strictly construed). Indeed, for claims before
the CFC, "every claim of which the United States CFC has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the
petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim first accrues." 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (1994).
172. See 28 U.S.C. § 2501. For purposes of section 2501, a claim accrues within the meaning
of the statute of limitations "when all the events have occurred which fix the liability of the
Government and entitle the claimant to institute an action." See Brighton Village Assocs. v.
United States, 52 F.3d 1056, 1060 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quoting Kinsey v. United States, 852 F.2d
556, 557 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
173. 127 F.3d 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
174. See id. at 1449-53.
175. Pub. L. No. 93-383,88 Stat. 633,653-67 (1974).
176. See Brown, 127 F.3d at 1450-51 (citing Pub. L. No. 93-883, 88 Stat. 633, 653-67 (1974)).
The HCDA actually amended the United States Housing Act of 1937. See id. at 1450 (citing 42
U.S.C. § 1437(0 (1994)). The "Section 8" program involves a housing program "[flor the pur-
pose of aiding low-income families in obtaining a decent place to live and of promoting eco-
nomically mixed housing." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1437(0 (a)).
177. See id. at 1451. The subsidies received under the Section 8 program were based on the
rental price, which was based on fair market value as initially set by HUD. See id.
178. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1437(0 (c) (2) (A)).
179. See id. at 1453.
180. See id.
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Before the CFC, the government moved to dismiss the suit on the
ground that plaintiffs' claims had accrued more than six years prior
to the filing of the suit. 8 ' Brown opposed the motion, arguing that
its suit was proper under the continuing claims doctrine.'82 The CFC
granted the motion to dismiss with the exception of the 1991 adjust-
ment claim.'83
In reviewing Brown's continuing claims doctrine argument, the
court applied the two-part test described in Polite v. United States.'84
Applying this test, the court found that the claims were (1) not "en-
trusted to an administrative officer or tribunal for determination,"' 5
and (2) indicative of the "exercise of expertise and discretion."'' r Ac-
cordingly, the CFC deemed the doctrine inapplicable.'87
On appeal, Brown argued that the government had been under a
continuing duty to make proper rent adjustments for the 1986-88 pe-
riods and the contracts were, therefore, subject to the continuing
claims doctrine."" Under this theory, even though HUD made
proper adjustments after 1988, the later rent adjustments were never
proper because they were all based on erroneous adjustments during
the 1986-88 periods.' 89 The Federal Circuit rejected this analysis out
of hand.' 90 The court noted that for Brown to prevail, each alleged
failure by HUD to make a proper rent adjustment had to give rise to
a new claim. '9 Because the allegedly improper rent adjustments were
all based on events that took place between 1986 and 1988 and that
181. See id. For all plaintiffs who had contracted directly with HUD, the government argued
that the suit was barred by the statute of limitations, citing 28 U.S.C. § 2501. See id. The gov-
ernment further demanded that, as the claims first arose in 1986, more than six years had
passed since the basis for the claims occurred. See id. at 1454. In addition, for the one plaintiff
who had contracted with a local entity, Stone Vista Apartments, the government argued that
there was no privity of contract and, thus, nojurisdiction. See id. at 1453; see also supra notes 77-
97 and accompanying text (discussing National Leased HousingAssociation v. United States).
182. See Brown, 127 F.3d at 1454. For a definition of the doctrine, see infra note 191.
183. See id. (stating that CFC found the statute of limitations to apply).
184. 24 Cl. Ct. 508, 510 (1991). The two-part Polite test provides that: "First, the subject
matter of the claim must not be one which Congress has entrusted to an administrative officer
or tribunal for a determination of claimant's eligibility for the pay sought. Second, the case
should involve narrow factual issues and should not involve the exercise of expertise and dis-
cretion." Brown, 127 F.3d at 1454.
185. Brown, 127 F.3d at 1454.
186. See id.
187. See id. The CFC also dismissed the claim by Stone Vista, noting that there was no priv-
ity of contract and that it therefore lackedjurisdiction. See id.
188. See id. at 1455.
189. See id.
190. See id. Notably, the Federal Circuit did not reach the issue of the appeal by Stone Vista
regarding privity of contract. See id.
191. See id. at 1456. In Friedman v. United States, 310 F.2d 381, 384-85 (Ct. Cl. 1962), the
Court of Claims noted that the continuing claims doctrine allowed certain "periodic pay
claims" to avoid the statute of limitations. See Brown, 127 F.3d at 1456 (citing Friedman, 310 F.2d
at 384).
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did not continue beyond February 1988, the court found no basis to
apply the continuing claims doctrine. 2 Thus, because the suit was
not filed until October, 1994, more than six years after the adjust-
ments, the Federal Circuit concluded that the statute of limitations
applied and affirmed the CFC's dismissal. 3
In contrast to the above situation, sometimes the contractor at-
tempts to benefit from the statute of limitations. Indeed, in Motorola,
Inc. v. West,'94 a contractor attempted to use the statute of limitations
to block a claim submitted by the government.'9 5 In the name of the
prime contractor, Motorola, the subcontractor, Aydin Corporation
("Aydin"), appealed a price reduction based on a dispute over the
computation methodology used for general and administrative
("G&A") expenses. '  In 1986, the Defense Contract Audit Agency
("DCAA") audited a proposal by Aydin, in which Aydin had included
a G&A rate of 45 percent. 197 Two years later, in 1988, the DCAA
audited Aydin and, in 1991, issued an audit report reducing the al-
lowable G&A rate from 45 percent to 24 percent, resulting in a rec-
ommended price reduction of $933,787.'0 Although the contracting
officer eventually reduced the recommended price reduction to
$784,219,200 Aydin appealed to the ASBCA, which affirmed the price
reduction. 2°'
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Aydin asserted that either of two
statutes of limitations barred the government's claim for a price re-
duction: (1) the statute of limitations at 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) con-
cerning actions for money damages brought by the United States or
(2) the statute of limitations added by the Federal Acquisition
Streamlining Act of 1994 ("FASA") 202 to the CDA.2 3 The court re-
192. See id. at 1457. The Federal Circuit stated that "[a]s far as the six years prior to filing
suit are concerned, appellants do not contend that HUD failed to make rent adjustments dur-
ing those years." Id.
193. See id. at 1452, 1458-59 (stating that "claims arising from HUD's failure to make rent
adjustments in earlier years... accrued when each such failure occurred").
194. 125 F.3d 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
195. See id. at 1471.
196. See id. at 1471-72.
197. See id. at 1472. Aydin had submitted a subcontract proposal to Motorola pursuant to a
Motorola contract with the Army. See id. In the proposal, Aydin refused to disclose its costs
data, which included its G&A rate. See id.
198. See id.
199. See id. at 1472. The price reduction dealt with the facilities capital charge. See id. Dur-
ing the original audit, this charge had not been discovered, but following the subsequent
audit, the charge was disallowed, resulting in the recommended price reduction. See id.
200. See id. The difference between the $993,787 recommended price reduction and the
$784,219 price reduction involved a change in the baseline, which was computed by the con-
tracting officer before imposing the actual price reduction, See id.
201. Seeid.
202. Pub. L. No. 103-355, 108 Star. 3243 (1994) (setting the statute of limitations at 180
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jected application of 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a), holding that a price reduc-
tion is not an "action for money damages.,,204 The Federal Circuit
also rejected application of the statute of limitations in the FASA,
recognizing that the FAR mandates that the FASA statute of limita-
tions only applies prospectively.205 Thus, in the absence of any other
rationale to challenge the price reduction, the Federal Circuit af-
firmed the ruling of the ASBCA.2°
G. Finality
For the Federal Circuit to have jurisdiction over an appeal, the de-
cision on which the appeal is based must be a final decision of the
court below. 2°1 In AAA Engineering & Drafting, Inc. v. Widnall,2" the
Federal Circuit emphasized the requirement of finality, stating that a
board ruling must be final both as to liability and damages before the
. . . . 209
appellate court can entertain jurisdiction.
In AAA Engineering, AAA Engineering ("AAAE") had a service op-
tion contract with the Air Force to provide storage, maintenance, and
processing of historical and negative files. 210 The contract required
that AAAE develop a computerized negative storage system pursuant
to certain technical specifications.2"1 After performance of the con-
tract, the Air Force paid the contract price in full.21 2  Thereafter,
days).
203. See Motorola, 125 F.3d at 1472-74.
204. Id. at 1473. The Federal Circuit explained: "[T]he challenged ["CDA"] action is not
an 'action for money damages brought by the United States,' as expressly required by the stat-
ute. Instead, it is an administrative appeal by a contractor from a contracting officer's decision
that the contractor owes the Government the amount of certain disallowed costs." Id. (citing
S.E.R.,Jobs for Progress, Inc. v. United States, 759 F.2d 1, 5 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
205. See id. In resolving this issue, the Federal Circuit cited FAR 33.206(b): "The 6-year
period [for a claim initiated against a contractor] shall not apply to contracts awarded prior to
October 1, 1995." 48 C.F.R. § 33.206(b) (1996); see also Following Up..., 39 GOV'T
CoNTRAcrOR 1 490, at 17 (Oct. 8, 1997) (reciting holding of Federal Circuit regarding statute
of limitations and FASA).
206. See Motorola, 125 F.3d at 1474 (explaining that Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act's
six-year statute of limitations did not apply retroactively and that Motorola did not satisfy obli-
gations under the Truth in Negotiations Act to submit subcontractor's cost data).
207. SeeFlanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 263 (1984) (reversing the Court ofAppeals
because no jurisdiction existed before the final order). The doctrine of finality also applies to
cases before the boards of contract appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (10) (1994) (providing for
appellate review "of an appeal from a final decision of an agency board of contract ap-
peals...").
208. 129 F.3d 602 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
209. See id. at 605.
210. See id. at 602.
211. See id. The contract required that the storage system be compatible with the Air
Force's Z-248 computer system and that the storage program be compatible with MS DOS,
Word Star Professional Word Processing Software, and Dbase III (Database Management Soft-
ware). See id.
212. See id. at 603. The contract price was $28,350. See id.
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when AAAE did not receive the follow-on contract, the Air Force in-
213
structed AAAE to deliver the storage system to the new contractor.
AAAE refused and the Air Force had to send government personnel
to pack and ship the equipment.214 At that time, the Air Force dis-
covered that the system did not meet the technical specifications de-
fined in the prior contract and accordingly demanded a refund of
the price of the system.2 5 AAAE appealed, but the contracting officer
denied the appeal, finding AAAE liable for $121,809.50. 216 Next,
AAAE appealed to the ASBCA, which found AAAE liable and re-
manded the matter to the parties for negotiation of the quantum on
damages.
217
On appeal, the Federal Circuit considered its jurisdiction over a
board decision for which a ruling on liability had issued but no rul-
ing had been made as to damages.18 Citing Teller Environmental Sys-
tems, Inc. v. United States,219 the Federal Circuit held that if a contract-
ing officer issues a decision based on both liability and quantum, an
appeal cannot be final until adjudication of both the liability and the
damages issues.20 The court of appeals further explained:
The doctrine of "finality," under the historical federal rule, has
generally allowed appellate review only when a judgment has
wholly disposed of a case, adjudicating all rights and ending the
litigation on the merits. Thus a judgment encompassing both li-
ability and damages, as a general rule, has been the prerequisite of
appellate review.
Observing that "[t]his case is on all fours with Teller," the Federal
Circuit concluded that it had no jurisdiction over the appeal.2 No-
tably, AAAE had argued that the court of appeals could consider the
issue of the storage system separately from other segregable issues in
the appeal, but the Federal Circuit specifically rejected this argu-
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See zd. Instead of the Dbase program, AAAE used the Data Flex program, which was
not only contrary to the contract but also incompatible with the Dbase program used by the Air
Force. See id.
216. See id. Because the storage system was incompatible with the technical specifications,
the Air Force had to contract for a replacement system. See id. The amount demanded by the
Air Force also reflected the charges of shipping and moving the AAAE equipment to the new
contractor. See id.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. 802 F.2d 1385, 1388 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that finality is satisfied "where a judg-
ment has wholly disposed of a case").
220. SeeAAA Eng' 129 F.3d at 603.
221. Id. at 604 (citations omitted).
222. See id. (finding that the lack of finality defeated the court's jurisdiction).
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ment.223
H. Dismissal or Summaty Judgment
As discussed above, to establish jurisdiction of the CFC, a party
must show compliance with the Tucker Act.224 The government fre-
quently responds to a claim brought under the Tucker Act by filing a
motion to dismiss for either lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b) (1)
of the Rules of the CFC ("RCFC") or for failure to state a claim under
RCFC 12(b) (4).2 On occasion, the CFC has summarily granted
these motions in their entirety, a practice that has been criticized by
the Federal Circuit.
22
In Trauma Service Group v. United States,27 the Federal Circuit re-
viewed yet another case from the CFC involving the grant of a mo-
tion to dismiss based alternatively on arguments of lack of jurisdic-
tion and failure to state a claim. 8 Trauma Service Group ("TSG")
had entered into a "Memorandum of Agreement" ("MOA") with the
Winn Army Community Hospital ("WACH"), for the provision of cer-
tain health care services under the Civilian Health and Medical Pro-
gram of the Uniformed Services ("CHAMPUS").m The MOA specifi-
cally required that TSG provide "[t]wo physicians, one RN, one LPN,
one appointment clerk/receptionist, one billing clerk, a Xerox ma-
chine and, office supplies during duty hours. '' 3' During the term of
the MOA, TSG terminated the agreement and, thereafter, submitted
a claim for reimbursement to the WACH.23' TSG subsequently
223. See id. at 604-05. In disposing of AAAE's segregability argument, the Federal Circuit
concluded: "To (consider the issues separately] would suggest that the historical requirement
of finality, expressly imposed by Congress, was subject to individual exception and judicial
waiver." Id. at 605. Notably, the Federal Circuit explained that this rule of finality does not ap-
ply in certain circumstances, such as "those classes of cases in which Congress has created an
explicit waiver to the finality rule such as, for example, appeals over orders 'granting, continu-
ing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions,' certified appeals, and appeals from judg-
ments in patent infringement cases that are 'final except for an accounting.'" Id. (citations
omitted).
224. See generally Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (asserting that an employee's claim that she was serving pursuant to a contract in the
complaint would be enough to satisfy Tucker Act).
225. Rule 12(b)(1) of the Court of Federal Claims parallels Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b) (1) (lack of jurisdiction), and Court of Federal Claims Rule 12(b) (4) parallels Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted).
226. See Gould, Inc. v. United States, 67 F.3d 925, 931 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (warning that
"Ijiustice delayed is indeed justice denied").
227. 104 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
228. See id. at 1324.
229. See id. at 1323.
230. Id. at 1324.
231. See id. The first MOA began on August 20, 1990, and expired on June 30, 1992. See id.
The second MOA extended the terms of the MOA through September 30, 1994. See id. How-
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sought to recover the costs associated with providing an x-ray techni-
232
cian, a position allegedly required by WACH under the MOA. Be-
fore the CFC, the government moved to dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction under RCFC 12(b) (1), or alternatively, failure to state a
claim under RCFC 12(b) (4).233 The CFC, however, granted the gov-
ernment's motion on both grounds.234
On appeal, the Federal Circuit quickly rejected the CFC's dismissal
for lack of jurisdiction.23 ' Citing Spruill v. Merit Systems Protection
Board, 'the Federal Circuit noted that "[a] well-pleaded allegation in
the complaint is sufficient to overcome challenges to jurisdiction. 23 7
Because TSG had alleged a proper basis for subject matter jurisdic-
tion, the court of appeals found the dismissal legally erroneous.238
The Federal Circuit found the dismissal for failure to state a claim
to be proper.23 The court noted that, to state a claim upon which re-
lief could be granted, TSG had to allege either an express or implied-
in-fact contract and a breach thereof. The court determined that
TSG could allege neither.24° With regard to the express contract, the
Federal Circuit concluded that TSG could not allege a breach, and
without a breach, the issue of a valid contract was moot.24' The court
further concluded that TSG could not allege the proper authority for
an implied-in-fact contract.242 Therefore, although the court found
that the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was indeed improper, it
concluded that the dismissal for the failure to state a claim was
proper and, accordingly, affirmed the CFC's ruling.43
ever, on December 8, 1993, TSG instructed WACH that the MOA would terminate on March 8,
1994. See id.
232. See id. TSG sought to recover the costs of the x-ray technician for the years 1990
through 1993, for a total claim of $95,816.71. See id.
233. See id.
234. See id. (stating that court based its decision to dismiss on both lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and failure to state a claim).
235. See id. at 1325.
236. 978 F.2d 679, 686 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
237. Trauma Service, 104 F.3d at 1325.
238. See id. (holding that TSG's allegation was sufficient to grant subject matter jurisdiction
to CFC); see also Gould, Inc. v. United States, 67 F.3d 925, 929 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("[t]he distinc-
tion between lack ofjurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
is an important one: '[T]he court must assume jurisdiction to decide whether the allegations
state a cause of action on which the court can grant relief.'") (quoting Do-Well Mach. Shop,
Inc. v. United States, 870 F.2d 637, 639-40 (Fed. Cir. 1989)) (citation omitted).
239. See Trauma Service, 104 F.3d at 1325.
240. See id.
241. See id. at 1325 (explaining that breach was not possible because TSG alleged no con-
tractual obligations which defendant failed to perform).
242. See id. at 1325-27 (explaining that to establish implied-in-fact contract, a contractor
must show that contract was entered into with an authorized agent of government).
243. See id. at 1328.
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In Total Medical Management, Inc. v. United States,244 the Federal Cir-
cuit reviewed a factually similar case in which the government had
submitted a motion to dismiss for lack ofjurisdiction or, alternatively,
for failure to state a claim. Total Medical Management ("TMM") had
entered into a "Memorandum of Understanding" ("MOU") with the
Army for the provision of primary and pediatric care for Army de-
pendents.24'5 Although the MOU called for the Army to reimburse
TMM for medical costs based on "75% of the current CHAMPUS
prevailing rate,2 46 the Army only compensated TMM based on the
prevailing rates as listed in the Medicare Economic Index (MEI) .27
TMM protested the lower payments, but the Army contended that it
authorized payment at either the 75 percent rate or the MEI, which-
ever rate was lower. 48 TMM subsequently filed a claim for $52,742.28
with the Army, representing the difference between the contract rate
and the MEI, but the Army denied authority to adjudicate the
claim.24" TMM then filed an action in the CFC. The court granted
summary judgment for TMM, finding that the Army had breached
the contract by using the MEI instead of the rate specified in the con-
tract.25
°
On appeal, the government raised ajurisdictional issue for the first
time, arguing that the CFC lacked jurisdiction because there was no
enforceable contract between TMM and the Army.2s Once again cit-
ing Spruill v. Merit Systems Protection Board,2 the Federal Circuit re-
jected this argument, noting that "the law is clear that, for the CFC to
have jurisdiction, a valid contract must only be pleaded, not ulti-
mately proven." 253 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit concluded that
the actual issue regarded the existence of a claim upon which relief
244. 104 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
245. See id. at 1316-17. In 1956, Congress established a health plan for the dependents of
members of the uniformed services, which was implemented through the Civilian Health and
Medical Program of the Uniformed Services ("CHAMPUS"). See id. at 1316. Under the plan,
military hospitals and private health care companies were allowed to create facility-sharing ar-
rangements, called either "Memoranda of Understanding" ("MOU") or "Memoranda of
Agreement" ("MOA"). See id.
246. See id. at 1317.
247. See id. at 1316-17. Technically, TMM processed all requests for reimbursement
through a fiscal intermediary (here, the Associated Group) for the processing and payment of
claims, but for simplicity, this Article simply refers to the Army. See id.
248. See id. at 1318.
249. See id. (stating that the Army recognized TMM's contract allegations, but denied the
existence of a contract).
250. See id. at 1318-19.
251. Seeid.at 1319.
252. 978 F.2d 679, 686-87 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (explaining that jurisdiction is not defeated by
the mere possibility that a complaint may ultimately fail to state a cause of action).
253. TotalMedica4 104 F.3d at 1319. The Federal Circuit explained, "[t ] here is no question
that TMM pleaded the existence of a valid contract here." Id.
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could be granted.24
To determine whether TMM had presented a claim upon which re-
lief could be granted, the court turned its attention to the contract
itself. Although it determined that a contract existed between TMM
and the Army,2 the court nevertheless held that the contracts were
void.2 The court noted that the applicable regulations clearly des-
ignated that the reimbursement to health care providers would equal
the lowest of the billed charge, the prevailing rate, or the MEI.s7 As
the MOUs obtained by TMM did not conform with this regulatory
requirement, the MOUs were illegal and void ab initio.s8 Subse-
quently, the court reversed and remanded the suit with instructions
to dismiss based on TMM's failure to state a valid claim.29
In both Trauma Service Group and Total Medical Management, the
Federal Circuit rejected government motions to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction and granted government motions to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. As explained in
these cases, if a valid contract is pleaded, then jurisdiction exists, per
Spruill v. Merit Systems Protection Board. Trauma Service Group and Total
Medical Management stand for the proposition that the disposition of
alternative motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or failure to
state a claim are not legally proper. The only question is how long it
will take for the CFC to recognize these clear rulings and dispose of
the typical alternative motions proffered by the government for vir-
260tually every contract case.
II. CONTRACT FORMATION
In government procurement, the formation of a contract deals
with the contractual relationship created between the United States
and a second party, the contractor.261 Because one party to this gov-
ernment procurement contract is the United States, there are many
special considerations for the establishment of this unique two-party
254. See id.
255. See id. at 1320. The Federal Circuit reasoned that "the MOU was ratified by a govern-
ment representative with the authority to bind the United States in contract. Thus, we hold all
elements for a contract were met by the MOUs." Id.
256. See id. (finding that MOUs met basic requirements for a government contract, but vio-
lated CHAMPUS regulations).
257. See id.
258. See id. at 1320-21.
259. See id. at 1321. Notably, the court explains that TMM had actual notice of the regula-
tory requirements, requiring reimbursement of the lowest rate (including MEI). See id.
260. SeeManiere v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 410, 414 (1994) (discussing different views of
dismissal under 12(b) (1)).
261. See CIBINIC & NASH, supra note 76, at 1 (discussing rights of parties to government con-
tracts).
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A. Bids and Proposals
The most basic component of contract formation deals with the so-
licitation and establishment of a contract.2  In government pro-
curement, a contract is generally solicited by one of two methods: an
invitation for bids ("IFB") or a request for proposals ("RFP") .24 Fre-
quently, disputes-known as "bid protests-arise with regard to the
procedures concerning an IFB or an RFP. '268 One frequent basis for
a bid protest is a mistake in the bid, either by the contractor or the
government.
26
In McClure Electrical Constructors, Inc. v. Dalton,67 the Federal Circuit
explained the options available to a contractor in the event the con-
tractor makes a mistake in a bid. The Navy had issued an IFB for the
construction of an electrical substation at a naval center in Louisville,
KY2. 8 McClure submitted the lowest bid at $145,000. 26 Based on per-
formance requirements, the Navy had estimated the contract would
cost $282,869.270 Because of the disparity between McClure's bid and
the government estimate, the Navy requested verification of the
$145,000 bid price.2 7' The request for verification included a list of
the other bids as well as the government estimate.2n McClure con-
firmed the accuracy of the bid and the Navy awarded it the con-
tract.
273
After completion of the contract, McClure determined that it had
274lost money on the contract and reviewed its bid calculations. At
that time, McClure first discovered that it had made a mistake in cal-
culating the bid and then requested reformation of the contract.2
The contracting officer rejected the reformation request, and the
ASBCA upheld the contracting officer's decision.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit considered the requirements for
262. See id.
263. See id. at 151.
264. See id. at 387, 522.
265. See id. at 1005.
266. See id. at 480.
267. 132 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
268. See id. at 710-11.
269. See id.
270. See id.
271. See id.
272. See id.
273. See id.
274. See id.
275. See id.
276. See id.
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27
recovery based on a unilateral mistake in a bid.. Explaining that the
recovery for a mistake in a bid depends upon five items of proof,78
the court noted that this appeal only involved one item of proof, the
279
adequacy of the government's request for verification. McClure
argued that the Navy's request for verification was inadequate be-
cause it did not specify a suspected error in the bid.280 McClure also
asserted that the Navy frequently sends requests for verification as a
matter of "standard operating procedure., 28' The court rejected
McClure's arguments, ruling that a request for verification contain-
ing the government's estimated contract price as well as the other
competing bids would sufficiently enable a contractor to discover any
likely bid mistake. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
ASBCA.
283
B. Authority
The most frequently disputed precept in the formation of a gov-
ernment contract concerns the presence or absence of authority, of
both the government official to enter into a contract and the gov-
ernment itself to enter into a specific contract.24 Authority is exceed-
ingly important in government procurement cases because if a con-
tractual transaction occurs without proper authority, the government
is not held responsible and thus not liable, regardless of the equi-
ties. In LDG Timber Enterprises, Inc. v. Glickman,' the Federal Cir-
cuit considered which party has the burden of proving whether a
government official had the requisite authority. LDG had contracted
277. See id.
278. To obtain reformation of a contract, the contractor must show by clear and convincing
evidence that: (1) a mistake in fact occurred prior to award of contract; (2) the mistake was a
clear-cut mathematical or clerical error;, (3) prior to the award of the contract the government
knew or should have known that a mistake had been made in the bid; (4) the government did
not request bid verification or the request was inadequate; and (5) proof of the intended bid is
established. See id. at 711.
279. See id.
280. See id.
281. See id. The contracting officer denied such a practice. See id.
282. See id. at 712. The Federal Circuit explained that, because the contracting officer did
not have a copy of the contractor's worksheets, the contracting officer could not have known of
the bid mistake. See id. The court noted that in such circumstances, the contracting officer can
only send the contractor a request for verification, along with a copy of the government's esti-
mate of the contract price and the competing bids. See id.
283. See id.
284. See CIBINIC & NASH, supra note 76, at 62-63.
285. See Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947) (explaining that a con-
tractor who enters into an agreement with an agent of the government bears the risk that the
agent is acting outside the bounds of his or her authority, even when the agent is unaware of
limitation to his or her authority).
286. 114 F.3d 1140 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
1998] 1425
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAw REvIEw [Vol. 47:1393
with the Forest Service to harvest certain quantities of timber, pursu-
ant to the "Blackstone Timber Sale" in the Sierra National Forest and
the "Boundary Timber Sale" in the Sequoia National Forest.287 While
LDG was logging the Blackstone area, a fire occurred in the Bound-
ary area, and the Forest Service requested that LDG move its opera-
tions from the Blackstone area to the Boundary area to harvest the
timber in the fire-affected areas.28 LDG agreed to the transfer after
the Forest Service promised to extend any logging deadlines in the
Blackstone area based on the number of days spent at the Boundary
area. 2  When LDG sought these extensions, however, the Forest
Service refused, and LDG appealed to the AGBCA,2" which denied
LDG's claim for damages.2'
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the government argued that the
contracting officer had no authority to promise an extension of time
for logging in the Blackstone area.2 The government further ar-
gued that LDG had the burden of proving that the contracting offi-
cer had the requisite authority, and absent such proof, the overn-
ment must prevail under Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill. The
court rejected the government's argument and distinguished Federal
Crop Insurance.
When the actions of the contracting officer are within the authority
that pertains to the subject matter of the contract, and no statute
or regulation limits that authority, as in Federal Crop Insurance, the
agency bears the burden of coming forward with evidence of lack
of authority for the actions of the contracting officer.
287. Seeid.at 1141.
288. See id.
289. See id. Under the contract, the Blackstone Timber Sale required completion by June
25, 1988, and the Boundary Timber Sale required completion by March 31, 1992. Id.
290. See id. at 1142.
291. See id. LDG initially sued seeking specific performance, but the AGBCA does not have
jurisdiction over claims not seeking money damages. See id. Accordingly, LDG filed a new suit
for damages, based on the failure to extend the time for logging in the Blackstone area. See id.
292. See id.
293. See id. (citing Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947)) (explaining that
anyone who enters into an arrangement with the government assumes the risk of having accu-
rately ascertained that the person acting on behalf of the government is acting within his or her
authority and holding that Wheat Crop Insurance Regulations are binding regardless of actual
knowledge of what is in the regulations or of hardship resulting from innocent ignorance).
294. See LDG Timber Enters., 114 F.3d at 1143. The Federal Circuit emphasized that "[wihen
the contracting officer administers a contract with which the officer is charged, the promises
and representation made by the officer, when within the scope of the subject matter of the con-
tract can not be avoided by simply disclaiming the contracting officer's authority when the con-
tract reaches litigation." Id. The court also indicated frustration with the government's use of
the authority argument in virtually every contract case: "This burden [of coming forward with
evidence of lack of authority] is not met simply by attorney allegation in a litigation context."
Id. Thus, under the court's ruling, the government must come forward with positive evidence
of a lack of authority to satisfy its burden. See id. This ruling appears to place a critical limita-
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Ironically, despite the favorable ruling on authority, the ruling of the
AGBCA was affirmed on other grounds. 5
In American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. United States,an however,
the ruling of the Federal Circuit was anything but favorable to the
contractor on the issue of authority. In 1987, AT&T had purportedly
entered into a $19 million fixed-price contract with the Navy to de-
velop and produce a new ship-towed, undersea surveillance system
known as the "Reduced Diameter Array" ("RDA") . After AT&T
completed the contract, it submitted a claim for approximately $60
million based on higher contract costs. 8
In the suit before the CFC, the parties submitted cross-motions for
summary judgment, and the CFC ruled that the contract was invalid
for lack of authority.2" In particular, the court held that the contract
was illegal pursuant to the 1987 Department of Defense Appropria-
tions Act, which forbade any fixed-price contract in excess of $10
million."' Although the court suggested that AT&T could still re-
cover under quantum meruit, the CFC nevertheless immediately cer-
tified the case for an interlocutory appeal .
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reviewed the relevant provision of
the Appropriations Act, which stated that "[n]one of the funds pro-
vided for in this Act may be obligated or expended for fixed-price
type contracts in excess of $10,000,000 for the development of a ma-
jor system or subsystem.""" AT&T argued that the Act rendered the
contract invalid, while the government contended that the Act did
not apply." Indeed, the government argued that because the con-
tion on the application of Federal Crop Irmurance.
295. See id. at 1143-44 (concluding that the Forest Service met its commitment). Although
the government failed to prove that the contracting officer did not have authority to extend the
term of the logging contract, the Federal Circuit concluded that the Forest Service had never-
theless provided extensions equal to the requisite term of any extension. See id.
296. 124 F.3d 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
297. See id. at 1472. The RDA is part of the "Surveillance Towed-Array Sensor System"
("SURTASS"), which provides undersea surveillance of submarines. See id.
298. See id. at 1473. The initial ceiling price of the Navy contract was $19 million. See id.
The price was eventually raised to $34.5 million, but AT&T claimed that the contract cost over
$60 million, significantly more than the $34.5 million contract price. See id.
299. See id. (noting that the trial court found it had jurisdiction to award relief for unjust
enrichment).
300. Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 8118, 101 Stat. 1329-84 (1987).
301. See AT&T, 124 F.3d at 1473.
302. See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d) (2) (1994 & Supp. 1998) (describing the provision
for an interlocutory appeal).
303. AT&T, 124 F.3d at 1472-73.
304. See id. AT&T argued that the contract was void pursuant to the 1987 DOD Appropria-
tions Act in an apparent attempt to obtain a reformation of the contract as a cost-type contract.
See id. If the court had agreed with this argument, the Federal Circuit postulated that AT&T
would have been entitled to recover all of its costs on the contract. See id. The government, on
the other hand, took the position that the contract was valid, in an attempt to forestall any addi-
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tract did not pertain to the development of a "major system" pursu-
ant to the Act, the contract was valid.305 After a thorough review of
the Act and the legislative history, the Federal Circuit disagreed, con-
cluding that the $19 million contract was clearly "a major system or
subsystem" under the Act.3°0 Accordingly, the court concluded that
the contract was void from its inception307 and affirmed the CFC's rul-
ing.308
Absent authority for the fully performed contract, the Federal Cir-
cuit next considered what other relief might be available to AT&T."
Surprisingly, if not incredibly, the court concluded that no relief was
apparent.310 The CFC had concluded that, in view of the completed
contract, AT&T was entitled to recover for quantum meruit as an
implied-in-fact contract. The Federal Circuit, however, reversed this
ruling, explaining that "[a] n implied-in-fact contract arises when, in
the absence of an express contract, the parties' behavior leaves no
doubt that what was intended was a contractual relationship permit-
ted by law." '12  The court concluded that because there was no
authority for the contract under the Department of Defense Appro-
priations Act, there was no contractual relationship permitted by
law.3 '3 Thus, in a split decision with one dissent, the court granted
tional recovery by AT&T. See id. However, it is quite unlikely that the government anticipated
that AT&T would have no right to any compensation for the performance of the completed
contract. See id.
305. See id. at 1474 (noting that the Act only prohibits major system or subsystem fixed price
contracts in excess of $10 million).
306. See id. at 1477.
307. See id. The Federal Circuit reasoned that, "[n]o valid contract was or could be entered
into in [the] face of the express congressional prohibition [in the 1987 DOD Appropriations
Act)." Id. at 1478.
308. See id.
309. See id.
310. See id. The court qualified this in the last paragraph of the decision when it offered:
"This is not to say that AT&T is without any remedy." Id. at 1480. However, the majority was
unable to muster any further basis for AT&T to recover for its performance of a multi-million
dollar contract: "Whether AT&T may replevy the goods, or bring an appropriate action for the
value of its wrongful retention and use by the Government, is not before us." Id. at 1482.
311. See id. As explained in the decision, "[q]uantum meruit is the name given to an im-
plied-in-law remedy for unjust enrichment." Id.
312. Id.
313. See id. As authority for its ruling on quantum meruit, the CFC cited United States v. Am-
dahl Corp., 786 F.2d 387 (Fed. Cir. 1986). See id. at 1478. In Amdah the Federal Circuit ex-
plained:
Where a benefit has been conferred by the contractor on the government in the form
of goods or service, which it accepted, a contractor may recover at least on a quantum
valebant or quantum meruit basis for the value of the conforming goods received by the
government prior to the rescission of the contract for invalidity.
Amdahl, 786 F.3d at 393. The Federal Circuit found this case unhelpful, however, explaining
that "Amdahl is distinguishable from plaintiff's situation because contracting authority was not
at issue in the case." AT&T, 124 F.3d at 1482. This holding seems to conflict with Gould, Inc. v.
United States, 67 F.3d 925 (Fed. Cir. 1994). In Goud, the author of the AT&T decision ex-
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judgment in favor of the government on the ground that AT&T had
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.3 4 As the
dissent emphasized, AT&T seems to stand for the proposition that a
contractor is responsible for knowing whether the government has
authority to enter into a government contract.35 Notably, the dissent-
ingjudge in AT&Tauthored the decision in LDG Timber, which may
explain the apparent inconsistency of these cases.
As AT&T illustrates, the single issue of authority cannot only in-
validate a contract but can also leave a contractor without any practi-
cal remedy for a properly and fully performed contract.316 As such, a
contractor should consider the ramifications of asserting that a gov-
ernment contract was void from its inception.
In Whittaker Electronic Systems v. Dalton,1 7 REL, Inc. ("REL") had ini-
tially agreed to design, fabricate, and test a simulator of certain Soviet
long-range radar for the Air Force under an "individual option con-
tract," pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 2304.318 Whittaker later acquired REL
and thus acquired the obligations under the contract.319 Due to vari-
ous delays, the cost of the contract exceeded both parties' expecta-
plained that "a contractor can be compensated under an implied-in-fact contract when the
contractor confers a benefit to the government in the course of performing a government con-
tract that is subsequently declared invalid." Gould, 67 F.3d at 930 (citing Amdahl, 786 F.3d at
395).
314. See AT&T, 124 F.3d at 1480. In a well-reasoned dissent, CircuitJudge Newman empa-
thized with the dilemma faced by AT&T. See id. (Newman, J., dissenting) Judge Newman
opined that the majority improperly held AT&T responsible for the Navy's failure to abide by
the 1987 DOD Appropriations Act. See id. Further, Judge Newman argued that it was simply
inappropriate to render the contract invalid: "Not every violation of a statute or regulation,
nor the failure to comply with a congressional request for reports and internal approvals, ren-
ders a contract void or invalid." Id. FinallyJudge Newman asserted that the majority improp-
erly construed the Act, noting that legislative intent could surely not render the result imposed
by the court, thus denying AT&T any remedy after full performance. See id. at 1481. Judge
Newman then concluded:
The panel majority's retroactive invalidation of the Reduced Diameter Array contract
is contrary to the rules of contract, contrary to precedent, and contrary to the statute
on which the majority relies. The contract was not illegal, and it was fully performed.
Thus I must, respectfully, dissent from the majority's ruling.
Id. at 1482.
315. See Federal Circuit Voids Fixed-Price R&D Contract C Remedy in Doubt, 39 GOv'T
CONTRACTOR 1 502, at 6 (Oct. 22, 1997). Given this onerous burden on contractors, as well as
the curious lack of remedies available to AT&T pursuant to this contract rendered void from
inception, one can only hope that the Federal Circuit will revisit this ruling on reconsideration
or in an en banc proceeding. See Federal Circuit Voids AT&T SURTASS Contract, Cites Section 8118
Bar on Fixed-Price R&D, 68 FEDERAL CONTRACTS REP. 9, 10 (1997) (explaining that AT&T has
submitted a motion for reconsideration or in banc proceedings).
316. SeeJohn Cibinic, Jr., Invalid Contracts: What Are a Contractor's Remedies?, 11 NASH &
CIBINIC REP. § 61, at 5, 8-9 (1997).
317. See 124 F.3d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
318. See id. at 1444 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (1994)). The contract included a compensa-
tion scheme based on a fixed price plus incentive fee contract. See id.
319. See id.
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tions, and Whittaker sought an equitable adjustment."' The ASBCA
denied the claim, and Whittaker appealed.""
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Whittaker asserted that the con-
tract was void ab initio and hoped to obtain reformation after per-
formance.32 In support of his position, Whittaker presented three
arguments relating to the government's authority to enter into the
contract: (1) that the contract violated 10 U.S.C. § 2304; (2) that the
contract violated DAR 1-1502; and (3) that the contract violated
DOD Directive 5000.1 or DAR 1-334.323
Whittaker first argued that 10 U.S.C. § 2304 only allowed the de-
velopment of a system, not the integration of a test system into a
working system. 4 The court quickly rejected this contention as too
narrow a reading of the statute.325 Whittaker next argued that DAR 1-
1502 prohibited the use of options in contracts with "undue risks."'
The court, ruled, however, that because Whittaker, by its acquisition
of REL, had accepted the terms of the contract and the contract's ob-
ligations without protest, it had waived any right to object under this
regulation. 7 Finally, Whittaker argued the option provisions vio-
lated DOD Directive 5000.1 or DAR 1-334.'28 The court again re-
jected Whittaker's argument, finding both the DOD directive and the
DAR provision wholly inapplicable.3 29 Accordingly, finding no basis
for the challenge to the government's authority to enter into the
above contract, the court affirmed the ASBCA's ruling.33 Given the
320. See id. at 1445.
321. See id.
322. See id.
323. See id. at 1445-47 (noting that 10 U.S.C. § 2304 requires an advertising and bidding
process; DAR 1-1502 limits the use of options; and DAR 1-334 limits the inclusion of ceiling
priced production options).
324. See id. at 1445 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (1988)); see also Defense Indus. v. United
States, 38 Fed. Cl. 489, 493 n.9 (1997) (explaining that section 2304 results in a contracting
officer choosing a procurement method which causes a part of system to be purchased at a
noncompetitive price).
325. See Whittaker, 124 F.3d at 1445-46 (holding that statutory language encompasses a new
integrated system).
326. See id. at 1446. DAR 1-1502(b) (ii) provides in relevant part: "Option clauses shall not
be included in contracts, and options provisions shall not be included in solicitations if... the
contractor would be required to incur undue risks (e.g., the price or availability or necessary
materials or labor is not reasonably foreseeable)." DAR 1-1502(b) (ii).
327. See Whittaker, 124 F.3d at 1446; see also Federal Circuit Upholds Air Force's Inclusion of Pro-
duction Options in Fixed-Price R&D Contract, 68 Fed. Cont. Rep. 11, 11-12 (1997) (discussing
waiver aspects of this case and noting that by completing the contract, Whittaker waived
grounds to void the contract on the basis of a regulatory violation).
328. See Whittaker, 124 F.3d at 1446.
329. See id. The Federal Circuit deemed the DOD directive inapplicable because the direc-
tive did not even mention options. See id. The court found the DAR regulations inapplicable
because they applied only to "major systems." See id. (citing DAR 1-334).
330. See id. Whittaker also presented two other arguments: (1) that the Air Force had mis-
represented the capabilities of the Soviet radar and (2) that the Air Force had breached its duty
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possibility of an outcome like that in AT&T, Whittaker may be satis-
fied with this affirmance.
C. Anti-Deficiency Act
Neither a federal employee nor a governmental entity may enter
into a contract for the future payment of money in excess of existing
appropriations, pursuant to the Antideficiency Act.3 ' Any contract
that conflicts with this Act will be deemed void.332 In Cessna Aircraft
Co. v. Dalton,3 the Federal Circuit considered the application of the
Antideficiency Act. Beginning in 1984, Cessna had a contract with
the U.S. Navel Air Station in Pensacola, Florida to provide training
and related technical and maintenance support for undergraduate
naval flight officers for five program years. 3 Upon the expiration of
the first contract in 1988, the contract provided for a three year op-
tion, which the Navy had to exercise by the beginning of that fiscal
year, October 1, 1988.33 Because October 1, 1988 fell on a Saturday,
the Navy requested permission to exercise the option on October 3,
but Cessna refused. 3" On October 1, 1988, the Navy exercised the
option, "CONTINGENT ON CONGRESSIONAL PASSAGE OF THE
FY89 APPROPRIATION ACT."337 Because the Navy exercised the op-
tion without funding, Cessna asserted that the exercise of the option
was in violation of the Antideficiency Act and thus void.3 Accord-
ingly, Cessna filed a claim for compensation based on work per-
of cooperation. See id. at 1446-47. Although there was evidence that the Air Force had not fully
disclosed the extent of the Soviet capabilities, the Federal Circuit concluded that no misrepre-
sentation had occurred. See id. Further, the court of appeals noted that Whittaker had submit-
ted an inadequate showing of a breach of the duty to cooperate. See id.
331. 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994). The Antideficiency Act provides:
An officer or employee of the United States Government or of the District of Colum-
bia may not (A) make or authorize expenditure or obligation exceeding amount
available in appropriation or fund for the expenditure or obligation; (B) involve ei-
ther government in a contract or obligation for the payment of money before appro-
priation is made unless authorized by law.
Id. § 1341 (a) (1) (A)-(B); see also CIBINIC & NASH, supra note 76, at 31 (describing role of Antide-
ficiency Act in government procurement).
332. See, e.g., Hercules Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 417 (1996) (explaining that the Act
also applies to contracts by implication); Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. United States,
622 F.2d 539, 542 n.4 (CL Cl. 1980) (explaining that contract provision stating that govern-
ment's liability was dependent on accessibility of appropriated monies from which full payment
could be satisfied was designed to protect against Anti-Deficiency Act violation).
333. 126 F.3d 1442 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
334. See id. at 1444.
335. See id. Each option ran for a period of one year based on a typical fiscal year, thus
from October 1 through September 30. See id.
336. See id. at 1444-45.
337. See id. at 1445. The Navy faxed the execution of the option to Cessna on Saturday, Oc-
tober 1, 1988, which Cessna discovered on Monday, October 3, 1988. See id.
338. See id.
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formed in the absence of a valid contract. The ASBCA denied the
claim, finding that the Navy had properly executed the option."9
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the primary consideration in-
volved the role of the Antideficiency Act.m4 The court noted that, al-
though the Antideficiency Act generally prohibits multi-year con-
tracts, a special statutory provision permits the government to enter
into special military contracts with performance periods of five years,
plus three years in options.Y Continuing, the court observed that
the Act dictates that if funds are not appropriated for a term of such
a contract in a given year, the "contract shall be canceled or termi-
nated.''M 2 Although conceding that the Navy contract was properly
established under the Act, Cessna contended that the option was im-
properly exercised by the Navy before the approval of appropriations
for the option year. 3 The court disagreed, reasoning that "the rele-
vant statutory provisions do not prohibit government agencies from
incurring contractual obligations before completing the apportion-
ment process. 344  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
ASBCA.
D. Third-Party Beneficiary
In contracts with the government, third parties sometimes claim
entitlement to certain rights provided by government contracts. 345 In
339. See id. at 1446. After the completion of the contract, Cessna submitted a claim to the
contracting officer for $25.7 million, based on the costs of the work performed under the con-
tract. See id. When the contracting officer did not issue a decision within sixty days, Cessna
filed a claim in the ASBCA. See id.
340. See id. at 1448-49. The Federal Circuit explained that "the Antideficiency Act finds its
origins in a statute enacted in 1870, known as the Act ofJuly 12, 1870, ch. 251, § 7, 16 Stat. 230,
251." Id. at 1449. The court further noted:
The statute addressed the problem that Executive Branch officials were obligat-
ing funds before they were appropriated by Congress, and then making defi-
ciency requests for appropriations that Congress had little choice in deciding be-
cause government agencies had basically committed the United States to make
good on its promises.
Id. at 1448-49.
341. See id. at 1449-50 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 2306(g) (1994)).
342. See id. (citing 10 U.S.C. § 2306 (g) (3) (1998)).
343. See id. Cessna cited a number of sources for the proposition that an obligation may
not be established by the government prior to the appropriation of funds, including 10 U.S.C.
§ 1512 (requiring appropriated funds); 10 U.S.C. § 1517 (prohibiting obligation of funds that
exceed appropriations); Department of Defense Accounting Manual § 4a, at 22-6 (providing
that appropriations are required before obligation of funds); and NAVY COMPTROLLER MANUAL
§§ 073002(2), 073100 (establishing a funding process, first requiring appropriation, then allow-
ing obligation of funds). See Cessna Aircraft, 126 F.3d at 1449-50.
344. Id. at 1450. The Federal Circuit concluded: "Thus, we hold that the CO's exercise of
the option did not violate the Antideficiency Act even though funds were obligated before they
were apportioned." Id. at 1452.
345. See GEORGEW. SCHWARTZ, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS § 1.1 at 1-13 (1994).
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such situations, the principal issue is whether these parties are able to
claim a "third-party beneficiary status" under the government con-
tract.m" Two cases have generally guided the CFC's analysis and con-
sideration of third-party beneficiary status, Baudier Marine Electronics
v. United States47 and Schuerman v. United States.48  Unfortunately,
these two cases espoused different tests, and the CFC had since pro-
vided little guidance.
In Montana v. United States,149 the Federal Circuit finally resolved
the analytical conflict between Baudier and Schuerman. Great Western
Sugar Co. ("Great Western") operated sugar processing plants in
Montana and provided self-insurance for its workers as allowed under
the Montana Workers' Compensation Act.3" The Commodity Credit
Corporation ("CCC"), an agency of the United States,35 had ap-
proved a number of price support loans to Great Western based on
quantities of sugar beets as collateral. When Great Western subse-
quently declared bankruptcy, however, the bankruptcy court sold the
sugar beets to offset corporate debts. 352 Montana asserted a first lien
against the proceeds of the sugar beets sale, but pursuant to a settle-
ment agreement between the CCC and the bank lenders, the CCC
obtained a superior lien to the sale proceeds.353
Based on claims made by injured workers at Great Western, Mon-
tana subsequently brought suit in the CFC to recover funds ex-
354pended in workers compensation claims. Montana's principal ar-
346. See id.
347. 6 Cl. CL 246, 249-50 (1984) (dismissing plaintiff's motion for summary judgment for
failing to show they were intended third-party beneficiaries and stating that no express or im-
plied warranty in the contract guaranteed the subcontractor's payment). The two-part Baudier
test for third-party beneficiary status examines: (1) whether the contract reflects the intent to
benefit the third-party; and (2) whether the contract gives the third-party the direct right to
compensation or to enforce that right to compensation against the promissor. See id. at 249.
The Baudier court based the second part of the test on the right of members of the public to
bring suit to obtain public services. See H.F. Orchards v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 601, 609-10
(1984) (suggesting that members of public must have more than injury from a contract which
benefits them; rather, some manifestation of intent between contracting parties that members
of public will be directly compensated by defaulting party is required).
348. 30 Fed. Cl. 420 (1994) (holding that although plaintiffs satisfied the intended benefi-
ciary test, they failed to meet other contract terms that were conditions precedent). The
Schuerman test for third-party beneficiary status involved only the first part of the Baudier two-
part analysis. See id. at 433.
349. 124 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
350. See id. at 1270-71.
351. See id. at 1271. Pursuant to the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 714 (1994), the CCC provides price support to producers or farmers of agricultural com-
modities. See7 C.F.R. § 1435.37 (1983) (explaining CCC's loan program regulations).
352. See 124 F.3d at 1271 (noting that sale of sugar beets netted $3,182,390).
353. See id. at 1272. Under the settlement agreement, the CCC received $28,136,427.47,
plus interest. See id.
354. See id. (seeking money damages in the amount of $667,759.63, plus interest, represent-
ing the amount paid by Montana to the workers who filed worker compensation claims).
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gument was that it was a third-party beneficiary under the terms of
the settlement agreement. 355 The CFC rejected this argument and
granted summary judgment to the government, concluding that the
settlement agreement did not make Montana a third-party benefici-356
ary.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit considered whether the Baudier test
or the Schuerman test was the proper test for determining third-party
beneficiary status. The court concluded that the Schuerman test was
the proper test and that under this test, a party may only qualify as a
third-party beneficiary if the contract reflects the express or implied
intention of the parties to the contract to benefit the third-party. 3
The court further clarified the new standard: "The intended benefi-
ciary need not be specifically or individually identified in the con-
tract, but must fall within a class clearly intended to be benefited
thereby."35 9
Pursuant to the Schuerman test, the court next considered whether
the settlement agreement contained language that gave rise to such a
"clear intent" to benefit Montana.s ° Concluding that both the set-
tlement agreement and the implementing regulations of the CCC
indicated that the CCC was to have priority on any liens against fed-
eral and state entities, the court ruled that Montana could not have
been a third-party beneficiary to the settlement agreement. 6 ' Ac-
cordingly, the ruling of the CFC was affirmed.
III. CONTRACr ADMINISTRATION
The cornerstone of contract administration in government pro-
curement involves interpretation of the terms of the contract.362 In
the construction or interpretation of a contract, the Federal Circuit
355. See id.
356. See id. (holding that Montana was not an intended third-party beneficiary of the set-
tlement agreement because CCC's lien took priority under congressionally mandated statutes
and regulations).
357. See id. at 1273.
358. See id.
359. Id.
360. See id. at 1274.
361. See id. at 1275 (explaining that regulatory provisions providing that no liens or encum-
brances may be placed on sugar once a loan is approved, and stipulation that any local or state
regulations inconsistent with this are inapplicable, mean that Montana laws cannot be used to
usurp priority of CCC's lien). Montana had argued that Montana state law provided a basis for
its third-party beneficiary argument. The Federal Circuit disagreed, explaining that "[t]he
statute provides that state law shall not apply to 'contracts or agreements of the Corporation or
the parties thereto.' State law is therefore not applicable to the contracts of CCC or, in the al-
ternative, to the parties to such contracts." Id. at 1276 (citation omitted).
362. See CIBINIC & NASH, supra note 76, at 102.
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exercises plenary or de novo review on an appeal. 63 Therefore, the
court owes no deference to the interpretation given the contract by
the lower tribunal.'6
In interpreting any contract, the Federal Circuit first looks for the
plain meaning of the contract.35 If the provisions of the contract are
clear, the court is obliged to give the contract its "plain and ordinary
meaning.""" However, if the terms are ambiguous and a judicial in-
terpretation must be made, the court will interpret the contract "as a
whole" and "in a manner which gives reasonable meaning to all its
parts and avoids conflict or surplusage of its provisions."67
A. Interpretation (Ambiguity)
If a government contract is ambiguous, the interpretation of its
terms is more difficult.m To mitigate this difficulty, courts have de-
veloped a judicial rule distinguishing two forms of ambiguity, each
involving different invocations of responsibility for the ambiguity.'6
In cases of a latent ambiguity, the government maintains responsibil-
ity for the ambiguity. In such cases, courts will interpret the ambigu-
ity against the drafter (the government) if the interpretation of the
non-drafter is reasonable, 7 ' and apply the rule of contra proferentemY'
In cases of a patent (or plain) ambiguity, the contractor maintains
the responsibility for the ambiguity.37 In such a case, the contractor
has the burden to inquire of the government, regarding the ambigu-
ous language, before even bidding on the contract.3 7 If the contrac-
363. SeeAerolineas Argentinas v. United States, 77 F.3d 1564, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting
that the interpretation of contracts is why circuit courts exercise plenary review on appeal).
364. See id.
365. See McAbee Constr., Inc. v. United States, 97 F.3d 1431, 1435 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("A con-
tract is read in accordance with its terms and the plain meaning thereof.").
366. See Alaska Lumber & Pulp Co. v. Madigan, 2 F.3d 389, 392 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding
that the plain language of contract is controlling).
367. See Granite Constr. Co. v. United States, 962 F.2d 998, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (referring
to this rule as a "well-established rule ofjudicial interpretation").
368. See CIBINIC & NASH, supra note 76, at 162.
369. See id.
370. See Interstate Gen. Govt. Contractors, Inc. v. Stone, 980 F.2d 1433, 1434 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (stating that it is well-settled that ambiguities in contracts are resolved against the
drafter).
371. See CIBINIC & NASH, supra note 76, at 162. As explained below, however, the Federal
Circuit has now described a latent ambiguity as "the general rule" and a patent ambiguity as "an
exception to that general rule." See infra notes 403-419 and accompanying text (discussing
Triax Pacific, Inc. v. West and explaining the legal test for ambiguity).
372. See Beacon Constr. Co. v. United States, 314 F.2d 501, 504 (Ct. Cl. 1963) (explaining
that if contractor interprets ambiguity for its benefit, it does so at its own peril).
373. See Dalton v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 98 F.3d 1298, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (asserting that
patent ambiguity creates a duty of inquiry irrespective of a contractor's reasonable interpreta-
tion); see also Fortec Constructors v. United States, 760 F.2d 1288, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (dis-
cussing the duty of inquiry and stating that consideration of trade standards and practices of
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tor fails to abide by this duty of inquiry, the ambiguity is construed
against the contractor. 74
In United International Investigative Services v. United States,3 71 the
Federal Circuit considered a typical dispute involving an ambiguity in
a contract. United International Investigative Services ("UIIS") had
contracted with the Air Force to provide security services at the New
Boston Air Force Tracking Station in Amherst, New HampshireY.37
The "Performance Work Statement" ("PWS") for the contract elabo-
rated: "This is not a contract for night-watchmen or minimal guard
services; it is a contract for a fully trained security police force ....
Actual police service, as in the Armed Forces of the United States or
in the police force of a civilian governmental unit in the United
States, is required. ''377 Another provision in the contract, however,
described "comparable civilian experience," which UIIS interpreted
to mean two years of experience, either as a police officer or as a se-
curity officer. 78
When the Air Force insisted on actual police experience, UIIS
brought suit in the CFC alleging an ambiguity between the two
clauses in the contract and seeking an additional $494,315.67."" The
CFC ruled that the contract contained a latent ambiguity. Noting
that the contractor had espoused a reasonable interpretation of the
disputed contractual provisions, the court applied the doctrine of
contra proferentem and construed the contract against the govern-
ment.so
On appeal, the Federal Circuit completely disagreed with the in-
terpretation rendered by the CFC381 Questioning the CFC's finding
of an ambiguity, the court observed that "lIt] he Scope of Work stated
in clear and unambiguous terms that 'actual police service' was re-
quired .... It is difficult to imagine a clearer statement, and we
the relevant business community is proper in cases of patent ambiguity).
374. See CIBINIC & NASH, supra note 76.
375. 109 F.3d 734 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
376. See id. at 735. At the time of contract formation, UIIS was known as United Security
Unlimited, Inc. ("USUI"), but during the performance of the contract, it changed its name to
UIIS. See id.
377. Id. at 736. In the context of this contract, the PWS is the same as a "Scope of Work"
clause. See id.
378. See id.
379. See id. UIIS had allegedly bid on the contract anticipating the use of a two year experi-
ence requirement for police officers or security officers, but the Air Force required actual po-
lice experience. See id. at 736. Because of this requirement, UIIS sustained greater costs. See
id.
380. See id. The CFC did not, however, award any damages. Although the court concluded
that the contract indeed contained a latent ambiguity, the court also found that UIS had failed
to prove that the ambiguity had resulted in any damages. See id.
381. See id. at 737-38.
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commend the drafters for including it. ''ss2 The court similarly dis-
missed UIIS' interpretation of the contract, explaining that "'compa-
rable civilian service' simply means actual police experience.",83
The court, however, focused its criticism on the CFC's analysis of
latent ambiguity. 4 In its analysis, the court set forth the two-step
process for determining whether an ambiguity exists: (1) is there an
ambiguity (that is, do both parties proffer a reasonable interpretation
of the disputed contract provision?); and (2) is the ambiguity patent
(that is, is the ambiguity plain, obvious, or glaring?)'ss Noting that
the CFC had confused and intermingled these two steps, the court
ruled that the disputed contract provisions were not ambiguous, and
because the contractor had not proffered a reasonable interpretation
of the contract terms, there was no reason to even consider the exis-
tence of a patent or latent ambiguity.s Accordingly, the court re-
versed the ruling of the CFC. 7
In Lockheed Martin IR Imaging Systems, Inc. v. United States,8 the
Federal Circuit considered another common dispute over an ambi-
guity in a government contract. In response to an IFB, Lockheed
Martin IR Imaging Systems, Inc. ("LMIR") bid a 100% option to fab-
ricate and deliver a quantity of 779 detector cooler assemblies and
779 accompanying warranties of supplies to the United States Army
Communications Electronics Command ("CECOM"). 9 The 100%
option included a unit price of $9,415 for each detector cooler as-
sembly and $389 for each warranty of supplies.39 The bid did not
contain terms for lesser quantities or varying option pricesY.
CECOM accepted the bid, but later sent LMIR a "supplemental con-
tract addendum," which stated that the contract was not for a 100%
option but for a quantity up to the 100% option. 2  Subsequently,
CECOM ordered only 135 units at a unit price of $9,415.-93 Contend-
382. Id. at 738.
383. See id.
384. See id.
385. See id. (citing Grumman Data Sys. Corp. v. Dalton, 88 F.3d 990,997 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
386. See id. Nevertheless, to the extent that any ambiguity existed, the Federal Circuit em-
phasized that it was patent. See id. Because a patent ambiguity requires a duty to seek clarifica-
tion, the court explained that UIIS was not entitled to rely upon its interpretation of the dis-
puted contract provision. See id.
387. See United IntyIInvestigative Servs., 109 F.3d at 738.
388. 108 F.3d 319 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
389. See id. at 320. Under the original contract, the offeror was Loral Infrared & Imaging
Systems ("Loral"), but LMIR succeeded to the interest of Loral in this claim. See id.
390. Seeid.at321.
391. See id.
392. See id. Notably, CECOM sent this supplemental addendum to LMIR after CECOM had
accepted the bid at the 100% option. See id.
393. See id.
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ing that CECOM had changed the terms of the contract, LMIR sub-
mitted a claim to the contracting officer for additional compensa-
tion.94 The contracting officer denied the claim based on a contract
term that allegedly required bidders to include quantities of less than
100% in the bids.95 On appeal, the ASBCA agreed that the contract
required less than a 100% optionS96
On appeal, the Federal Circuit considered whether the contract
provided for the right to offer a 100% option.9 7 CECOM argued that
the terms of the contract were patently ambiguous, while LMIR ar-
gued that, if any ambiguity existed, it was latent.98 The court con-
cluded that, when reading the contract as a whole, the terms clearly
indicated a right to offer a 100% option.39 Accordingly, the court
held that the contract terms were not patently ambiguous:
A contract provision is deemed to be patently ambiguous if it is sus-
ceptible of two different yet reasonable interpretations, each of
which is consistent with the contract language and with the other
provisions of the contract, and if the ambiguity would be apparent
to a reasonable person in the claimant's position.
The court also noted that CECOM attempted to resolve any ambi-
guity that may have existed with the "supplemental contract adden-
dum," but concluded that this addendum failed to remedy the flawed
solicitation.40' Accordingly, through the application of a somewhat
394. See id. at 321-22.
395. See id. at 322 (stating the Army's argument that notification was provided by section M-
2 of solicitation, which stated that the contract was not a 100% option).
396. See id. (explaining that ASBCA agreed that the contract was not for a 100% option and
that any quantity could have been ordered at the same unit price that Loral had offered for a
100% option).
397. See id.
398. See id. at 322-23.
399. See id. at 323. The Federal Circuit described the contract dispute as follows:
The solicitation included a line item for a 100% option. Loral bid a 100% option.
Section H-4a.... provided that the government could 'require' delivery of the option
'identified in Section B,' which was the 100% option, while section M-2 stated that a
bidder 'may' offer additional option prices for varying option quantities and order
dates. Loral reasonably read the solicitation as not requiring it to offer other than a
100% option, and did not do so. When the Army awarded the contract to Loral, Lo-
ral's bid terms were accepted.
Id.; see also Michael W. Clancy, Contract Options: Options Must Be Exercised in Exact Accord with
Their Terms, 7 FED. CIR. B.J. 78, 79 (1997) (citing Lockheeds affirmance of contract options prin-
ciple).
400. Lockheed Martin, 108 F.3d at 323.
401. See id. The Federal Circuit explained: "The regulations permit no additions or
changes after the bid is opened." Id. (citing FAR 14.101(d)). Thus, the court reasoned that
CECOM's attempt to remedy the ambiguity with the "supplemental contract addendum," con-
stituted a material change in the terms of the contract. See id.; see also Addendum Impermissibly
Changes Terms of Sealed Bid Solicitation, Gov't Cont. Rep. (CCH) 2 (May 23, 1997). Accordingly,
the court concluded that a constructive change had occurred. See id.; see also Loral Entitled to
Price Adjustment for Partial Exercise of 100% Option, Federal Circuit Rules, 67 Fed. Cont. Rep. 308,
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different legal approach than used in United International Investigative,
the court concluded that "if there is no facial ambiguity, the criterion
is whether the contractor reasonably interpreted the contract, apply-
ing the usual rule of contra proferentem against the contract drafter."4 2
Because the contractor applied a reasonable interpretation of the
contract, the Federal Circuit reversed the ruling of the ASBCA.
Both United International Investigative and Lockheed Martin IR dem-
onstrate similar analyses of cases involving conflicting contractual
terms. In both cases, the Federal Circuit resolved the disputes by
finding that no ambiguity existed. Yet, in reaching these conclusions,
the court relied on seemingly conflicting recitations of law to deter-
mine whether an ambiguity existed.
In Triax Pacific, Inc. v. West,403 the Federal Circuit attempted to re-
solve this conflict by expressly setting forth the applicable legal test
for ambiguity.44 Triax Pacific, Inc. ("Triax") contracted with the
Army for the renovation of twenty-one military housing units at Fort
Shafter, Hawaii. 4"' Because Triax submitted a bid of $1,593,500,
which was well below the government estimate, the Army requested
and received verification of the bid price.4°6 During the performance
of the contract, however, a dispute arose over the painting require-
ments of the contract4 °7 Ultimately, Triax agreed to paint the dis-
puted areas and later seek an equitable adjustment.4°8 When the con-
tracting officer denied the request for an equitable adjustment, Triax
appealed to the ASBCA, claiming that the painting requirements of
the contract were ambiguous.409 The ASBCA held that the contract
was not ambiguous and sustained the interpretation of the Army.410
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the Army again argued that the
contract was not ambiguous, while Triax argued that the contract was
308-09 (1997) (briefing the Federal Circuit decision in Lockheed Martin).
402. Lockheed Martin, 108 F.3d at 322.
403. 130 F.3d 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
404. See id. at 1475.
405. See id. at 1471. The contract required the construction of new lanais (covered,
screened patios) on each housing unit, consisting of a concrete construction with a wooden
roof. See id.
406. See id. The government's estimated cost of the project was $1.9 million. See id.
407. See id. The Army interpreted the contract as requiring the painting of the concrete
and wood roof beams for the lanais, but Triax had interpreted the contract as not requiring
any painting of these areas pursuant to customary commercial practice. See id. at 1471-72.
408. See id. at 1472.
409. See Appeal of Triax Pacific, Inc., ASBCA No. 44,645, 96-2 B.CA (CCH) 28,468
(1996), affd sub nom. Triax Pacific, Inc. v. West, 130 F.3d 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Because the
contract included certain curing requirements for the concrete, Triax argued that the contract
was ambiguous: If the concrete had to be painted, the curing time requirements and the paint-
ing time requirements could not be read consistently. See id. Triax further explained that
painting of the roof wood beams was contrary to customary commercial practice. See id.
410. See id.
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ambiguous, contending that the terms of the contract clearly could
not require the scope of painting asserted by the Army.41' The court,
however, rejected both arguments, observing that "[w]e are left with
a situation in which neither Triax nor the government can harmo-
nize all provisions of the contract., 41 2 In such a scenario, the Federal
Circuit concluded that the contract would have to be read against
one of the parties.4'3 The court then considered whether the ambigu-
ity was patent and subject to the contractor's duty of inquiry, or latent
and subject to the doctrine of contra proferentem.'1'
Significantly, the court emphasized that if a contract contains an
ambiguity, it is not the general rule to interpret such ambiguity as
patent.415 In this case, however, the court determined that the ambi-
guities in the contract were "so apparent" that a patent ambiguity was
clear and application of the duty of inquiry was unavoidable. Ac-
cordingly, though on other grounds, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
ruling of the ASBCA.4 7
In Triax, the Federal Circuit explained that if a contract contains
an ambiguity, the ambiguity will be considered a latent ambiguity as a
"general rule" and the doctrine of contra proferentem will apply.4 8 The
court further emphasized that finding a patent ambiguity (and appli-
cation of the duty of inquiry) is "an exception to that general rule. 41 9
Consequently, in future cases dealing with ambiguities in govern-
411. See id. at 1473-74.
412. Id. at 1474.
413. See id. (explaining that neither the government's nor Triax's interpretation was satis-
factory and concluding that contract terms could not be reconciled with one another).
414. See id. at 1475. The Federal Circuit explained:
The patent ambiguity doctrine is a court-made rule that is designed to ensure, to the
greatest extent possible, that all parties bidding on a contract share a common under-
standing of the scope of the project. That objective is particularly important in gov-
ernment contracts, in which significant post-award modifications are limited by the
government's obligation to use competitive bidding procedures and by the risk of
prejudice to other potential contractors.
Id. The court also described the contractor's duty of inquiry: "[Tihe duty of inquiry prevents
contractors from taking advantage of ambiguities in government contracts by adopting narrow
interpretations in preparing their bids and then, after the award, seeking equitable adjustments
to perform the additional work the government actually wanted." Id.
415. See id. (stating that the patent ambiguity doctrine is only to be applied to contract am-
biguities meeting the "patent" and "glaring" standard).
416. See id. Notably, the Federal Circuit emphasized that "the presence or absence of a pat-
ent ambiguity is not determined by the contractor's actual knowledge, but rather by what a rea-
sonable contractor would have perceived in studying the bid packet." Id. Thus, even if Triax
had not noticed the ambiguity, the duty of inquiry would still apply, as "a reasonable contractor
studying the specifications" would have noticed the ambiguity. Id.
417. See id. (explaining that the contract was patently ambiguous and therefore must be
construed against Triax).
418. See id. at 1474-75 (explaining that subtle ambiguities are latent and therefore inter-
preted in favor of contractor).
419. See id. at 1474.
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ment contracts, this application of a "general rule" and the "excep-
tion" regarding ambiguities will likely be relied upon by contractors.
However, the Federal Circuit in T. Brown Constructors, Inc. v. Pena 
2
established that, regardless of whether a latent or a patent ambiguity
exists in a government contract, the party must have actually relied
on the ambiguity. T. Brown Constructors ("Brown") contracted with
the Federal Highway Administration ("FHWA") for the construction
of a two-lane highway in the Lincoln National Forest, near Cloud-
croft, New Mexico. In part, payment under the contract depended
on the result of gradation tests that established the quality of material
used to construct the highway.42 The FHWA took five tests and estab-
lished a pay factor based on the lowest mean pay factor.2 3 Brown ob-
jected to this computation methodology and filed a claim with the
424
contracting officer. When the contracting officer rejected the
claim based on the lower methodology, Brown appealed to the De-
partment of Transportation Board of Contract Appeals
("DOTBCA").42
The DOTBCA held that the contract term concerning the use of
the gradation test to establish a pay factor was patently ambiguous
and ruled that Brown had a duty to inquire regarding the pay meth-
odology.426 Because Brown failed to inquire about the methodology
for computing the pay factor, the DOTBCA sustained the decision of
the contracting officer.427
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Brown asserted that the ASBCA
had improperly relied on an older version of the contract specifica-
tion in making its contract interpretation analysis.428  The Federal
Circuit, however, focused on another component of the Board's
holding: that Brown had neither relied upon, nor proven reliance
420. 132 F.3d 724 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
421. See id. at 726.
422. See id. at 735 (describing gradation test for highway construction whereby subject ma-
terial is passed through successively smaller sieves to determine its composition).
423. See id. After the FHWA performed gradation tests on five subplots, it computed a pay
factor for each gradation size, averaged the sizes, and computed an arithmetic mean for the
five subplots. See id. The FHWA then took the lowest of the mean pay factors to determine the
overall pay factor. See id.
424. See id. (outlining the methodology forwarded by Brown that averaged mean pay factors
to produce the average pay factor).
425. See T. Brown Constructors, Inc., DOT CAB No.1986, 95-2 B.CA (CCH) 1 27,870, at
138,972 (1995), affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom T. Brown Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 132
F.3d 724 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
426. See id. at 139,026 (noting several reasonable interpretations of contract language).
427. See id. (arguing that failure to inquire shows no reliance on Brown's interpretation of
contract pay factor meaning).
428. See T. Brown Constructors, Inc., 132 F.3d at 735. The Federal Circuit seemingly agreed
with Brown, noting that the Board had relied on older specifications. See id. The court, how-
ever, explained that this in itself was not dispositive of the question. See id.
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on, the disputed ambiguity.42 The court ruled that, regardless of the
version of the contract cited by the Board, Brown could not recover
for an ambiguity in a contract if it could not establish that it had re-
lied on the ambiguity.30 Noting that the DOTBCA's ruling that
Brown had not relied on the alleged ambiguity was "virtually unas-
sailable since it is based on an assessment of Mr. Brown's credibil-
ity,"43 ' the court affirmed the ruling of the DOTBCA. 432
In some cases, the resolution of asserted contract ambiguity does
not involve a complicated legal analysis, but rather a simple matter of
contract interpretation, at times based on quite implausible argu-
ments. For example, in Barsebdck Kraft AB v. United States,33 the plain-
tiff, with little other basis to challenge a contract term, asserted a
contract ambiguity. Barsebdck Kraft, a Swedish energy company,
purchased uranium enrichment services from the United States pur-
suant to a treaty dealing with peaceful uses of nuclear power.434 In
1984, Barsebdck Kraft entered into a thirty-year contract for enriched
uranium administered by the Department of Energy ("DOE"). 4
The contract established the price of the uranium "in accordance
with the established DOE pricing policy for such services.,,43 Pursu-
ant to the Energy Policy Act of 1992, however, Congress substantially
revised the manner by which the United States provided uranium en-
richment services to third parties.437 The Act transferred uranium en
richment responsibilities from the DOE to a new entity, the United
States Enrichment Services Corporation ("USEC"), and allowed the
USEC to make a profit on its enrichment services . In light of these
429. See id. ("Brown, however, fails to address the other independent basis for the Board's
decision-lack of reliance.").
430. See id. ("In order for Brown to prevail on its claim it must have relied on its interpreta-
tion when bidding the contract.").
431. See id.
432. This case also involved a number of other claims based on this contract. See id. at 726
(citing differing site condition, subgrade tolerance, traffic control, tree and stump removal,
and delay claims). The DOTBCA had denied all the claims submitted by Brown, but the Fed-
eral Circuit reversed some and affirmed others. See id. at 726-27, 735 (reversing the site condi-
tions and tree and stump removal claims and affirming all others). Nevertheless, except to
Brown, of course, the decision based on the reliance on an ambiguous term in a contract is the
only ruling of legal significance.
433. 121 F.3d 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
434. See id. at 1477. The case also included a similar claim submitted by Empresa Nacional
del Uranio, S.A. ("ENUSA"), a nuclear fuel cycle company owned and operated by Spain,
which also purchased uranium enrichment services from the United States pursuant to an in-
ternational treaty. See id. The arguments made by ENUSA were identical to those made by
Barseb5ck Kraft and thus the discussion is limited to BarsebAck Kraft. See id. at 1479 n.3.
435. See id. at 1477.
436. Id. at 1478. At the time that the parties entered into the contract, the established DOE
pricing policy involved only recovery of government costs. See id.
437. See id.
438. See id. The Energy Policy Act also created the Uranium Enrichment Decontamination
1442
1998] GOVERNMENT CONTRACT CASES 1443
changes, Barsebfick Kraft brought suit in the CFC,439 claiming, inter
alia, that the USEC's prices for uranium enrichment services violated
the contract because the USEC had failed to set prices in accordance
with the cost-recovery methodology in place at the time of the con-
tract." The CFC granted summary judgment for the United States.44'
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Barsebfick Kraft proffered three
arguments in support of its position that the contract terms regard-
ing enrichment services were ambiguous. 2 First, it argued that the
many references to the DOE in the contract made any assertion of
authority by the USEC ambiguous. Second, Barseb5.ck Kraft argued
that the use of the word "any" in the pricing provisions was ambigu-
ous in the context of a pricing policy reflecting "any policy estab-
lished by DOE." Third, the company argued that certain recital
clauses in the contracting of the pricing provision were ambiguous,
making reference to DOE (but not to USEC).443 The Federal Circuit,
•• 444
however, rejected all of these positions. Recognizing Barseback
Kraft's veiled attempt to avoid the terms of the Energy Policy Act of
1992, the court explained that the Act properly transferred the re-
sponsibility of uranium enrichment services from the DOE to the
new USEC.44 5 Accordingly, the court found no ambiguity in the con-
and Decommissioning Fund ("UEDDF"), a fund administered by the DOE (and not the
USEC). See id. For a case dealing with the UEDDF, see infra notes 497-498 and accompanying
text.
439. See Barsebtck Kraft AB v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 691, 698 (1996), affd, 121 F.3d
1475 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Barseback Kraft also claimed damages for (1) costs incurred by the
USEC in applying a pricing method not founded on the USEC's costs, (2) the difference be-
tween the market price of the USEC's services and the prices actually charged, and (3) the
USEC's "double-charging" of plaintiffs. See id. Before filing a claim in the CFC Barseb5ck Kraft
submitted similar claims to the contracting officer pursuant to the dispute clause of the con-
tract. See id. The contracting officer denied all the claims in toto. See id.
440. See id. Barsebtck Kraft also presented two other arguments: first, that the new un-
competitive and discriminatory pricing policies breached the international agreement between
Sweden and the United States regarding uranium enrichment services; and second, that the
new Act improperly allowed double recovery of costs for the UEDDF. See id.
441. Seeid.at708.
442. See Barsebdck Kraft AB, 121 F.3d at 1480 (noting that Baresbtck specifically alleged con-
tract ambiguity on appeal).
443. See id. at 1480-81.
444. See id. Baresb~ck Kraft's assertions of contract ambiguity did not persuade the Federal
Circuit, which commented: "Although framed as arguments that the contracts are ambiguous,
Barsebkck and ENUSA essentially argue, in part, that USEC's pricing policy breaches their con-
tracts." Id. at 1480 n.5.
445. See id. at 1480-81. The Federal Circuit explained that this case "is the other side of the
Winstarcoin." See id. at 1481. In United States v. Winstar, Inc., 518 U.S. 839 (1996), the Supreme
Court affirmed a ruling by the Federal Circuit, that a government contract placed the risk of
loss due to later legislation on the government. See id. at 888-89. In contrast, in Barsebfek Kraft,
the Federal Circuit explained that the contract placed the risk of loss due to later legislation on
the contractor. See Barsebdrk Kraft, 121 F.3d at 1481; see also Contractors Assumed Risk of Statutory
Change in Uranium Enrichment Pricing Polity, 39 GOv'T CONTRACrOR 1473, at 16-17 (OCLt. 1,
1997) (discussing Winstar ruling with regard to Barsebdck Kraft).
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tract and thus affirmed the ruling of the CFC. 6
B. Claim (Adhering to Contract Requirements)
If the government demands a change in a government contract
that results in additional costs to the contractor, the contractor may
assert a "claim" to recover the increased costs, plus a proportional
profit, on the additional work."7 For example, in Advanced Materials,
Inc. v. Perry,48 the Federal Circuit considered a typical claim for in-
creased costs. Advanced Materials entered into a costs plus fixed fee
("CPFF") contract with the Army to design and develop decontami-
nation kits. 49 The contract contained a "Limitations of Cost" provi-
sion, which provided that the government would not be obligated to
reimburse the contractor for any costs in excess of the estimated
cost.450 The contract estimated the total cost of the contract at
$825,262, which the government later raised to $1,085,712."
After delivery of the kits to the Army, but before completing per-
formance of the contract, Advanced Materials informed the contract-
ing officer that a cost overrun had occurred on the contract due to
accounting exigencies.42 The contracting officer refused to approve
the overrun because Advanced Materials had not presented informa-
tion regarding the overrun in writing.4 3 After the completion date of
the contract, Advanced Materials submitted written notification of
the overruns, but the contracting officer indicated that no additional
money would be paid under the contract.4H Advanced Materials then
appealed the decision to the ASBCA, but the Board denied the claim,
ruling that the Limitations of Cost provision barred recovery.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reviewed the terms of the contract
446. See Barsebeck Kraft, 121 F.3d at 1480 (finding that "any" connotes "all" or "every" and is
not restricted to DOE pricing policy and that recital clauses only express desires of DOE, not
contractual commitments). The court disposed of Barseb~ck Kraft's argument based on the
international treaty violations, by noting that nothing in the treaties guaranteed a certain price
for the uranium enrichment services. See id. at 1482. Similarly, the court noted that the DOE
(and not the USEC) collects the assessments and receives appropriations for the UEDDF and
accordingly rejected the argument that, by charging a higher price for uranium services paid to
the USEC, the DOE somehow received additional monies for the UEDDF. See id. at 1483.
447. See CIBINIC & NASH, supra note 76, at 967.
448. 108 F.3d 307 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
449. See id. at 308.
450. See id. (citing FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 52.232-20).
451. See id. at 308.
452. See id. at 309.
453. See id.
454. See id. Advanced Materials sought an additional $191,053. See id.
455. See Advanced Materials, Inc., ASBCA No.47,014, 96-1 B.CA. (CCH) 1 28,002, at 139,
851-52 (1995) (finding that the appellant failed to establish the required elements for estop-
ping respondent's reliance on the limitations of the cost clause), affd, 108 F.3d 307 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
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and detailed the various contractual provisions, focusing in particular
on the Limitations of Cost provision. 4 6
Recognizing that Advanced Materials failed to adhere to the con-
tractual requirements for increasing the Limitations of Cost provi-
sion, the court affirmed the decision of the ASBCA 57 Advanced Ma-
terials argued that its inexperience with accounting practices for
government contracts contributed to its noncompliance with the
contractual requirements.4 5 8 Not surprisingly, this argument did not
impress the Federal Circuit.4
9
C. Change (Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies)
Generally, a contractor asserts a claim for an equitable adjustment
based on changes required by the government under the "Changes
Clause" of the contract.46  In addition, where a contract contains
provisions dealing with obtaining relief for a claim against the gov-
ernment, the "doctrine of the exhaustion of administrative remedies"
requires that the contractor first exhaust all administrative remedies
before seeking a judicial remedy.46' The purpose of the exhaustion
requirement is to provide an opportunity for the parties to resolve a
dispute in an administrative setting before resorting to judicial re-
dress.b2
In New Valley Corp. v. United States,463 the Federal Circuit reviewed a
decision dismissing a contractor's claim for, inter alia, failing to ex-
456. See Advanced Materials, Inc., 108 F.3d at 308-10. Under the terms of the contract, the
contract price was the cost of performance plus a fixed fee and included a schedule showing
the estimated total cost of performance, which if exceeded by the contractor, the government
was not obligated to reimburse. See id.
457. See id. (noting that nothing prevented Advanced Materials from following contractual
provisions for pursuing additional funding). The contract allowed for an increase in the esti-
mated cost, provided that (1) the contractor notifies the contracting officer in writing of an
anticipated cost overrun within sixty days of reaching seventy-five percent of the estimated total
cost, (2) the contracting officer notifies the contractor in writing that the total estimated cost
has been increased, and (3) the contractor does not incur costs above the total estimated cost
before the contracting officer gives notice of an increase. See id. at 310. The Federal Circuit
determined that the three requirements had not been satisfied. See id.
458. See id. at 311 ("Advanced Materials recognized the inadequacy of its accounting system,
and should have adjusted its cost calculations to reflect the impact of postponed and canceled
contracts.").
459. See id. Advanced Materials also made estoppel and waiver arguments pertaining to the
actions of the contracting officer, but the Federal Circuit quickly disposed of these arguments
as well. See id. at 311-12 (stating that Advanced Materials failed to satisfy elements of an estop-
pel claim and that government's letters indicate that it did not waive the cost provision).
460. See CIBINIC & NASH, supra note 76, at 280.
461. See Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States, 386 U.S. 503, 511-12 (1967) (arguing that
relief from a court is barred when no administrative remedy has been sought).
462. See United States v.Joseph A. Holpuch Co., 328 U.S. 234, 23940 (1946) (citing mitiga-
tion and avoidance of large damages as benefits of administrative proceedings).
463. 119 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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haust the administrative remedies. Similar to the contractors in
Hughes Communications Galaxy, Inc. v. United State.d" and American Sat-
ellite Co. v. United States,46 New Valley had executed a "Launch Serv-
ices Agreement" ("LSA"), whereby the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration ("NASA") agreed to launch certain of its com-
mercial satellites.4  The LSA provided that NASA would only termi-
nate the launch agreement "for Reasons Beyond NASA's control."4 7
Following the Challenger accident on January 28, 1986, however,
President Reagan terminated the LSAs for all satellites not requiring
a manned vehicle, or necessary for national security or foreign policy
reasons.4 ' NASA subsequently advised New Valley that its LSA had
been terminated, and New Valley soon thereafter submitted a claim
to NASA for $58,596,964.4w When NASA agreed to refund only the
$4,783,264 that had been paid to NASA for the launch services, New
Valley submitted a claim to the Associate Administrator for Space
Flight, as required by the LSA.470 When the Associate Administrator
failed to respond, 47' New Valley submitted a claim to the NASA Ad-
ministrator.47 Receiving no answer from the NASA Administrator af-
464. 998 F.2d 953 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Hughes had a Launch Services Agreement ("LSA")
with NASA for the launch of ten commercial satellites. See id. at 955. After the Challenger ac-
cident, President Reagan reduced the shuttle fleet to three and restricted its use to "Shuttle
Unique" and "National Security and Foreign Policy" categories. See id. at 956. Due to this re-
striction, NASA informed Hughes that its satellites would not be launched because they did not
fall into either category. See id. at 957. Hughes sued in the CFC for breach of contract. See
Hughes Communications Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 123 (1992). The court denied
the claim based on the "sovereign acts doctrine." See id. at 144 (holding that the decision to
change the use of shuttles was a sovereign act because it did not carry security or foreign policy
implications). On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed, explaining that NASA had simply
breached the LSA contract, a contract that NASA had entered into pursuant to its capacity as
"government-as-contractor." See id. at 958-59.
465. 998 F.2d 950, 952-53 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (finding that for the reasons set forth in Hughes,
NASA breached a LSA with American Satellite).
466. New Valley, 119 F.3d at 1577. The LSA with New Valley, known then as Western Union
Telegraph Company, provided for the launch of two commercial satellites. See id.
467. See id. at 1578. "Reasons Beyond NASA's Control" were defined as "acts of the United
States Government other than NASA, in either its sovereign or contractual capacity." Id. How-
ever, should a dispute arise, the contract required that the dispute first be presented to NASA's
Associate Administrator of Space Flight, and if a decision was not availing, that the dispute must
then be presented to the NASAAdministrator. See id.
468. See id.
469. See id. at 1579. This figure represented $4,783,264 paid to NASA for launch services,
$12,063,700 for preparing the satellite for launch, $29,750,000 for increased launch expenses
due to NASA delays, and $12,000,000 for the loss of capital investment. See id.
470. See id. The claim emphasized that, in light of the rulings in Hughes and American Satel-
lite, NASA should seriously consider the claim. See id. The claim further stated, that if no deci-
sion was made within sixty days, New Valley would file a claim in the CFC. See id.
471. See id. Initially, the Associate Administrator responded that if New Valley established
that it succeeded to the rights ofWestern Union, he would consider the claim. See id. New Val-
ley submitted evidence of the name change, but the Associate Administrator never responded.
See id.
472. See id. (stating that unless the Administrator agreed to meet with New Valley within
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ter sixty days, New Valley filed an action in the CFC.4 73
Before the CFC, New Valley alleged a breach of contract and a tak-
474ing without just compensation. The government countered by as-
serting that New Valley had failed to exhaust administrative remedies
and accordingly moved for summaryjudgment. The CFC agreed and
granted the government's motion to dismiss.4 7 5 The court alterna-
tively held that, even if New Valley had exhausted its administrative
remedies, it had waived any claim for a breach of contract based on
the LSA.4 r' Finally, the court ruled that NASA had properly termi-
nated the LSA with New Valley. 7
On appeal, the Federal Circuit carefully addressed, and subse-
quently reversed, each of the alternative rulings of the CFC.47 8 The
court first considered the CFC's ruling that New Valley had failed to
exhaust its administrative remedies because the letters submitted to
NASA did not constitute a "dispute."4  In some detail, the court re-
pudiated what it viewed to be the CFC's Dawco-like approach to the
exhaustion issue.4" The court explained that a Dawco-like analysis-
requiring a pre-existing suit prior to the filing of a claim-was errone-
ous because the LSA at issue was not subject to the CDA.48' The court
concluded that "[r]egardless of whether that letter [to the Associate
Administrator] concerned an existing dispute when submitted, or
even whether an existing dispute was a prerequisite, there is no
sixty days, New Valley would consider the dispute process exhausted).
473. SeeNew Valley Corp. v. United States, 34 Fed. CI. 703 (1996), rev'd, 119 F.3d 1576 (Fed.
Cir. 1997).
474. See id. at 705 (alleging damages for the government's failure to launch satellites).
475. See id. at 710-11 (finding that none of New Valley's submissions satisfied the contract's
dispute clause).
476. See id. at 712 (determining that, from the express language of contract, the parties in-
tended to waive alljudicial claims).
477. See id. at 711-12 (holding that the President's revision of national space policy termi-
nated the contract and precluded a damage claim).
478. See New Valey, 119 F.3d at 1584. (declaring that the court is charged with interpreting
the LSA in a manner that preserves its integrity and does not destroy it). A dissenting opinion
was filed by CircuitJudge Lourie. See id. at 1584 (LourieJ. dissenting).
479. SeeNew Valley, 34 Fed. Cl. at 710-11.
480. See Dawco Constr., Inc. v. United States, 930 F.2d 872 (Fed. Cir. 1991), overrued by Re-
flectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In Dawco, the Federal Circuit imposed a
burdensome requirement that any claim submitted to the government be based on a pre-
existing dispute. See Dawco, 930 F.2d at 877-78 (holding that the plain language of FAR regula-
tions mandate that to have a valid claim, there must be a pre-existing amount in dispute). After
several years of governmental abuse of this precedent, the Federal Circuit corrected itself in
Refleatone. See Reflecton4 60 F.3d at 1579-80 (holding that the requirement of pre-existing dis-
pute be applied only to "routine" requests for payment and that the contractor's request for
equitable adjustment was "non-routine"). It seems quite interesting that the CFC would at-
tempt to revive such a stolid and unfair doctrine for the purpose of analysis for the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. Fortunately, the Federal Circuit specifically rejected
this approach. See New Valley, 119 F.3d at 1581.
481. SeeNew Valley 119 F.3d at 1581 n.3.
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doubt that the parties ultimately disputed whether NASA had
breached the LSA.
4 82
The court next considered the issues of wavier and termination,
noting that, for the most part, Hughes and American Satellite were con-
trolling.4 3 In the end, the court warned that if it had accepted the
ruling of the CFC, "[i] t would come perilously close to, if not shove
the contract over, the cliff of voidness.,1 4 As a result, in a tone imply-
ing frustration over the CFC's ruling, the Federal Circuit reversed.
D. Change (Sovereign Acts and Unmistakability)
In 1996, the United States Supreme Court addressed the sovereign
acts doctrine 48 6 and the unmistakability doctrine 48 7 in United States v.
Winstar Corp.48s Discussing the sovereign acts doctrine, 49 the Court
explained that the government has two roles in federal procurement
matters, the role of contractor and the role of sovereign. 490 For sov-
ereign acts by the government-as-contractor, the normal rules of gov-
ernment procurement apply, but for sovereign acts by the govern-
ment-as-sovereign, the government may take actions for which it
cannot be held liable.49'
Under the unmistakability doctrine, the Court explained that "a
contract with [the government] will not be read to include an un-
stated term exempting the other contracting party from the applica-
482. Id. at 1581 (concluding that New Valley's written submission of a dispute concerning a
question of law or fact facially complied with the procedures in the Disputes Clause).
483. See id. at 1582-84; supra notes 464-65 (discussing Hughes and American Satellite). The
government also argued that, by accepting a partial refund, New Valley had waived all judicial
claims. See New Valley, 119 F.3d at 1583. The Federal Circuit noted that this argument was
completely contrary to the facts in the case. See id. (acknowledging that both parties reserved
any and all claims or rights they may have had with regard to damages). In rejecting the termi-
nation argument, the Federal Circuit further pointed out that NASA never terminated the LSA
and instead, made continued representations to the contrary. See id. at 1582 (noting that on
January 29, 1987, NASA wrote a letter specifically stating that the LSA was still in existence).
484. New Valley, 119 F.3d at 1584 (citing Torncello v. United States, 681 F.2d 756, 760 (Ct.
Cl. 1982) ("[A] party may not reserve to itself a method of unlimited exculpation without ren-
dering its promises illusory and the contract void.")); see also Federal Circuit Reverses COFC Says
Satellite Firm Exhausted Remedies, Didn't Waive Claims Under LSA, 68 Fed. Cont. Rep. 109, 109-10
(1997) (summarizing the Federal Circuit's reversal of CFC's ruling in New Valley).
485. See New Valley, 119 F.3d at 1584 (asserting that affirming the CFC would "do violence
to," and render superfluous the termination provision in the LSA).
486. See infra note 489 for a definition of sovereign acts doctrine.
487. See infra notes 492-93 and accompanying text.
488. 518 U.S. 839 (1996).
489. The sovereign acts doctrine maintains that "the United States when sued as a contrac-
tor cannot be held liable for an obstruction to the performance of the particular contract re-
sulting from its public and general acts as a sovereign." See Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S.
458,461 (1925); see also Merrion v.Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 145-46 (1982) (examin-
ing the powers of a sovereign tribe over lessors of reservation land).
490. See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 892.
491. See id. at 892-93.
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tion of a subsequent [governmental] act (including an Act of Con-
gress)." 92 Thus, the unmistakability doctrine identifies the "rule that
applies when the Government... has surrendered a sovereign
power," such that "[t]he application of the doctrine turns on whether
enforcement of the contractual obligation would block the exercise
of a sovereign power of the Government.""49
In Yankee Atomic Electric Co. v. United States,94 the Federal Circuit
had occasion to apply the sovereign acts doctrine for the first time
following the Winstar ruling. Yankee Atomic consisted of an associa-
tion of utility companies organized in 1954 that produced electricity
using nuclear fuels.49"5 In 1963, Yankee Atomic begun purchasing
uranium enrichment services from the United States.4  In 1992,
Congress passed the Energy Policy Act of 1992, which established the
Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning Fund
("UEDDF") to decommission old uranium enrichment plants.4 7 To
fund the UEDDF, Congress enacted a special assessment against util-
ity companies that previously purchased uranium enrichment serv-
ices from the United States.49 Even though Yankee Atomic had shut
down prior to the passage of the Energy Policy Act, the government
nevertheless required that Yankee Atomic pay the special assess-
ment." " After making payment, Yankee Atomic brought suit for a re-
fund in the CFC. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court
granted summary judgment for Yankee Atomic on the refund.5,
On appeal, the Federal Circuit first considered the dual arguments
pertaining to the sovereign acts doctrine: whether the passage of
the Energy Policy Act constituted a sovereign act by the government-
492. Id. at 878. It should be noted that this quoted formulation of the unmistakability doc-
trine was that of only a plurality of the Supreme Court.
493. Id. at 879.
494. 112 F.3d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
495. See id. at 1572.
496. See id.
497. See id.
498. See id. (noting that almost two-thirds of the funding came from congressional appro-
priation). Under the Energy Policy Act, the amount of the special assessment for the UEDDF
was determined by a computation of work units, which represented the percentage of the ura-
nium enrichment services procured from the government. See id.
499. See id. at 1573. Yankee Atomic paid approximately $3,000,000 to the special assess-
ment. See id.
500. SeeYankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 580, 586 (1995), rev'd, 112
F.3d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1997). On cross-motions for summaryjudgment, the CFC granted Yankee
Atomic's motion based on an application of a sovereign act by the government-as-contractor
analysis. See id. at 584. The government proffered the opposite argument, that it had acted
according to the government-as-sovereign analysis. See id. at 585. The CFC concluded that the
assessment constituted nothing more than a retroactive price increase of the contract terms
and accordingly held that annual assessments for contract purchases were to be refunded with
interest. See id. at 586.
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as-contractor or a sovereign act by the government-as-sovereign.5'
Yankee Atomic argued that the assessment required under the Act
constituted a sovereign act by the government-as-contractor striving
to reconstruct the terms of the enrichment services contracts.m Con-
versely, the government argued that the assessment constituted a sov-
ereign act by the government-as-sovereign and applied not only to
the utilities that had contracted with the government, but also to
utilities that had obtained enrichment services on the secondary
market.0 3
Concluding that the assessment approximated "a general tax that
falls proportionally on all utilities," the Federal Circuit ruled that the
assessment constituted a sovereign act by the government-as-
sovereign .f
Having found a sovereign act, the Federal Circuit next considered
the application of the unmistakability doctrine, examining "whether
the contracts between Yankee Atomic and the Government unmis-
takably precluded the Government from subsequently exercising its
sovereign power to assess a tax."505 Concluding that any exception to
the assessment for Yankee Power would effectively block the exercise
of the sovereign power to raise money (by the sovereign power to
tax), the Federal Circuit concluded that the unmistakability doctrine
applied.5 6 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed the ruling of the
CFC. '
In a compelling dissent, Circuit Judge (now Chief Judge) Mayer
argued that the majority improperly ignored the fixed-price nature of
the contracts between Yankee Atomic and the government.& Be-
501. See Yankee Atomic, 112 F.3d 1574-77.
502. See id. at 1573, 1575.
503. See id. at 1573, 1575-76.
504. See id. at 1576; see also Assessment on Utilities That Used Uranium Enrichment Services Valid,
Gov't Cont. Rep. (CCH) 4-5 (June 18, 1997).
505. See Yankee Atomic, 112 F.3d at 1579.
506. See id. at 1579-80 (explaining that if Yankee Power prevailed, a refund would essentially
constitute a tax rebate, which would block exercise of the sovereign power to tax). In making
its ruling on the issue of unmistakability, the Federal Circuit reviewed the contracts and found
nothing indicating that a future assessment would not be made against Yankee Atomic. See id.
As a result, the court concluded that Yankee Atomic was precluded from avoiding application
of the unmistakability doctrine. See id. at 1581.
507. See id. at 1581-82. The Federal Circuit explained that a special assessment is a sover-
eign act designed to spread the costs associated with decontamination and decommissioning
over all utilities. The court then held that the contract between Yankee Atomic and the gov-
ernment did not contain an unmistakable promise that precluded the government from exer-
cising this sovereign power and that Yankee Atomic was not exempt from the special assess-
ment simply because it had ceased operations before the Act's passage. See id.
508. See id. at 1582-83 (MayerJ, dissenting); see also id. at 1582 ("Where one agrees to do,
for a fixed sum, a thing possible to be performed, he will not be excused or become entitled to
additional compensation, because unforeseen difficulties arise.") (quoting United States v.
1450
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cause these contracts had been satisfactorily performed, Judge Mayer
pointed out that an assessment based on a fully performed contract
would constitute a retroactive price increase." Judge Mayer further
reasoned that neither the sovereign acts nor the unmistakability doc-
trines would be applicable, as both doctrines apply to contract
claims.10 Judge Mayer concluded that the assessment against Yankee
Atomic constituted nothing less than a taking under the Fifth
Amendment.1
Therefore, as demonstrated by the majority and dissenting opin-
ions and despite the recent ruling of the Supreme Court in Winstar,
questions involving the application of the sovereign acts doctrine and
the unmistakability doctrine continue to haunt the government pro-
curement community.
512
IV. COST AND PRICING
In government procurement, the government allows contractors to
recover certain costs from certain government contracts.13 In order
to recover such costs, however, the contractor has an obligation to
establish properly that it is entitled to these costs, as illustrated by Ti-
tan Corp. v. West.514 Titan had entered into a CPFF contract with the
Army Corps of Engineers for the research and development of serv-
ices concerning the effects of explosions on geological materials.5 , 5
The contract contained a "Limitations of Costs" clause, which limited
cost recovery to the amount of the contract's original estimate, unless
the contractor notified the government of potential cost overruns
Spearin, 248 U.S. 132, 136 (1918)).
509. See id. at 1583 (MayerJ, dissenting).
510. See id. at 1583-85 (arguing that the action was not a contract claim, but rather an action
seeking reimbursement for an improper abrogation of vested property rights which happened
to arise out of completed contracts).
511. See id. at 1584-85. Judge Mayer explained that Congress made the former contracting
parties pay for something which they had no contractual obligation to pay. See id. at 1584. As
such, the assessments could only be regarded as a taking under the Fifth Amendment. See id. at
1585.
512. See generally Federal Circuit Panel Applies Winstar, Rules That Special Assessment Imposed on
Utility Was Sovereign Act, Does Not Abrogate Fixed Price Uranium Enrichment Contracts, 67 Fed. Cont.
Rep. (BNA) 561-63 (May 12, 1997) (discussing the still uncertain application of the sovereign
acts doctrine and unmistakability doctrine following Winstar).
513. SeeJOHN CIBINICJR. & RALPH C. NASHJR., COST REIMBURSEMENT CONTRACTING 1 (2d
ed. 1993) (explaining that for a cost reimbursement contract to be enforceable against the
government, it must comply with the same legal requirements that apply to all federal govern-
ment contracts). The types of contracts for which the government generally reimburses costs
are referred to as "cost-reimbursement contracts." See id.
514. 129 F.3d 1479, 1482 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (referring to companies' responsibilities when
contracting with the federal government).
515. See id. at 1480.
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and obtained authorization to incur the increased costs.516 Following
the performance of the Titan contract, the DCAA audited a subcon-
tractor that Titan had used, showing costs in excess of the original
government estimate. 5 7 Based on the audit, Titan filed a claim with
the contracting officer requesting reimbursement of the additional
costs, but the contracting officer denied the claim.1 8 The ASBCA sus-
tained the decision of the contracting officer and denied the claim,
chastising Titan for failing to monitor its costs properly.1 9
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that the Limitations of Costs
clause allowed for increased costs in the absence of notice to the gov-
ernment, if the costs were unforeseeable.5 20 To benefit from this ex-
ception, however, the court stated that the contractor must present
evidence to show that the costs were actually unforeseeable. 2' Citing
the findings of the ASBCA, the Federal Circuit concluded that Titan
had not satisfied its burden of proof.2
In situations where the costs were foreseeable, the court empha-
sized the importance of the Limitations of Costs clause: "There is
sound reason for the notice requirement of the Limitation of Costs
provision. It protects the contractor by either providing assurance of
reimbursement or permitting the contractor to cease performance.
It protects the government from paying more than it had expected
for the project."52 The court further emphasized that the govern-
ment, not the contractor, controls the decision whether or not to in-
cur cost overruns. 24 Thus, because Titan had failed to adhere to
516. See id. at 1480-81 (citing 48 C.F.R. § 52.232-20(b), (d) (2)). The original estimated cost
of the Titan contract was $108,737, and the fixed fee was $9,678. See id. at 1480. If any cost
overruns are anticipated, the Limitations of Costs clause provides that the contractor must no-
tify the government contracting officer in writing sixty days before the date when the excep-
tional costs are to be incurred. See id. (quoting 48 C.F.R. § 52.232-20(b)).
517. See id. at 1481. The DCAA audit showed that the subcontractor incurred $11,624.82
more in costs than provided for in the contract's original estimate. See id. Additionally, the
subcontractor claimed $2,025.49 in direct costs. See id.
518. See id. Titan alleged entitlement to the additional costs because of the "generally ac-
cepted accounting principle that provisional costs are not deemed final until after an audit."
Id.
519. See id. The ASBCA ruled that Titan had not proven the unforeseeability of its cost
overruns for the original contract work or for work due to changes allegedly requested by the
government. See id.
520. See id. (citing RMI, Inc. v. United States, 800 F.2d 246, 248 (Fed. Cir. 1986)) (finding
that a contractor does not have to give notice if there is no reason to think that a cost overrun
will occur immediately).
521. See id.
522. See id. at 1480. The court also summarily rejected Titan's argument that the stress of
fulfilling the contract had inhibited proper accounting methodologies. See id. at 1482 ("Al-
though relatively small entities may well encounter disproportionate burdens in dealing with
the government, the obligations of the relationship cannot be unilaterally waived.").
523. Id.
524. See id. at 1482.
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these requirements and did not properly monitor its costs during
contract performance, the Federal Circuit affirmed the ASBCA's de-
cision.s5s
Assuming conformance with the ruling in Titan, it is possible for a
contractor to show proper entitlement to the recovery of costs.
52 6
The government, however, places two general sets of limitations on
the specific types of costs for which a contractor may seek reim-
bursement: Cost Accounting Standards2 7 and Cost Principles.52 8 In
addition to such limitations on the types of costs, the government
also places certain obligations on contractors who recover costs un-
der government contracts, including the Truth in Negotiations Act
("TINA") .f
A. Cost Accounting Standards ("CAS")
In certain circumstances, a government contract may be subject to
the CAS, which provide specific accounting methodologies to
which a contractor must adhere to recover costs.5 ' In the 1997 term,
the Federal Circuit did not issue any precedential cases relating spe-
532
cifically to an issue dealing with the CAS .
B. Cost Principles
Recovery of costs from the government pursuant to a government
contract is considered "allowable" provided there is no specific pro-
hibition on recovery of the cost.53 If there is such a prohibition, the
cost is deemed unallowable. 3 In essence then, the Cost Principles
are a group of regulatory principles that define and distinguish those
525. See id. (finding that Titan could have foreseen cost overruns).
526. See id. (explaining that the notification requirement gives contractors assurance of re-
imbursement for properly reported and approved cost overruns, or provides the option of
stopping performance until cost overruns are approved by government).
527. See48 C.F.R. §§ 30.000-.603 (1996).
528. See id. §§ 31.000-.703.
529. See 10 U.S.C. § 2306(a) (1994) (requiring government contractors to utilize certain
accounting and certification of costs practices).
530. See Richard C. Walters, The Matter of Interest in Federal Government Contracting 14 PUB.
CONT. LJ. 96, 105 (1983) (describing the history and purpose of CAS).
531. See id. The first CAS were promulgated in 1970 by the original Cost Accounting Stan-
dards Board. See id.
532. In Motorola Inc. v. West, however, the Federal Circuit did issue an interesting non-
precedential opinion relating to the CAS. See supra notes 194-206 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Motorola); see also Federal Circuit Reverses Where ASBCA Exceeded Remand on Aydin's Foreign
Selling Costs Claim, 68 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 108, 108-09 (1997) (discussing the allocation of
foreign selling costs to CAS 402 and CAS 410).
533. See 48 C.F.R. § 31.201-202 (1997) (explaining the standards for determining whether
costs are allowable).
534. See id. § 31.201-206 (identifying the reasons for unallowability).
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costs which are allowable from those which are unallowable. 5
1. Cost Principle: FAR 31.205-6
Cost Principle 31.205-6, which pertains to compensation for per-
sonal services, states that the question of "[s]everence to be allow-
able... depend[s] upon whether the severance is normal or abnor-
mal.'53 6 In = Federal Services Corp. v. Widnall, 537 the Federal Circuit
considered whether a contractor with a firm, fixed-price ("FFP") con-
tract could recover the cost of severance pay, even though the sever-
ance pay was abnormal.5m ITT had an FFP contract with the Air
Force to provide data support services at the Phillips Laboratory at
Edwards Air Force Base in California.5 9 Upon the conclusion of the
contract and the termination of related work, ITT placed all but six
employees in other positions, and provided severance pay to those
unplaced employees according to corporate practice. 0 ITT sought
reimbursement for the abnormal severance pay, asserting that the Air
Force should pay "its fair share" of the costs pursuant to FAR 31.205-
6 (g) (2) (iii). 5"' After the contracting officer denied the claim,52 ITT
appealed to the ASBCA, which affirmed the contracting officer's de-
cision, noting that cost reimbursement pursuant to FAR 31.205-6 was
not available for a FFP contract.
543
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, ITT conceded that the severance
payments constituted abnormal severance pay under FAR 31.205-6
535. See id. §§ 31.201-.252 (laying out Cost Principles). Prior to April 1, 1984, the Cost Prin-
ciples were located in the Defense Acquisition Regulation for DOD contracts, the Federal Pro-
curement Regulation for civilian contracts, and the NASA Procurement Regulations for NASA
contracts. See CIBINIC & NASH, supra note 513, at 613. After April 1, 1984, however, all the Cost
Principles were centralized in Part 31 of the FAR, which is located in Title 48 of the CFR. See id.
536. See 48 C.F.R. § 31.205-6(g) (2) (1997). FAR 31.205-6(g) states that normal severance
pay consists of "payments ... allocated to all work performed in the contractor's plant, or
where the contractor provides for accrual of pay for normal severances" and provides that ab-
normal severance pay consists of costs too speculative to accrue accurately and fairly. See id. §
31.205-06(g) (2) (ii) (iii).
537. 132 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
538. See id. at 1449.
539. See id. at 1450.
540. See id. at 1449-50. The contract in question was the third in a series of consecutive, five-
year contracts for the data support services at the Phillips Laboratory. See id. at 1450. T had
not anticipated that the contract would end after this third five-year contract. See id. at 1451.
541. See id. at 1450. FAR 31.205-6(g) (2) (iii) provides:
Abnormal or mass severance pay is of such a conjectural nature that measurement of costs by
means of an accrual will not achieve equity to both parties. Thus, accruals for this purpose are
not allowable. However, the Government recognizes its obligation to participate, to the extent of its fair
share, in any specfic payment. Thus, allowability will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
48 C.F.R. § 31.205-6(g) (2) (iii) (1996) (emphasis added).
542. See ITTFed. Ser's. Corp, 132 F.3d at 1450.
543. See id. (noting that FFP contracts require the contractor to pay all costs unless the ac-
tual contract provides for government cost overrun reimbursement).
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but asserted that the costs were nevertheless reimbursable.5 4  Al-
though FAR 31.205-6 normally excludes abnormal severance pay,
ITT noted that the cost principle also provides an exception for ex-
traordinary abnormal severance payments on a case-by-case basis. 5
Based on this exception, ITT asserted entitlement under FAR 31.205-
6(g) (2) (iii) .4 6 The Federal Circuit, however, rejected this position
and ruled that ITT had not proven the "extraordinary circumstances"
necessary to assert the exception to recovery of abnormal severance
pay described in FAR 31.205-6(g) (2) (iii).547 Somewhat surprisingly,
the Federal Circuit did not reject the argument that FAR 31.205 pro-
hibits the recovery of abnormal severance pay for FFP contracts.5 8
Instead, the court only concluded that ITT had not established enti-
tlement under the facts of the case,5 9 and accordingly affirmed the
ruling of the ASBCA.5 'o
2. Cost Principle: FAR 31.205-15
Cost Principle 31.205-15 provides that "[c]osts of fines and penal-
ties resulting from violations of... laws and regulations, are unallow-
able."'5 ' In Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Dalton,552 the Federal Circuit
considered whether payments under the Longshore and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act ("LHWCA") 5 3 constitute unallowable
544. See id.; supra note 541 (quoting FAR 31.205-6(g) (2) (iii)).
545. See ITT Fed. Servs. Corp, 132 F.3d at 1451 (presenting ITT's argument based on FAR
31.205-6 (g) (2) (iii) that the government should reimburse "its fair share" of abnormal or mass
severance costs).
546. See id.
547. See id. (finding that ITT's contract had expired normally, according to its terms, and
that no other situation existed that would necessitate reimbursement under FAR 31-205-
6(g) (2) (iii)).
548. See id. The Federal Circuit stated that "[a]ssuming, without deciding, that FAR 31.205-
6(g) (2) (iii) is a remedy-granting provision, absent extraordinary circumstances, not present
here, abnormal or mass severance within the contemplation of that clause does not occur when
a contract expires in accordance with its terms." Id. (emphasis added).
549. See id. The court explained that under the facts of the case, "the severance payments
were normal severance when viewed in the context of the expiration of the contract, a foresee-
able and expected event when a firm, fixed-price contract is entered into." Id.
550. See id. IT presented another argument based on the "Continuity of Services" clause,
arguing that the severance payments were recoverable under the "phase-in, phase-out" provi-
sions of FAR 52.237-3. See id. at 1451-52. Concluding that severance payments were not phase-
in, phase-out costs, however, the Federal Circuit likewise rejected this argument. See id. at 1452.
551. 48 C.F.R. § 31.205-15(a) (1997). In whole, FAR 31.205-15(a) provides:
Costs of fines and penalties resulting from violations of, or failure of the contractor to
comply with, Federal, State, local, or foreign laws and regulations, are unallowable ex-
cept when incurred as a result of compliance with specific terms and conditions of the
contract or written instructions from the contracting officer.
Id.
552. 119 F.3d 972 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
553. 33 U.S.C. § 914(e) (1994) (establishing a time schedule for compensating injured em-
ployees under LHWCA and providing penalties for employer noncompliance).
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"fines and penalties" under FAR 31.205-15.55  Ingalls Shipbuilding
("Ingalls") frequently contracted with the Navy for the construction,
repair, and overhaul of surface combat ships.5 55 Pursuant to sixty-six
of these contracts, several thousand injury claims were filed against
Ingalls.5 6 To save costs, Ingalls chose not pay the LHWGA pre-award
installments but to answer generically the claims.5' 7 Subsequent court
proceedings58 determined that the answers provided were inade-
quate and Ingalls was forced to make payments to the successful
claimants pursuant to the LHWCA. Ingalls then charged these pay-
ments to its Navy contracts. 559 A DCAA audit determined that these
costs were improper, and the contracting officer similarly rejected
the costs as unallowable under FAR 31.205-15.'6 When Ingalls ap-
pealed to the ASBCA, the Board also concluded that the costs were
unallowable under FAR 31.207-15.56l
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that no court had previously
considered FAR 31.205-15.62 As such, the court conceded that there
was little statutory or judicial indication of the meaning of "fines and
penalties," as used in the cost principle. 563 The court then reviewed
the statutory scheme for the LHWCA and concluded that payments
due under the LHWGA were not akin to "fines and penalties." 56 Ac-
554. See Ingalls Shipbuilding 119 F.3d at 973.
555. See id.
556. See id. at 974.
557. See id. (describing LHWCA procedures for reimbursing injured employees and fines
that accrue against employers who do not pay within the specified time and who do not receive
a valid excuse from the Deputy Commissioner).
558. See id. at 974; see also Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Director, 976 F.2d 934, 935-37 (5th
Cir. 1992) (discussing Ingall's LHWCA proceedings); Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Director, 898
F.2d 1088, 1095-96 (5th Cir. 1990).
559. See Ingalls Shipbuilding 119 F.3d at 974 (noting that Ingall's payments totaled
$190,598.54).
560. See id. at 974-75. The contracting officer deemed the costs unallowable based on FAR
31.205-15 (defining certain fines, penalties, and mischarging costs as unallowable) and FAR
31.205-20 (defining certain interest and other financial costs as unallowable). See id. at 975.
561. See id. The Board did not address FAR 31.205-20. See id.
562. See id. at 976 (explaining that in order to construe section 914(e) and decide whether
it creates a penalty, it is necessary to look to the statutory scheme of which it is a part, the
LHWCA). The Federal Circuit did note, however, that boards of contract appeals had consid-
ered the scope of the regulation but that no board decision had addressed the section of the
LHWCA raised by the IngaUs case. See id.
563. See id. (noting that nothing in any provision of the FAR specifically defines the words
"fines and penalties").
564. See id. at 977. The court explained that section 914(e) of the LHWCA "does not use
the word fine or penalty. Thus, within the framework of the LHWCA, it appears that Congress
did not intend section 914(e) payments to be treated as fines or penalties." Id. The court also
cited with approval Huntington v. Attrill 146 U.S. 657 (1892). See id. at 978. Relying on
Huntington, the court described the three elements necessary for a cost to represent a penalty.
(1) the absence of an association between the costs imposed and the actual harm done; (2) the
extent to which the state benefits from the proceeds; and (3) whether the wrong sought to be
redressed is a wrong to the public or a wrong to an individual. See id. As section 914(e) of the
1456
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cordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed the ASBCA's decision.55
3. Cost Principle: FAR 31.205-20
Cost Principle FAR 31.205-20'6 provides that "[i]nterest on bor-
rowings (however represented)" are unallowable costs. 6 7 In Lockheed
Corp. v. United States,' the Federal Circuit considered whether a tax
liability constitutes a "borrowing" under DAR 15-207.17 (currently
FAR 31.205-20). Lockheed filed and paid federal income tax to the
federal government and state franchise tax to the State of California
for the years 1973 and 1974.5 In 1982, however, the Internal Reve-
nue Service audited those tax years and determined that several de-
ductions were impermissible, resulting in a larger taxable income for
Lockheed.570 Due to operating losses, the upward adjustment in tax-
able income did not result in additional federal taxes, but did result
in additional state tax liability.57' In accounting for these taxes,
Lockheed allocated the payments (both tax and interest) to its resid-
ual corporate overhead.5n In a corporate overhead review, however,
the contracting officer rejected this allocation, citing the prohibition
against "interest on borrowings" in DAR 15-205.17. 573 Following a fi-
nal decision by the contracting officer, Lockheed appealed to the
LHWCA did not satisfy these elements, Ingall's LHWCA costs were not penalties. See id. at 979.
565. See id. The government alternatively argued that the costs were unallowable pursuant
to FAR 31.205-20 as "interest on borrowings." See id. at 978. The Federal Circuit recited the
government's theory regarding FAR 31.205-20 as follows: "[The government] argues that be-
cause the § [sic] 914(e) payments provide additional compensation to replace money that
claimants were wrongly denied, they may be considered a form of interest." Id. The court re-
buffed the argument, exclaiming that "[t]his argument has so little merit that we are surprised
to find it presented to us." Id.
566. 48 C.F.R. § 31.205-20 (1997).
567. Id. In whole, FAR 31.205-20 provides:
Interest and Other Financial Costs. Interest on borrowings (however represented),
bond discounts, costs of financing and refinancing capital (net worth plus long-term
liabilities), legal and professional fees paid in connection with preparing prospec-
tuses, costs of preparing and issuing stock rights, and directly associated costs, are un-
allowable except for interest assessed by State and local taxing authorities under the
conditions specified in 31.205-41.
Id. In 1984, the Federal Acquisition Regulation superseded the DAR, see Lockheed Corp. v.
United States, 113 F.3d 1225, 1226 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1997), and DAR 15-205.17 became FAR
31.205-20. See Lockheed, 113 F.3d at 1228.
568. 113 F.3d 1225 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
569. See id.
570. See id.
571. See id. at 1225-26. The upward adjustment resulted in $708,397 in additional state tax
liability and $645,226 in interest. See id. at 1226. For the $645,226 in interest, Lockheed ini-
tially claimed $15,706 in interest as the amount allocated to its corporate residual expense
pool, but subsequently reduced its claim to $8,260. See id. at 1226 n.2.
572. See id. at 1226 (characterizing Lockheed's decision as complying with normal corpo-
rate accounting methods).
573. See id. (citing DAR because, at the time of the audit, the FAR had not yet superseded
the DAR).
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ASBCA.574 In a 3-2 decision, the Board affirmed the decision of the
contracting officer 57'
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Lockheed argued that the
ASBCA improperly focused on the word "interest" and emphasized
that DAR 15-205.17 concerned not merely "interest" but "interest on
borrowings."576 In contrast, the government argued that the Board
ruled correctly, noting that the cost principle not only states "interest
on borrowings" but also specifies "(however represented) . The
Federal Circuit ruled that the cost principle only applied to interest
on borrowings in the sense of a loan.ss Because Lockheed did not
intend to obtain a loan from the State of California, the court con-
cluded that the tax payments did not constitute "interest on borrow-
ings."57 Although the court explained that further analysis was un-
necessary because the reading of the cost principle was clear, it
nevertheless noted that the regulatory history supported the court's
interpretation.58  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed the
judgment of the ASBCA. 1
4. Cost Principle: FAR 31.205-41
Cost principle 31.205-41 provides that "federal income and excess
profits taxes" are unallowable costs.1s  In Rockwell International Corp. v.
Widnall,5 the Federal Circuit considered whether a tax imposed on
all corporate taxpayers constituted an income tax pursuant to FAR
574. See id. The contracting officer selected two contracts as test vehicles so that Lockheed
could obtain an appealable final decision on the DAR 15-205.17 issue. See id.
575. See id. The ASBCA majority held that DAR 15-205.17 specifically prohibited the reim-
bursement of costs based on borrowings, and that a tax constitutes a borrowing. See id. The
majority concluded that the only exception to DAR 15-205.17 was DAR 15-205.41, which is spe-
cifically mentioned in DAR 15-205.17. See id. (citing DAR 15-205.17).
576. See id. at 1226-27 (discussing Lockheed's argument that ASBCA had applied too broad
a construction of the cost principle).
577. See id. at 1227.
578. See id. (construing DAR 15-205.17 as prohibiting interest paid on capital-providing
loans). As the construction of a regulation is a matter of law for the court to decide, the Fed-
eral Circuit reviewed the cost principle de novo. See id. The court concluded that, by its plain
meaning, DAR 15-205.17 only applied to borrowings in the sense of a loan. See id. The court
reasoned that this construction of the cost principle made the most sense because all the bor-
rowings cited in DAR 15-205.17 regarded methods of raising capital. See id.
579. See id. (explaining that "[a]n inadvertent tax deficiency is not generally a method of
raising capital").
580. See id. As described by the court, the original draft of the cost principle applied
broadly to "interest," but drafters narrowed the final draft of the regulation to only include "in-
terest on borrowings." See id. The court noted that this change indicated an intent to limit the
type of interest covered by the cost principle to interest on borrowings. See id. at 1227-28.
581. See id.
582. See4 8 C.F.Rt § 31.205.41 (b) (1) (1996).
583. 109 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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31.20541.5 Rockwell had entered into a cost-reimbursement con-
tract with the Air Force in 19 8 7 .""' One year earlier, Congress had
enacted the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986,5 which created the "Superfund tax," an environmental income
587tax imposed on all corporate taxpayers. In 1990, Rockwell decided
to treat this tax as an allowable cost and submitted a claim for reim-
bursement of the Superfund taxes it had paid in 1988, 1989, and
1990.5 The contracting officer, however, denied the claim, alleging
that the tax was an income tax and thus an unallowable cost pursuant
to FAR 31.205-41(b). 5" Rockwell appealed to the ASBCA, but the
Board concurred that the Superfund tax was an unallowable cost.'"
On appeal, the Federal Circuit observed that all indications fa-
vored a conclusion that the Superfund tax was indeed an income tax
and thus an unallowable cost.59' Rockwell argued that, despite the
fact that the Superfund tax was designated as an income tax, the tax
should be treated otherwise, because it actually operated as an excise
tax.5 Although, the court conceded that the tax acted as an excise
tax, it nonetheless rejected Rockwell's argument due to the "strong
evidence of congressional intent to create an income tax.
Rockwell further argued that, because the FAR was later amended
to include the Superfund tax as an allowable cost under FAR 31.205-
584. See id. at 1579-80.
585. See id. at 1580.
586. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613.
587. See Rockwell Int'l Corp., 109 F.3d at 1580. The Superfund tax was to pay for a trust fund
that would defray the expenses arising from the environmental effects of hazardous substances.
See id. The tax rate totaled 0.12 percent of all "modified alternative minimum taxable income
exceeding two million dollars." Id.
588. See id.
589. See id. FAR 31.205-41(b) states "[t]he following types of costs are not allowable: (1)
Federal income and excess profits taxes." 48 C.F.R. § 31.205-41 (b) to -41 (b) (1) (1996).
590. See Rockwell Int'l C"rp., 109 F.3d at 1580 (noting that the ASBCA extensively analyzed
the cost provision's legislative and administrative background in reaching its decision).
591. See id. at 1581. The court noted that the Superfund tax was located in the "Income
Tax" portion of the Internal Revenue Code and that the legislative history of the tax indicated
that Congress considered it akin to an income tax. See id. at 1581-82.
592. See id. at 1582. See gnerally Vournas v. United States, 10 Cl. Ct 591, 593 (1986) (defin-
ing an excise tax as "all internal taxes that are not property taxes assessed by virtue of owner-
ship alone").
593. See Rockwell Int'l Conp., 109 F.3d at 1582-83. Rockwell also presented other similar ar-
guments, including the argument that because the Superfund tax was deductible from corpo-
rate gross income, it should not be regarded as an income tax. See id. at 1583. The Federal
Circuit refused to attach great weight to the deductibility status of a tax, noting that "deductibil-
ity alone does not convert what otherwise would be an income tax into some other form of
tax." Id. Rockwell also asserted that the reference to "federal income taxes" in FAR 31.205-
41(b) (1) cannot be interpreted to include all income taxes because such an interpretation
would make the phrase "excess profits tax" superfluous. See id. The court also rejected this
argument. See id. at 1584 (holding that Superfund taxes are federal income taxes that are not
allowable as costs of performance).
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the regulatory amendment should have a retroactive effect.
Conversely, the government argued that, because the cost issue in-
volving the Superfund tax required an amendment of the FAR, the
tax was not initially meant to be an allowable cost.59 To resolve these
conflicting positions, the Federal Circuit referenced a memorandum
from the Defense Acquisition Regulatory Council ("DARC"), which
explained that the FAR amendment was not intended to affect the
interpretation of the cost issue for earlier years.59  Based on this
memorandum, the court considered the issue independent of the
amendment and concluded that the Superfund tax was indeed an in-
come tax for purposes of FAR 31.205-41.59' The court accordingly af-
firmed the decision of the ASBCA. 5"
C. TINA
The Truth in Negotiations Act ("TINA")6 mandates that contrac-
torsG°' supply cost and pricing data for government contracts in excess
of $500,000 and requires certification of the accuracy, completeness,
and timeliness of the data .6 2 In Motorola, Inc. v. West,"" the Federal
Circuit reiterated the government contractor's obligation to abide by
the disclosure requirements in the TINA.604 Aydin was a subcontrac-
tor for Motorola and refused to submit its cost data to Motorola due
to proprietary concerns. 5 Instead, Aydin submitted the cost data di-
rectly to the DCAA, but failed to "specifically identify" the relevant
594. 48 C.F.R. § 31.205-41 (a) (4) (1997).
595. See Rockwell Int'l Corp., 109 F.3d at 1584 (citing 55 Fed. Reg. 52,782 (1990)) (describing
an amendment to the FAR which defined the Superfund tax as an allowable cost under FAR
31.205-41); 54 Fed. Reg. 43,032 (1989) (discussing a proposed amendment to designate the
Superfund tax as allowable cost).
596. See id. (contrasting Rockwell's and the government's interpretations of the FAR
amendment).
597. See id. at 1585. The DARC memorandum stated that: "'The old rule must stand on its
own. The new rule is not intended to influence the interpretation of the old one as to whether
the 'Superfund Tax' is an 'income tax' or an 'excise tax.'" Id. (citing DARC Memorandum,
Cost Principles Committee (undated)).
598. See id. at 1585.
599. See id. See generally Superfund Tax Was Federal Income Tax Under FAR, Was Not Allowable
Cost, CAFC Rules, 67 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 510-12 (Apr. 28, 1997) (analyzing the Rockwell rul-
ing on allowable costs).
600. 10 U.S.C. § 2306(a) (1994).
601. See id. § 2306a(a) (1) (A) (placing obligations on "offerors, contractors, and subcontrac-
tors").
602. See id. § 2306a(a) (2).
603. 125 F.3d 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also supra notes 194-206 (discussing the facts of this
case).
604. See id. at 1474.
605. See id. at 1471 (observing that Aydin and Motorola were competitors in certain areas of
production).
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data . ' The DCAA subsequently audited Aydin and recommended a
price reduction based, in part, on Aydin's failure to make proper
TINA disclosures.O7 The ASBCA confirmed that the submission vio-
lated the disclosure requirements of the TINA.'"
On appeal, the Federal Circuit also concluded that Aydin had
failed to satisfy the TINA requirements.& The court observed that
Aydin seemed to believe that the mere submission of data would sat-
isfy the TINA.6 The court specifically rejected such a contention:
"The mere deposit of books and records does not meet the require-
ment of identifying cost information for reasonable access by the
contracting officer.""" Accordingly, the court affirmed the price re-
duction against Aydin based, in part, on its failure to adhere to the
TINA requirements.
61 2
V. DAMAGES
Under the common law, if a party breaches a contract, that party
must pay damages sufficient to restore the injured party to a position
equivalent to that in which he or she would have been had the
breaching party honored the contract.613  In government procure-
ment law, the same rule applies, but due to the special nature of con-
tractual relationships with the United States, special limitations and
rules frequently restrict the scope of this general rule.
614
A. No Speculative Damages
The measure of damages recoverable from the government in-
volves the same issues and considerations found in private transac-
tions. However, whereas speculative damages are generally not re-
coverable against private parties, this rule is strictly enforced in
606. See id. at 1474 (noting that Aydin submitted "financial statements," operational state-
ments, and "general ledger[s]," but did not accompany data with explanations).
607. See id. at 1472 (explaining that without clarification from Aydin, auditor was unable to
determine the source of certain costs).
608. See id. (finding that Aydin's procedural failings detrimentally affected the govern-
ment).
609. See id. at 1474 (chastising Aydin for not offering proper data to either Motorola or the
government).
610. See id.
611. Id. Citing FAR 31.804-6(d), the Federal Circuit noted that "[t]here is a clear distinc-
tion between submitting cost or pricing data and merely making available books, records, and
other documents without identification. The latter does not constitute "submission" of cost or
pricing data." Id. (quoting 48 C.F.R. § 15.804-6(d) (1996)).
612. See id.
613. See Estate of Berg v. United States, 687 F.2d 377, 379 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (deciding a breach
of contract case involving the value of government bonds that the government failed to re-
deem).
614. See CIBINIC & NASH, supra note 76, at 498-99.
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government transactions.1 5 San Carlos Irrigation and Drainage District
616
v. United States, provides an excellent example of this principle.
The San Carlos Irrigation & Drainage District ("SCIDD") con-
tracted with the Department of the Interior ("DOI") for the provision
of power and water from the Coolidge Dam across the Gila River in
Arizona.1 7 After a storm and subsequent flood damaged the dam
and interrupted access to power and water, SCIDD sued for the tem-
porary loss of power and water."' The CFC (then, the Claims Court)
denied the claim,6 9 but the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the
DOI had a contractual duty to keep the dam in good repair.6" The
Federal Circuit then remanded the case for a determination as to
611damages. On remand, the CFC found that the contract entitled
SCIDD to "at-cost" groundwater pumping power charges, rather than
the more costly electricity purchased from other non-Coolidge Dam
sources, and accordingly awarded $667,021 for the power claim (later
revised to $77 0 ,9 0 0 ).622 The court, however, awarded no damages for
the water claim. 62
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, SCIDD challenged the damage
award as to both power and water.62 4 SCIDD sought an increase in
the power-related damages, asserting that the DOI's failure to main-
tain the dam resulted in consequential damages based on the $4.7
615. See Northern Helex Co. v. United States, 524 F.2d 707, 720 (Ct. Cl. 1975) ("[R]emote
and consequential damages are not recoverable in a common-law suit for breach of con-
tract... especially... in suits against the United States for the recovery of common law dam-
ages[.") (omissions in original), quoted in Wells Fargo Bank v. United States, 88 F.3d 1012,
1021 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
616. 111 F.3d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
617. See id. at 1560 (reporting that the first SCIDD contract took effect in 1931).
618. See id. at 1560-61 (describing the failure of dam spillways during storm, which pre-
vented reservoir from holding more water and interrupted hydroelectric generation).
619. See San Carlos Irrigation and Drainage Dist. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 197, 204 (1988)
(finding no clear contractual duties upon which court could base damages).
620. See San Carlos Irrigation and Drainage Dist., 877 F.2d 957, 959-60 (1989) (holding that
government had a duty to maintain properly the spillways and take precaution against their
failure).
621. See id. at 961 (holding that the lower court's grant of summaryjudgment failed to ad-
dress the issues of breach, causation, and damages).
622. See San Carlos Irrigation and Drainage Dist. v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 200, 202
(1994).
623. See id. SCUD had originally sought $4,673,834 for the power claim. See San Carlos Irri-
gation, 111 F.3d at 1561. The CFC awarded no damages on the water claim, as the court held
that SCIID had obtained its "contractual allocation of water." See id.
624. See San Carlos Irrigation and Drainage; 111 F.3d at 1561. On a cross-appeal, the govern-
ment sought a reduction in the power-related damages awarded to SCIDD by the CFC. See id.
at 1564. The government argued that SCIID was not entitled to damages on the power and
water claims because it had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies under the Administra-
tive Procedures Act ("APA"). The Federal Circuit quickly rejected this argument, noting that
nothing in the contract made the provision or pricing of power or water contingent upon the
APA. See id. (citing APA, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1994)).
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million cost of replacement power for the groundwater pumps.25
The court, however, found that the contract required only that the
DOI supply power for the pumps, not that it supply free power for
the groundwater pumps.6 26 The court concluded that the DOI prop-
erly required SCIDD to pay for the power obtained from other
627
sources.
SCIDD also argued that it was entitled to damages for lack of access
to water because DOI had not properly maintained the dam.628 The
CFC ruled that, although the damage to the dam had in fact resulted
in less availability of water, the DOI had not breached its contractual
obligations. 2! The Federal Circuit disagreed,6 ° concluding that a
breach of contract had occurred, but that the damages claimed by
SCIID for the loss of water were too speculative.63' Indeed, SCIID
conceded that it had obtained sufficient water immediately following
the flood, but nevertheless sought damages based on water shortages
602in 1989 and 1990, several years after the dam failed . In conclusion,
the court explained that "In]ot every injury resulting from a breach
of contract is remediable in damages." 3 Accordingly, the court af-
firmed the judgment of the CFC.6
B. Eichleay Damages
If a suspension of work caused by the government occurs in a gov-
ernment contract, a contractor may recover the expenses incurred
625. See id. at 1565 (noting SCIDD's claim of having expectation interests in the continued
operation of the dam and explaining that before the storm in 1983, the dam was self-sufficient
in terms of power and expenses, and therefore, SCIDD did not have to pay for pumping
power).
626. See id. at 1565-66.
627. See id. at 1566 (rejecting SCIDD's claim that all costs of pumping should be assumed by
government).
628. See id. at 1561.
629. See id. at 1562.
630. See id. (noting that one obligation of the government under the SCIDD contract was
water storage for droughts, which was impaired when dam broke and reservoir could no longer
function at full capacity).
631. See id. at 1562-63 (outlining various factors that could affect water availability, includ-
ing weather, evaporation, and DOI discretion to sell surplus water). The Federal Circuit em-
phasized: "A plaintiff must show that but for the breach, the damage alleged would not have
been suffered." Id. at 1563. SCIDD had also argued that damages were proper for the loss of
water because the DOI could have sold the excess water and thereby decreased the costs of op-
eration for the dam (and thus the cost of the power). See id. at 1562. The Federal Circuit was
not persuaded by this argument and observed that nothing in the contract required that the
DOI realize a profit on the sale of excess water in order to offset operating expenses. See id. at
1563.
632. See id. at 1562-63.
633. Id.
634. See id. at 1569 (finding a breach of duty by the government but upholding the Court of
Claims' award of damages).
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due to the delay pursuant to a computational formula called "the
Eichleay formula. ,'35 Also known as Eichleay damages, this formula is
used to compensate the contractor for other work that could not be
performed due to the delay.06 In Satellite Electric Co. v. Dalton, 7 the
Federal Circuit reviewed the three elements necessary for obtaining
Eichleay damages and specifically considered the respective burdens
of proof for one of these three elements. Satellite Electric contracted
with the Navy to install a power supply system at a Navy facility."" On
two occasions, after Satellite Electric had completed 96.7 percent of
the contract, the Navy required Satellite Electric to suspend work due
to the unavailability of certain government-supplied parts.0 9
Due to the Navy's suspensions of work, Satellite Electric sought
Eichleay damages based on its home office overhead costs during the
periods of delay." °' On appeal to the ASBCA, the Board set out the
three elements required for Eichleay damages: (1) a government-
imposed delay; (2) that the government required the contractor to
remain available to proceed on the contract during the period of de-
lay; and (3) that during the period of delay, the contractor was un-
able to perform additional work."' The government conceded that
the Navy caused the delay, required Satellite Electric to remain able
to perform the contract, but disputed that Satellite Electric was un-
635. See Eichleay Corp., ASBCA No. 5183, 60-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 2688 (1960), affd on recon.,
ASBCA No.5183, 61-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 2894 (1960). The Eichleay formula comprises:
an allocation of the total recorded main office expense to the contract in the ratio of
contract billings to total billings for the period of performance. The resulting deter-
mination of a contract allocation is divided into a daily rate, which is multiplied by the
number of days of delay to arrive at the amount of the claim.
Id. at 13,574. The Federal Circuit first approved the award of damages based on the Eichleay
formula in CapitalElectric Co. v. United States, 729 F.2d 743 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating that a prime
contractor is to use the Eichleay formula in determining the amount of damages for extended
overhead).
636. SeeSatellite Elec. Co. v. Dalton, 105 F.3d 1418, 1420 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that evi-
dence of contractor's ability to take on other work during suspensions prevented judgment for
Eichleay damages). Generally, during the periods of delay pursuant to a suspension of work, the
government requires that the contractor remain ready and able to resume work upon notifica-
tion of the government. SeeEichleay, 60-2 B.C.A. (CCH), at 13,574. As a result, the contractor is
exposed to substantial losses for these periods of inactivity. See generally id. (determining
amount of equitable adjustments owed a contractor under work suspension contract provi-
sions).
637. 105 F.3d 1418 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
638. See id. at 1420 (explaining that part of the contract required the Navy to produce two
items: batteries and an induction coil).
639. See id. at 1420 (reporting that the first suspension of work lasted 82 days, and the sec-
ond suspension lasted 146 days due to Navy's inability to provide batteries and an induction
coil).
640. See id. at 1420. "Home office overhead costs" comprise "those costs that are expended
for the benefit of the whole business, which by their nature cannot be attributed or charged to
any particular contract." Altmayer v.Johnson, 79 F.3d 1129, 1132 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cited in Satel-
liteElec., 105 F.3d at 1421.
641. See Satellitelec. Co., 105 F.3d at 1421.
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able to obtain and perform other work.' 2 The ASBCA agreed that
Satellite Electric could have obtained other work and denied its
claim.' 3
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reviewed the single issue of whether
Satellite Electric was able to obtain and perform other work during
the delay.""' In addressing this issue, the court emphasized that, al-
though the government maintained the burden of "showing" all
three elements to avoid the payment of Eichleay damages, the con-
tractor nevertheless had to "prove" the inability to take on additional
work. 6" In meeting its initial showing, the government indicated that
Satellite Electric was able to bid on forty-nine jobs during the period
of suspension and inferred that this indicated its ability to perform
other work.' The court noted, however, that mere bidding does not
necessarily demonstrate an ability to perform."7 To determine
whether Satellite Electric was able to perform another contract, the
court examined various statements made by Satellite Electric before
the ASBCA regarding its ability to perform.648 In one such statement,
the company's president admitted that "we probably could have
[taken other work] if we had been able to find such."'' 9 Based in part
on statements such as this, the Federal Circuit concluded that Satel-
lite Electric could not "prove" an inability to take on other work and,
therefore, was not eligible for Eichleay damages. The court, accord-
ingly, affirmed the ruling of the ASBCA.6
642. See id. at 1421-22.
643. See Satellite Elec. Co., ASBCA No. 46,935, 95-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 27,883, at 139,089
(1995) (explaining that the government was only required to show, not prove, Satellite Elec-
tronic's ability to take on additional work), affd sub nom. Satellite Elec. Co. v. Dalton, 105 F.3d
1418 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
644. SeeSatelliteElec. Co., 105 F.3d at 1421.
645. See id. at 1422-23 (refusing to require the government to "prove" rather than "show"
that Satellite was able to take on additional work). Historically, the contractor had the burden
of proving all the requisite elements for Eichleay damages, but in Mech-Con Corp. v. West, 61 F.3d
883, 886 (Fed. Cir. 1995), the Federal Circuit shifted the initial burden to the government, if it
wanted to avoid Eichleay damages. In Mech-Con, the issue of burdens comprised an important
part of the Federal Circuit's decision, particularly in distinguishing the burden of "showing" a
contractor's ability to take on additional work from the burden of "proving" the ability to take
on additional work. Significantly, in Satellite Electronic, the Federal Circuit rejected an argument
that the government had the burden to prove that the contractor could not take on additional
work. See Satellite Elec. Co., 105 F.3d at 1423.
646. See id. at 1422.
647. See id. ("[T]he fact that the contractor may have bid on other contracts 'at the very
end' of the subject contract, does not establish that it was able to reduce its overhead or take on
other work during the delay.") (quoting Atmayer v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 1129, 1135 (Fed. Cir.
1996)).
648. See id. at 1422.
649. See id.
650. See id. at 1423. The court also noted that the fact that the contract was so near comple-
tion further indicated an ability to perform other contracts. See id. Satellite Electric had also
argued that it was unable to perform other work because its outstanding contract with the Navy
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C. Lost Profits
If the government is liable for damages to a contractor within the
scope of a contract, a board or court must generally compute such
damages based on the terms of the contract.6l However, if the gov-
ernment is liable for damages outside the terms of a contract, such as
damages for patent infringement, a court has greater discretion in
awarding damages.652 In Gargoyles, Inc. v. United States,6" for example,
the Federal Circuit considered the propriety of lost profits as a form
of available damages in a patent infringement suit against the United
States. In the 1970's, the Army sought to develop protective eyewear
that soldiers would wear both on and off-duty. The Army consid-
ered eyewear manufactured by Gargoyles, 5 which was the subject of
U.S. Patent No. 4,741,611.66 Although the eyewear contained the sty-
listic components desired by the Army, it was considered unfit for
657military purposes. The Army then awarded a contract to various
other entities for the production of the required eyewear. Because
the Army eyewear contained stylistic features similar to the Gargoyles
product, Gargoyles brought suit in the CFC for patent infringement
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1498.59 In the liability phase, the CFC found
infringement,6° and in the damages phase, awarded damages based
on a reasonable royalty.65'
On appeal of the damage award, Gargoyles sought damages in the
made additional bonding unavailable. The court rejected this argument, noting that many of
Satellite's bonding issues were due to the untimely submission of an invoice by Satellite Electric
to the Navy. See id. at 1422.
651. See CIBINIC & NASH, supra note 76, at 499-501.
652. See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b) (1994) (explaining that a suit against the govern-
ment for patent infringement is only available in CFC). See generally Lionel M. Lavenue, Patent
Infringement by the United States and Government Contractors under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 in the United
States Court of Federal Claims, 2J. INTELL. PROP. L. 389 (1995) (providing a thorough overview of
patent suits against the government pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1498).
653. 113 F.3d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
654. See id. at 1574.
655. See id. at 1573-74 (explaining that Gargoyles eyewear was considered for use by the
Army because soldiers would readily use the eyewear both on and off duty due to its stylistic
wrap configuration).
656. See id. at 1573.
657. See id.
658. See id. (detailing various contracts with American Optical, Genex, Inc., and Uvex Win-
ter Optical, Inc.).
659. See id. at 1573-74.
660. See id. at 1574. The CFC had originally found noninfringement in Gargoyles, Inc. v.
United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1367, 1368 (1992), but the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded that
ruling in Gargoyles, Inc. v. United States, 6 F.3d 787 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (unpublished table deci-
sion). On remand, the CFC found infringement, both literally and under the doctrine of
equivalents. See Gargoyles, Inc. v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 157, 170 (1994).
661. See Gargoyles, 113 F.3d at 1574 (awarding Gargoyles a ten percent royalty on a base,
representing the bulk of ballistic/laser protective glasses, and a fifty percent royalty on a minor
portion of the development phase contract).
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form of lost profits instead in the form of a reasonable royalty. 6 2 Cit-
ing Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co.,O Gargoyles argued that, but for the in-
fringement of the government, there was a "reasonable probability"
that it would have made the sales in question and, thus, claimed enti-
tlement to lost profits." The government responded that lost profits
are not available for damages in patent infringement suits pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1498.66 Even if lost profits were available, the govern-
ment argued that under Tektronix, Inc. v. United States,"6 lost profits
would be available only upon a showing of "strictest proof," and then
only by "clear and convincing evidence."' 7 In considering these con-
flicting arguments, the Federal Circuit indicated that "Gargoyles is
reasonable in speculating on the continued viability of the vague lan-
guage of 'strict proof' in Tektronix and the 'clear and convincing'
proof standard discussed therein."( The court noted, however, that
the standard and burden stated in Tektronix nevertheless "binds th[e]
court until overruled."' In its final conclusion, the court did not re-
solve the issue of the continuing viability of the Tektronix standard
because the court concluded that even under the lower "reasonable
probability" standard, Gargoyles did not demonstrate entitlement to
lost profits."" At the same time, the Federal Circuit clearly reiterated
that "[s]ince both section 284 and section 1498 speak of 'compensa-
tion,' albeit 'adequate' compensation in the former and 'reasonable
and entire' compensation in the latter, lost profits should be recover-
able in at least some infringement actions against the government,
even though the Fifth Amendment is implicated."67' Accordingly, the
662. Seeid. at 1575.
663. 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
664. See Gargoyles, 113 F.3d at 1575 (citing Rite-Hite, which explained that patentee need
only show "reasonable probability" that sales would have occurred "but for" the infringement).
665. See id.
666. 552 F.2d 343, 348-49 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
667. See Gargoyles, 113 F.3d at 1575 (citing the Tektronix standard of proof). In Tektronix the
Court of Claims held: "If lost profits are ever to be awarded under § 1498, it should be only
after the strictest proof that the patentee would actually have earned and retained those sums
in its sales to the Government." Tektronix, 522 F.2d at 349. In Gargoyles, the government argued
that, because a section 1498 action is considered akin to a taking, rather than a tortuous act,
the proper remedy is a royalty, not lost profits. See Gargoyles, 113 F.3d at 1575.
668. See Gargoyles, 113 F.3d at 1575-76. The Federal Circuit explained that "the standard in
private actions is that the 'patentee must establish, by a preponderance of evidence, that but for
the infringement, he would have earned the profits he asserts were lost.'" See id. at 1576 (quot-
ing Herbert v. Lisle Corp., 99 F.3d 1109, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
669. See id. at 1576 (stating that decisions of CFC that are on point legally and factually are
binding unless overruled by en banc decision of U.S. Court of Appeals).
670. See id. at 1576-77.
671. Id. at 1576. In a cross-appeal, the government also challenged the quantum of the
award of damages based on a reasonable royalty. See id. at 1580. The CFC applied the fifteen-
factor test as described in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116,
1120 (S.D.N.Y.), rood. and affd, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971). See Gargoyles, 113 F.3d at 1580.
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court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the CFC.67
D. Pre-Judgment Interest
In a recovery of damages against the United States, the damages
computation typically includes both prejudgment interest (interest
on the amount of the claim from the date payment was due until the
time that the payment obligation is adjudicated) and post-judgment
interest (interest on the sum from the time that the liability was adju-
dicated as due until the time of payment)*675 However, while post-
judgment interest is generally awarded as a matter of course, 674 spe-
cific authority, such as a contract, statute, or express consent of Con-
gress, must exist for the recovery of prejudgment interest. 67
In Doty v. United States,676 the Federal Circuit considered whether
the Prompt Payment Act provided authority for the award of pre-
judgment interest. On April 12, 1995, Doty obtained a judgment
677
against the United States in the amount of $99,841.96. The gov-
ernment, however, refused to pay Doty prejudgment interest, despite
the fact that section 14(c) of the Prompt Payment Act specifically re-
quires the payment of prejudgment interest "with respect to all obli-
gations incurred on or after January 1, 1989.,,678 The government ar-
gued that, although the obligation was incurred on April 12, 1995,
section 14(c) did not apply because the basis of the claim was a con-
tract executed prior to January 1, 1989. 67 The CFC agreed with the
The Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court's damage calculation. See id. at 1581.
672. See Gargoyles, 113 F.3d at 1582.
673. SeeW. NOEL KEYES, GOVERNMENT CONTRAcrs § 33.28(c), at 515-16 (1986).
674. See 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (a) (1994) ("Interest shall be allowed on any moneyjudgment in a
civil case recovered in district court.").
675. See Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 317 (1986) (upholding a "no interest
rule" in claims against United States); see also Smith v. United States, 302 U.S. 329, 353 (1937)
("The rule is established that in the absence of contract or statute evincing a contrary inten-
tion, interest does not run upon claims against the Government even though there has been
default in the payment of the principal.").
676. 109 F.3d 746 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
677. See id. at 747. Doty further argued that the government owed them interest on their
claim. See id. They based their claim on 28 U.S.C. § 2516 which states that "[I]nterest on a
claim against the United States shall be allowed in a judgment of the United States Court of
Federal Claims only under a contract or act of Congress providing for payment thereof." 28
U.S.C. § 2516 (1994). Accordingly, Doty argued that interest was due under a farm support
program agreement, administered by the Commodity Credit Corporation under the Agricul-
tural Act of 1949 and reinforced by the Prompt Payment Act Amendments of 1988.
678. See Doty, 109 F.3d at 748. The Prompt Payment Act authorizes the payment of pre-
judgment interest for farm support programs administered by the Commodity Credit Corpora-
tion. See 31 U.S.C. § 3902(h) (2) (A) (1994). The Federal Circuit recognized that Congress had
specifically implored the Commodity Credit Corporation to pay pre-judgment interest in the
1988 amendments to the Prompt Payment Act. See Doty, 109 F.3d at 747-48 (citing Prompt
Payment Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-496, 102 Stat. 2455 (1988), (which applies
the obligation to pay prejudgment interest to all obligations incurred afterJanuary 1, 1989).
679. See Doty, 109 F.3d at 748.
1998] GOVERNMENT CONTRACT CASES 1469
government's position and denied the claim for pre-judgment inter-
est.'"
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the plain
meaning of section 14(c) pertains to "obligations" incurred after
January 1, 1989, and not "contracts executed" afterJanuary 1, 1989.6
In so holding, the court emphasized that "[t]here is no ambiguity
concerning congressional intent. It is not reasonable to read section
14(c) as applying only to contracts awarded after the effective date,
particularly in view of the words of section 14(b). The text 'obliga-
tions incurred' must be given effect." 2
In a related issue, the Federal Circuit also ruled that the govern-
ment must return the interest it assessed against Doty for payments
that were made as representative of the $99,841.96judgment." 3 After
award of the judgment, the government refused to refund this as-
sessment of interest, and the Federal Circuit was forced to resolve this
wrongful collection issue. 4 In ruling against the government on this
issue as well, the court exclaimed, "[t]he government has no right to
retain the interest that was improperly collected."65 Thus, the Fed-
eral Circuit ruled in favor of Doty on each issue appealed from the
CFC.'
Similarly, in Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority v. United
States,' 7 the Federal Circuit considered the scope of a type of pre-
judgment interest under to the Intergovernmental Cooperation
680. See id. at 746 (holding that the contract was executed prior to January 1, 1989, and
therefore, constituted an obligation incurred prior toJanuary 1, 1989).
681. See id. at 748.
682. Id.
683. See id. at 748-49 (holding that as the Dotys were entitled to the payments that were
wrongly retrieved by the government, the interest the government charged them for the use of
their own money should be returned).
684. See id. at 749 (reporting the total payment awarded to Doty).
685. Id. at 748.
686. See id. at 749. An additional issue in Dory regarding the payment of ajudgment against
the United States remained. As the government contested the right to interest on ajudgment,
it refused to verify that no further judicial review would be sought and thus withheld payment
of the judgment. See id. at 747. The Federal Circuit disapproved of this action because the ap-
peal had not encompassed the amount due under the judgment: "There is no discretion on
the part of government counsel to delay the ministerial act of verifying to the Treasury that no
further judicial review would be sought of the adjudicated amount for which payment had
been requested." Id. Title 28, section 2517(a) of the United States Code governs the type of
payments in question. This section states in relevant part:
Except as provided by the Contracts Disputes Act of 1978, every final judgment ren-
dered by the United States Court of Federal Claims against the United States shall be
paid out of any general appropriation therefor, on presentation to the General Ac-
counting Office of a certification of the judgment by the clerk and the chiefjudge of
the court.
28 U.S.C § 2517(a) (1994).
687. 129 F.3d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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Act.r" Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority ("MBTA") en-
tered into an agreement with the Federal Railroad Administration
("FRA") to renovate South Station in Boston, Massachusetts.6 Pur-
suant to the terms of the "South Station Transportation Center Proj-
ect Cooperative Construction Agreement," the FRA agreed to fund
100 percent of the operational costs and fifty percent of the shared
improvement costs, while the MBTA agreed to fund the other fifty
percent of the shared improvement costs and 100 percent of the lo-
cal improvement costs.6 Under the agreement, the FRA also had re-
sponsibility for the design of the project.6' After completion of the
renovations, the construction contractor obtained from a state set-
tlement more than $3.8 million: $1.9 million from the MBTA, $1.8
million from the design professionals, and $110,000 from Amtrak
and Boston Edison.02 Based on its portion of the liability, the MBTA
brought suit in the CFCWs The CFC granted a motion for summary
judgment for the FRA.64
On appeal, the Federal Circuit remanded or reversed virtually all
the rulings made by the CFC.6s In addition, because the MBTA
sought a type of prejudgment interest based on its claims against the
FRA, the court also considered the scope of the interest provisions in
the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act,6 which entitles the states
to recover interest for funds expended by them to fund programs
based on Federal law, regulation, or other agreement.07  The FRA
688. 31 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6503 (1994).
689. See Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 129 F.3d at 1228 (stating that renovation of South
Station was a component of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Act of 1976, codified at
45 U.S.C. §§ 801-836 (1994)). The MBTA owned South Station. See id.
690. See id. at 1229. The contract price for the renovations was $48.775 million. See id. at
1230.
691. Seeid.at1229.
692. See id. at 1230 (explaining that due to design defects, the project was completed 956
days late at a cost of approximately $69 million, and that construction contractor, J.F. White,
sought $23,680,228 in increased costs).
693. See id. The causes of action brought in the CFC included (1) a warranty claim, (2) a
claim based on insurance endorsements, (3) a claim based on certain settlement costs relating
to the allocation of contractor claims, (4) a claim based on the Terrazzo floors, and (5) a claim
based on the Headhouse floors. See id. at 1230-35.
694. See id. at 1230 (holding that a warranty disclaimer shielded FRA from all liability for
damages due to design error).
695. See id. at 1230-36. For example, the court remanded the claims concerning the insur-
ance endorsements, the allocation of contractor costs, the Terrazzo floors, and the Headhouse
floors. See id. The court reversed the CFC's decision concerning the warranty claim. See id. at
1230-36.
696. See id. at 1236 (citing 31 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6503 (1994)).
697. See id. The Act provides:
If a State disburses its own funds for program purposes in accordance with Federal
law, Federal regulation, or Federal-State agreement, the State shall be entitled to in-
terest from the time the State's funds are paid out to redeem checks or warrants, or
make payments by other means, until the Federal funds are deposited to the State's
1470
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argued that the Act did not include the MBTA because it was an "in-
dependent political subdivision."O' Citing Massachusetts law, an
opinion of the Massachusetts Attorney General, and a ruling of the
Comptroller General, the MBTA argued that it was indeed a "state
instrumentality" for purposes of the Act." The Federal Circuit
agreed,7°° noting that "FRA has not presented any cogent argument
to the contrary. ''7°
E. Costs, Attorney Fees, and Expenses
Following a recovery against the United States, a contractor fre-
quently desires to recover the costs associated with bringing suit
against the government, including the costs associated with filing the
702suit, attorney fees, and other expenses related to the litigation.
While the costs associated with filing the suit are almost always de
minimis in an appeal, such costs can reach substantial sums during
the initial proceeding before the forum of first instance.0 3
As demonstrated in Neal & Co. v. United States,70 the CFC has wide
discretion in the award of the costs associated with the filing of a suit.
Neal & Co. ("Neal") sued the United States based on a contract with
the U.S. Coast Guard.7 5 Of nine claims, Neal prevailed on four and
obtained an award of $792,143.83. 706 Despite this favorable ruling,
bank account.
See31 U.S.C. § 6503(d) (1) (1994).
698. See Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 129 F.3d at 1236 (explaining that while the Act in-
cludes "an instrumentality of a State," the Act specifically excludes "political subdivisions"); see
also 31 U.S.C. § 6501(10) (1994) (stating that a "unit of general local government" means a
county, city, town, village, or other general purpose political subdivision of a state).
699. See Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 129 F.3d at 1236 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
161A, § 1, and Op. Mass. Att'y Gen. 9 (July 24, 1978), which found that Massachusetts Bay is a
state agency and thus may retain interest on federal grant funds); In re Status of Transit Auth.,
56 Comp. Gen. 353, 356 (1977) (describing Massachusetts Bay as a state instrumentality).
700. See Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 129 F.3d at 1237 (concluding that a reference to a
political subdivision" merely referred to "a local government of a State"); see also 31 U.S.C.
§ 6501(10) (1994).
701. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 129 F.3d at 1237. Although cited here with regard to
prejudgment interest, this case is also of particular interest due to the manner by which the
Federal Circuit roundly remanded and reversed every ruling of the CFC.
702. See KEYES, supra note 673, §§ 33.32-33.32(a), at 548-50. Under "The American rule," a
party is generally responsible for its own attorney fees and expenses. See id. For government
procurement, certain statutory provisions provide exceptions to this general rule, such as the
Equal Access to justice Act ("EAJA"). See id. § 33.32(a), at 551.
703. For an appeal, the only costs generally pertain to the filing costs. For the initial pro-
ceeding, however, these costs can total thousands of dollars.
704. 121 F.3d 683 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
705. See id. at 684. The contract was for the construction of thirty units of family housing at
the U.S. Coast Guard Support Center on Kodiak Island, Alaska. See id. The suit arose due to
alleged differing site conditions, delays, and other asserted breaches. See id.
706. See id.
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the CFC did not award costs to Neal.70 ' Neal thereafter filed a motion
for an award of costs totaling approximately $90,000, but the CFC
denied the motion without providing a written rationale.7° The CFC
similarly refused a motion for reconsideration.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit analyzed the claim for costs, noting
that the claim cited Rule 54(d) of the RCFC as authorization for the
claim.710 Because the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA") governs all
requests for costs by prevailing parties in the CFC, however, the Fed-
eral Circuit determined that the RCFC 54(d) was inapplicable to any
claim in the CFC71' and, accordingly, considered Neal's request for
costs under the EAJA . More specifically, the court examined
whether "the trial court abused its discretion by declining to offer an
explanation of its reasons for refusing costs [under the EAJA]."7 5
Significantly, although RCFC 54(d) creates a presumption requir-
ing the award of costs to a prevailing party, the court described threeS 714
reasons why the EAJA does not create a similar presumption. First,
unlike RCFC 54(d), the language of the EAJA describes the award of
costs in a permissive, not mandatory, manner.75  Based on the dis-
tinction between the mandatory "shall" in RCFC 54(d) and the per-
missive "may" in the EAJA, the court found the standards distinguish-
able for purposes of costs.
7 6
707. See id.
708. See id.
709. See id.
710. See id. Court of Federal Claims Rule 54(d) states:
Except when express provision therefor is made either in statute of the United States
or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing party in
any action not dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, unless the court oth-
erwise directs; but costs against the United States shall be imposed only to the extent
permitted by law.
Id. Note that this rule somewhat mirrors the language of Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
711. See id. at 684-85. The EAJA provides that "ajudgment for costs... may be awarded to
the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United States." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(a) (1) (1994). The Federal Circuit explained: "ARCFC 54(d) would not seem to apply
to any case before that court unless 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a) [EAJA] was changed." See Nea4 121
F.3d at 685. In addition to the award of costs, the EAJA pertains to the award of attorney fees
and other expenses. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1994). However, whereas the recovery of costs
under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a) applies to all prevailing parties, the recovery of attorney fees and
other expenses under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) requires that certain prerequisites be satisfied. See
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (2) (B) (1994) (describing the small entity status prerequisite).
712. SeeNea, 121 F.3d at686.
713. Id.
714. See id.
715. See id. The EAJA provides in relevant part: "[A] judgment for costs, as enumerated in
section 1920 of this title, but not including the fees and expenses of attorneys, may be awarded
to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United States... in any
court havingjurisdiction of such action." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (1) (1994); see also supra note 710
(providing text of Court of Federal Claims Rule 54(d)).
716. See Nea4 121 F.3d at 686 ("The term 'may' in EAJA provides the Court of Federal
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Second, the contrast of the language of EAJA making the award of
attorney fees and expenses mandatory, with the permissive language
in the EAJA regarding costs, further indicates the discretion allowed
to a court in awarding costs.7 17 The EAJA provides: "[A] court shall
award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and
other expenses,... unless the court finds the position of the United
States substantiallyjustified."71 8 Therefore, in contrast to this manda-
tory language regarding attorneys fees and expenses, the provision
on costs uses permissive language, which the court of appeals cited as
persuasive.
Finally, the court noted that its restrictive reading of the EAJA was
consistent with the requirement of a limited waiver of sovereign im-
munity.7 Based on these three reasons, the Federal Circuit affirmed
the ruling of the CFC, concluding that the CFC has wide discretion
in the award of costs, which includes the discretion to deny costs
without any explanation.72
Attorney fees and other litigation expenses generally comprise the
bulk of the costs associated with bringing suit against the govern-
ment.m In most cases, at least for small entities that prevail in their
actions, these costs may be recovered from the government pursuant
to the EAJA.7 In Ed A. Wilson, Inc. v. General Services Administration,7
4
Claims wide discretion to award costs.").
717. See id.
718. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1) (A) (1994)).
719. See id. Although the recovery of costs seems subject to wide discretion, the Federal
Circuit makes some strong statements regarding the award of attorney fees and expenses. For
example, the court stated: "Thus in awarding attorney fees, the trial court has no choice, but
the required conditions for award occur rarely." Id. With reference to these conditions, the
court further explained: "Attorney fees and expenses must be awarded when the Govern-
ment's position is not 'substantiallyjustified.'" Id. Although this case will not result in an in-
crease in the award of costs by the CFC, it may perhaps result in a greater likelihood of receiv-
ing an award of attorney fees and expenses. Indeed, although the recovery of these costs are
only available upon petition to the court, the above citations should provide ample basis for a
contractor to make such a petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1994) (discussing petitions for th
award of attorney fees and expenses).
720. See Nea 121 F.3d at 687 (explaining that waiver of sovereign immunity is not to be
"'enlarge(d] ... beyond what the language requires'") (citing Eastern Transp. Co. v. United
States, 272 U.S. 675, 686 (1927)).
721. See id. ("Without a presumption in favor of a costs award, the CFC is under no obliga-
tion to explain a deviation from the norm."). The court further explained that, in "awarding
costs, the trial court has broad discretion to determine whether and how much to award a pre-
vailing party." Id. at 686-87.
722. See KEYES, supra note 673, § 33.32(b), at 552. These costs are usually computed by ref-
erence to an hourly rate or a contingency fee. See id.
723. See geeraUy 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1994 & Supp. 1997). The general rule for the recovery of
attorney fees and expenses under the EAJA requires that the party have a net worth of less than
$7,000,000 or less than 500 employees at the time the adversary adjudication was initiated. See
id. § 504(b) (1) (B).
724. 126 F.3d 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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the Federal Circuit considered which party must actually incur the
legal fees to properly assert a claim to attorney fees under the EAJA.
Ed A. Wilson, Inc. ("Wilson") entered into a fixed price contract with
the General Services Administration ("GSA") for the remodeling of a
federal building in Dallas, Texas.m During contract performance, a
sprinkler line broke, causing damage to the building.us After the
contracting officer refused a claim for the damage, Wilson filed a
claim with its insurance company, Bituminous Casualty Corp. ("Bi-
tuminous"), which provided an interest-free loan to cover the dam-
ages in exchange for the right to pursue a claim against the GSA .
Bituminous then pursued a claim against the GSA in the name of
Wilson and prevailed in an action before the GSBCA.78 Thereafter,
Bituminous filed a claim for the award of attorney fees pursuant to
the EAJA, but the GSBCA denied the claim, holding that Wilson per-
sonally had not "incurred" any of the attorney fees or expenses as re-
quired by the language of the statute.'
On appeal, the Federal Circuit considered whether Wilson had in-
curred the legal fees associated with the suit before the GSBCA for
purposes of the EAJA, even though Wilson's insurance company ac-
tually incurred the fees." ° The court first considered the language of
the statute:
An agency that conducts an adversary adjudication shall award, to a
prevailing party other than the United States, fees and other ex-
penses incurred by that party in connection with that proceeding,
unless the adjudicative officer of the agency finds that the position
of the agency was substantially justified or that special circum-
stances make an award unjust.
The court concluded that as there was no clear definition of "in-
curred," as used in the statute, the GSBCA's ruling was overly restric-
tive." 2 The court noted that precedent existed for allowing a party to
725. See id. at 1407.
726. See id.
727. See id. Based on the broken sprinkler line, Wilson submitted a claim to the contracting
officer for $26,293.62, which was denied. See id. Wilson then submitted an insurance claim to
Bituminous, which provided Wilson with an interest-free loan in the amount of $21,445.33. See
id. The loan was only to be repaid, if Wilson recovered any amount from a party liable for the
damage. See id. Wilson then assigned all rights to such liability to Bituminous, including all
litigation responsibilities. See id.
728. See id. (citing Ed A. Wilson, Inc. v. GSA, GSBCA No. 12596, 96-1 B.CA (CCH)
127,934, at 139,507 (1995)).
729. See id. at 1408.
730. See id.
731. See id. at 1408 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 504(a) (1) (1994)).
732. See id. at 1411. The court noted that "[t]he board held that fees and expenses are in-
curred when the prevailing party is either liable for, or subject to paying, them." Id. at 1409.
The court, however, rejected this holding, observing that "[w]hile there is some allure to sim-
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be represented by an attorney from another entity, such as a legal
733
services organization or a union counsel. As such, the court rea-
soned that there was no basis to deny the recovery of attorney fees
and expenses by Wilson, even though its insurer had actually in-
curred the costs. Thus, the court reversed the ruling of the
GSBCA.
Ts
VI. OTHER DECISIONS
In addition to the decisions described above, in 1997, the Federal
Circuit issued ninety-three unpublished government contract deci-
sions. Forty-seven of these decisions involved a summary affirmance,
commonly called "disposition by Rule 36."75 The more significant
plicity of the board's construction, it cannot stand in light of precedent and the purposes un-
derlying the [EAJAI." Id. at 1409. The court further explained that "whether the linchpin to
an award of attorney fees is the actual payment of attorney fees, the existence of an attorney-
client relationship, or the incurrence of fees on behalf of an applicant, Wilson meets the stan-
dard." Id. at 1410. The court did, however, reject Wilson's (or its insurer) claim for $2,131 in
labor costs associated with employees who monitored the litigation before the board. See id. at
1408 n.2.
733. See id. at 1409. The court emphasized: "[W]e are unable to discern any material dis-
tinction between the union cases and this one." Id. Moreover, the court observed that, if a
party were not able to recovery attorney fees and expenses under circumstances such as these,
it would defeat the purpose of the EAJA. See id. at 1410 ("Any contrary ruling would subvert the
Act's purpose."). In further support of its decision, the court noted that the purposes of the
EAJA included defending against unjustified government action as well as helping to refine
and formulate public policy. See id.
In addition, the Federal Circuit seems to indicate that a non-attorney, pro se contractor may
also be entitled to recovery of fees and expenses under the EAJA. See id. Currently, there is a
split of opinion among the boards of contract appeals on this issue. See Simpson Contracting
Corp., EBCA No. 9,602,190, 96-2 B.C-A. (CCH) 1 28,471 (1996) (holding that pro se litigants are
not entitled to litigation expenditures if they are not expenses covered by the Act but that
other boards have allowed such expenditures); see also Joseph R. DeClerk & Assocs., Inc.,
ASBCA No. 49,595, 97-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 29,268 (1997) (holding that the intent of EAJA is to
encourage representation by an attorney, thus awarding attorney fees to a non-attorney would
thwart the aim of the law). See generally EAJA Allows Award of Legal Fees Paid by Contractor's In-
surer-Federal Circuit Resolves Conflict Between Boards, 39 GOV'T CONTRACTOR 1 520, at 18-19 (Oct.
29, 1997).
734. See Wilson, 126 F.3d at 1410-11. The Federal Circuit clearly indicated that Wilson had
acted properly, stating-
Denying a small business, which in its keen acumen has obtained insurance to insulate
itself from liability for accidents during contract performance, and thus from poten-
tial insolvency, an award of fees for the attorney services that it procured as part of its
policy would thwart the Act's purpose of deterring unreasonable governmental action.
Id. at 1410. Notably, however, the court only determined that Wilson was eligible to recover
attorney fees and expenses, but that he still had to satisfy the other qualifications for the recov-
ery of fees and expenses pursuant to the EAJA. See id. at 1408 n.3.
735. The Local Rules of the Federal Circuit provide for a summary affirmance. See FED.
CIR. R. 36 (permitting a judgment in docket to constitute an entry of judgment, making an
opinion unnecessary). In 1996, of the 726 decisions, the Federal Circuit issued 175 affirmances
based on Rule 36.
In 1997, approximately 24 percent of the court's decisions were Rule 36 affirmances. See,
e.g., D.E.W., Inc v. West, 129 F.3d 134, (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision); West v.
Red Samm Constr., Inc., 124 F.3d 227 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision); Roach v.
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cases of this group are presented below. Significantly, the Local
Rules of the Federal Circuit prohibit citation to unpublished deci-
sions as precedent7 6  Nevertheless, to provide a complete survey of
all the significant decisions of the Federal Circuit for 1997, these un-
published decisions are cited and summarized solely for purposes of
education and review.
A. Jurisdiction
In Janicki Logging Co. v. United States,737 Janicki had submitted a
claim in the CFC some fifty-four months after the contracting offi-
cer's final decision. 7 The CFC had denied the claim under the stat-
Runyon, 124 F.3d 227 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision); K & S Constr. v. United
States, 121 F.3d 727 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision); GDE Sys., Inc. v. GSA, 119
F.3d 16 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Barram, 119 F.3d
16 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision); Planned Sys. Int'l v. Widnall, 119 F.3d 15
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision); Pizzagalli Constr. Co. v. Dalton, 119 F.3d 15
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision); Environmental Data Consultants, Inc. v. GSA,
119 F.3d 15 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision); Hubsch Industrieanlagen Spezial-
bay Gmbh v. United States, 116 F.3d 1497 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision);
Monde Constr. Co. v. Dalton, 116 F.3d 1497 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision);
Honig Indus. Diamond Wheel, Inc. v. West, 116 F.3d 1496 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table
decision); OMNI, Inc. v. Barram, 116 F.3d 1496 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision);
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, 114 F.3d 1208 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished
table decision); McRae Indus. v. Cohen, 114 F.3d 1207 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table de-
cision); Dick Enter. v. Reno, 114 F.3d 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision); First
Interstate Bank v. United States, 114 F.3d 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision);
GLR Constructors, Inc. v. Togo, 114 F.3d 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision);
Penn. Envtl. Control, Inc. v. Brown, 113 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table deci-
sion); Heathman, Inc. v. United States, 113 F.3d 1257 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table deci-
sion); Conner Bros. Constr. Co. v. Brown, 113 F.3d 1256 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table
decision); RosinkaJoint Venture v. Albright, 113 F.3d 1256 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table
decision); Rehabilitation Servs. v. Perry, 113 F.3d 1256 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table de-
cision); Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Dalton, 113 F.3d 1256 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table
decision); A.S. McGaughan Co. v. Barrram, 113 F.3d 1256 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table
decision); Hendlish v. United States Postal Serv., 113 F.3d 1255 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished
table decision); Desciose v. United States, 113 F.3d 1254 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table
decision); Hydro Eng'g, Inc. v. United States, 113 F.3d 1254 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished ta-
ble decision); Reddy-Buffaloes Pump, Inc. v. West, 111 F.3d 144 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished
table decision); Strand Hunt Constr., Inc. v. West, 111 F.3d 142 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished
table decision); 9th & D Joint Venture v. GSA, 108 F.3d 1394 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished
table decision); KMS Fusion, Inc. v. United States, 108 F.3d 1394 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished
table decision); Rincon Ctr. Assocs. v.Johnson, 108 F.3d 1393 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished
table decision); Turner-Mak v. West, 108 F.3d 1393 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table deci-
sion); Amertex Enters., Ltd. v. United States, 108 F.3d 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table
decision); Dalton v. Gaffny Corp., 108 F.3d 1391 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision);
Orbas & Assocs. v. Widnall, 108 F.3d 1391 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision);
Tempo, Inc. v. West, 108 F.3d 1391 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision); Libby Corp.
v. Widnall, 106 F.3d 427 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision); GKS Inc. v. Perry, 106
F.3d 427 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision).
736. FED. CIR. R. 47.6(b) (stating that opinions unanimously decided by panel as "not add-
ing significantly to the body of law" are not citable as precedent).
737. No. 97-5006, 1997 WL 468285 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 18, 1997).
738. Seeid.at*1.
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ute of limitations. 7"' On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed, reject-
ingJanicki's assertion of entitlement to equitable tolling.
In Strand Hunt Construction, Inc. v. West,74' Strand Hunt Construc-
tion had submitted a claim to the ASBCA based on a construction
contract with the Army Corps of Engineers. The ASBCA denied the
claim, but on appeal, the Federal Circuit questioned whether it even
had jurisdiction over the appeal.7 2 Because the contract specifically
provided that it was not subject to the CDA, and because the Federal
Circuit only has jurisdiction over board cases based on the CDA, the
Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack ofjurisdiction.743
In Phoenix Control Systems, Inc. v. Babbit,74 the Federal Circuit ad-
dressed its standard of review for the factual findings of a BCA.
Phoenix Control Systems challenged the board's factual findings, but
the Federal Circuit affirmed, noting the "heavy burden" that the ap-
pellant has when challenging a board of contract appeals' factual
findings.74
In In re Sasco Electric,746 the CFC denied a subcontractor's right to
intervene in an action, and the subcontractor submitted a writ of
mandamus to the Federal Circuit.747 Ruling that the CFC had prop-
erly rejected the request for intervention due to the lack of privity of
contract between the subcontractor and the government, and citing
the lack of a "clear and indisputable" right to the issuance of a writ of
mandamus, the Federal Circuit affirmed the CFC's decision. 748
739. See id. The CDA provides that, after the contracting officer has rendered a final deci-
sion, the contractor has twelve months to appeal the decision to the CFC. See 41 U.S.C.
§ 609(a) (3) (1994).
740. SeeJanicki, 1997 WL 468285, at *1. As the Federal Circuit explained: "Equitable toll-
ing permits a plaintiff to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations if, for example, despite all
due diligence he is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of his claim."
Id. (citing Weddel v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 100 F.3d 929, 931 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
In rejecting Janicki's argument, the court concluded thatJanicki had not acted with due dili-
gence. See id.
741. No. 96-1323, 1997 WL 130326 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 21, 1997).
742. See id. at *1.
743. See id. at *2 ("If the CDA does not apply to the contract at issue, then we lack jurisdic-
tion.").
744. No. 96-1292, 1997 WL 196776 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 22, 1997).
745. See id. at *1 (noting that Phoenix has a "difficult row to hoe" when the basis of appeal
is an attempt to overturn a board's factual findings); see also Fruin-Colnon Corp. v. United
States, 912 F.2d 1426, 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (noting that the appellant bears a "heavy burden in
demonstrating that a board's factual findings should be overturned"); Blount Bros. Corp. v.
United States, 872 F.2d 1003, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("If there is conflicting testimony in the
record, the Board's preference will, generally, not be disturbed.... ") (citations omitted).
746. No. 509, 1997WL 355315 (Fed. Cir.June 3, 1997).
747. See id. at *1. In denying its right to intervene, the CFC pointed out that the subcon-
tractor's remedy was against the prime contractor, not the government. See id.
748. See id. The court explained, "[tihe remedy of mandamus in [sic] available only in ex-
traordinary situations to correct a clear abuse of discretion or usurpation ofjudicial power." Id.
The court continued: "A party seeking such a writ bears the burden of proving that it has no
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In Korczak v. United States,749 a unique case dealing with jurisdiction
over secret contracts, Korczak submitted a contract claim for com-
pensation to the CFC. Based on the 122-year-old case Totten v. United
States,70 the CFC dismissed the complaint, stating that it lacked juris-
diction over secret contracts.75' On appeal, the Federal Circuit af-
firmed, citing the binding authority of Totten, which prohibits any ju-
dicial review of secret contracts with the government.
7 2
B. Contract Formation
- 753
In Mac's Cleaning & Repair Service v. Dalton, the Federal Circuit
considered a typical dispute over the type of contract. Mac's Clean-
ing had a contract with the Navy, which provided for a FFP per
month with a unit price for any additional work ordered under an
indefinite quantity component. 4 Mac's Cleaning, however, asserted
that the contract contained only a FEP component and sought to re-
cover the maximum amount available under the contract. On ap-
peal, the Federal Circuit rejected this argument and held that the
contract was a mixed contract, containing both a FFP component
and an indefinite quantity component. 7%
In Zacharin v. United States,757 a case involving the issue of authority,
Zacharin sued the United States for patent infringement under 28
U.S.C. § 1498. 75' The government argued that the United States had
an express license to use the invention, but Zacharin contended that
a memorandum executed by a government representative concur-
rent with the license invalidated the express license. 759 The Federal
means of attaining the relief desired, and that the right to issuance of the writ is 'clear and in-
disputable.'" Id. (quoting Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35 (1980)).
749. No. 96-5139, 1997WL 488751 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 25, 1997).
750. 92 U.S. 105 (1875) (holding that suits cannot be maintained against the government
in cases of contracts for secret or confidential services with the government).
751. SeeKorczak, 1997 WL 488751, at*1.
752. See id. In so holding, the court observed that "[tihe secrecy which such [secret] con-
tracts impose precludes any action for their enforcement." Id. (citing Totten, 92 U.S. at 107).
Apparently, Korczak did not refute the holding of Totten, but merely requested that the Federal
Circuit review the rationale of the holding. See id. at *2. The court refused, noting that "[w]e
are duty bound to follow the law given us by the Supreme Court unless and until it is changed."
Id.
753. No. 97-1293, 1997WL 697921 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 7, 1997).
754. Seeid.at "1.
755. See id. Whereas the government interpreted the contract to include a monthly pay-
ment of $3,813, Mac's Cleaning interpreted it to include a monthly payment of $9,530.99. See
id.
756. See id. The court stated that as Mac's Cleaning had separately identified the two com-
ponents in its bid, it expressly understood the dual nature of the mixed contract. See id.
757. No. 96-5076, 1997WL 63177 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 14, 1997).
758. See id. at *1. See generally Lavenue, supra note 652, at 489 (describing the history and
current application of 28 U.S.C. § 1498).
759. SeeZacharin, 1997 WL 63177, at *1.
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Circuit concluded that the government official did not have authority
to invalidate the license but, because both instruments had been exe-
cuted together, held that both the memorandum and license were
void.76° The court, accordingly, vacated the decision of the CFC and
remanded for disposition in the absence of an express license.6
C. Contract Administration
In A.S. McGaughan Co. v. Barram,,62 the Federal Circuit reversed
and remanded the ruling of the GSBCA, which had found that a con-
tract term requiring a certain renovation requirement was unambi-
guous. 6 3 The Federal Circuit determined that the contract term was
latently ambiguous and, pursuant to the doctrine of contra proferentem,
concluded that the contractor should recover for the ambiguity.7
In Conner Brothers Construction Co. v. Brown,765 the Federal Circuit af-
firmed a ruling of the VABCA finding a contract provision patently
ambiguous. The court explained that "[w] hen a contract contains a
patent ambiguity, the contractor is under a duty to seek clarification,
and if no clarification is sought, the contractor cannot later argue
that its interpretation is correct."'7
In Acmat Corp. v. Panama Canal Commission, however, the ambigu-
ity dealt with a conflict between the contract and a regulation. The
ENGBCA had denied a claim for an equitable adjustment based on
an asserted conflict between the contract and regulations of the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA").7' The Fed-
eral Circuit conceded that the contract was "somewhat ambiguous,"
760. See id. at *3-5 (explaining that since both components were executed together, they
formed a single contract and noting that had express license been divisible or a separate con-
tract entirely, it might have been enforceable).
761. Seeid.at*7-8.
762. No. 96-1315, 1997 WL 199464 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 25, 1997).
763. See id. at *1 (explaining GSBCA's holding that a contract requiring centering of the
sprinkler heads in ceiling tiles was unambiguous regardless of whether or not the sprinkler
heads constituted ceiling fixtures, which were required by contract to be centered).
764. See id. at *2. The Federal Circuit explained that "[a]n ambiguity exists, however, when
more than one reasonable interpretation of a contract exists," but noted that "[t] his ambiguity,
however, is not patent because it is not 'glaring.'" Id.
765. Nos. 95-1336,96-1154, 1997WL 225068 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 30, 1997).
766. Id. at *3. In addition to the ambiguity issue, the contractor also raised four other is-
sues on appeal, all of which were rejected by the court of appeals. See id.
767. No. 95-1466, 1997WL 696231 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 10, 1997).
768. See id. at *1. The dispute involved the use of a "glove bag" procedure for abating as-
bestos. See id. at *2. Initially, the government allowed the contractor to use the procedure for
all piping, but later restricted the use of the procedure to piping of a certain size. See id. Acmat
sought to recover the costs incurred for using the full containment method on the larger pip-
ing. See id. OSHA's regulations on the other hand, required full containment "wherever feasi-
ble" and provided an exception for the glove bag method only in limited circumstances. See 29
C.F.R. § 1926.58(e) (6) (i), (iv) (1991).
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but, finding no conflict between the OSHA regulation and the con-
tract terms, affirmed the ENGBCA . 9
In some cases, such as GLR Constructors, Inc. v. Togo,7 0 the contrac-
tor does not merely seek an equitable adjustment because of an am-
biguity in a contract, but because the contract as written was impossi-
ble to perform.7 7 ' The ENGBCA had determined that GLR had not
proven impossibility of performance, and on appeal, the Federal Cir-
cuit affirmed the Board's decision."n
As in Rincon Center Associates v. Johnson,"5 the terms of a contract
are so clear that seemingly no basis for an assertion of ambiguity ex-
ists. The contract in question specifically required that Rincon pro-
vide air conditioning for a computer room,"4 and the Federal Circuit
did not believe that there was any possibility of an ambiguity in the
contract.77 5 To the extent that any ambiguity existed, the court re-
solved the question by relying on parole evidence.7
In Contact International, Inc. v. Widnall,777 Contact International
("Contact") sued for an equitable adjustment following the comple-
tion of the contract, basing its claim alternatively on a constructive
termination for convenience, a cardinal change, or a constructive
769. See Acmat Corp., 1997 WL 696231, at *4. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Newman ex-
plained that the government initially interpreted the contract in the same way as the contractor
and only later changed its interpretation. See id. (Newman, J., dissenting). In light of this,
Judge Newman argued that the contractor must have had a reasonable basis for its interpreta-
tion, one that would have satisfied the OSHA regulations. See id.
770. No. 96-1422, 1997WL 311543 (Fed. Cir. May 27, 1997).
771. See id. at *9.
772. See id at *10. The Federal Circuit concluded that, to demonstrate impossibility of per-
formance, the contractor had to show that at least one other competent contractor could not
achieve the result in question. See id. In reaching its decision, the court noted that GLR had
failed to demonstrate such evidence for any of the eight contractors. See id. The court also af-
firmed a similar ruling, regarding an alleged failure of the government to cooperate. See id. at
*7 (agreeing that Corps hindered and failed to cooperate in performance of contract).
773. No. 96-1284, 1997WL 91431 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 5, 1997).
774. The contract provided that "One (1) computer room ... shall be provided with...
individually zoned HVAC .... The HVAC systems shall be provided to accommodate equip-
ment and personnel .... The HVAC shall be maintained 24-hours and 7 days a week." See id.
at *2. Rincon argued that the contract only required it to provide a 24-hour cooling system,
not to run the system after hours without compensation. See id.
775. See id. at *3 (holding that the computer room provision in the contract required Rin-
con to maintain the HVAC 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and further stating that "[ilt is quite
clear that the computer room heating and cooling requirements are an exception to the gen-
eral temperature requirements for the rest of the building .... These more specific provisions
must be viewed as specific requirements beyond the more general provisions").
776. See id. at *3-4 (holding that parole evidence supported GSA's interpretation of the
contract since the only person who supported Rincon's allegations that GSA agreed to pay an
overtime rate was not found credible by GSBCA, whose determinations are unreviewable); see
also Beta Sys., Inc. v. United States, 838 F.2d 1179, 1183 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (declaring that parole
evidence is admissible for purposes of resolving an ambiguity in a contract).
777. No. 96-1133, 1997WL 12922 (Fed. Cir.Jan. 15, 1997).
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change.7  In rejecting Contact's constructive termination for con-
venience argument, the Federal Circuit explained that "no decision
has upheld retroactive application of a termination for convenience
clause to a contract that has been fully performed in accordance with
its terms. ' 7" As a basis for its cardinal change argument, Contact as-
serted that a change by the government had made a term of the con-
tract uncertain.7 ° The court, however, disagreed that the uncertainty
constituted "an alternation in the work so drastic that it effectively
requires the contractor to perform duties materially different from
those originally bargained for."78' Finally, noting that "[a] construc-
tive change occurs when 'a contractor performs work beyond the
contract requirements, without a formal order under the changes
clause, either by an informal order of the Government or by fault of
the Government, '' 78 2 the court determined that Contact had not
demonstrated such a change.783 Thus, the Federal Circuit affirmed
the ASBCA.
While the contractor in Contact International asserted numerous al-
ternative arguments, the contractor in Solar Turbines Inc. v. United
States 4 asserted even more alternative grounds for relief.' 5 Despite
such arguments, the Federal Circuit affirmed the CFC on all
grounds.7 78
In PLB Grain Storage Corp. v. Glickman,8 7 the contract issue con-
cerned a termination for default. PLB Grain Storage argued that the
termination was improper because the contracting officer had not
independently made the default determination.7s Although the Fed-
eral Circuit recognized that the contracting officer was "advised" to
terminate the contract, it affirmed the ruling of the AGBCA, noting
778. Seeid.at*1.
779. See id. at *3 (quoting Maxima Corp. v. United States, 847 F.2d 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
780. See id. (detailing Contact's argument that the Air Force, by stating that an amended
RFP would be issued, changed the contract to such an extent that Contact felt the contract was
"in limbo").
781. Id. (quoting Allied Materials & Equip. Co., v. United States, 569 F.2d 562, 563-64 (Ct.
CI. 1978)).
782. Id. at *4 (quoting Miller Elevator v. United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 662, 678 (Ct. Cl. 1994)).
783. See id. (explaining that Contact failed to show that it was forced to engage in work that
went beyond the scope of the contract).
784. No. 96-5088, 1997 WL 291971 (Fed. Cir. May 30, 1997).
785. See id. at *1. The contractor asserted the following grounds for a claim of breach of a
cost-reimbursement contract: (1) superior knowledge, (2) misrepresentation, (3) breach of
warranty, (4) estoppel, and (5) breach of express warranties. See id. at *3-6.
786. See id. at*6.
787. No. 95-1169, 1997WL 242179 (Fed. Cir. May 12, 1997).
788. See id. at *2. Initially, a committee (called the REACT committee) had determined
that the contract should be terminated for default. See id.; see also Schlesinger v. United States,
390 F.2d 702 (Ct. Cl. 1968) (explaining that a contracting officer must use his independentjudgment when terminating a contract for default).
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that the contracting officer had "reviewed, agreed with, and made re-
visions to the termination order before its execution."789
In Amertex Enterprises, Ltd. v. United States,79 the Federal Circuit ad-
dressed the cardinal change issue. In a contract to produce chemical
warfare protective suits, the government issued forty-two modifica-
tions and eight amendments to the contract, totaling over 100
changes to the specifications for the suits."' The government even-
tually terminated the contract for default.792 Amertex argued that the
modifications and amendments constituted a cardinal change, but
the CFC rejected this argument.73 On appeal, the Federal Circuit af-
firmed, noting that Amertex had agreed to each modification and
amendment.
794
In West v. Red Samm Construction, Inc.,7 the ASBCA awarded an eq-
uitable adjustment to the contractor and the government appealed.
The contractor obtained the award based on a government order to
replace a subcontractor, for which the principal had been de-
barred.7 6 On appeal, the government argued that, if the principal
for a contractor is debarred, the debarment extends to the corporate
789. PLB Grain Storage, 1997 WL 242179, at *2. The Federal Circuit concluded that "[t]his
evidence supports the AGBCA's determination that the contracting officer was the final deci-
sion-maker and that he exercised independent, personaljudgment." Id.
On a related note, a potential landmark case is currently before the CFC that seems factually
similar to this decision. In McDonnellDouglas Corp. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 358 (1996), the
CFC converted a termination for default into a termination for convenience because the con-
tracting officer had not acted independently when issuing the termination for default. See id. at
369. In PLB Grain, albeit an unpublished decision, the Federal Circuit held that reviewing a
termination decision, agreeing with it, and then executing it are "actions... sufficient to satisfy
the requirement of a decision by the contracting officer to terminate and conclude that the
termination ... was legally effective." PLB Grain Storage, 1997 WL 242179, at *2. Yet the facts in
the McDonnell Douglas case seem much more egregious than in this case.
790. No. 96-5070, 1997WL 73789 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 24, 1997).
791. Seeid.at*l.
792. See id. At the time of termination, Amertex had delivered half of the chemsuits, over
two years after the original deadline. See id.
793. See id. at *2 (holding that Amertex's cardinal change argument is "fatally undercut"
because of bilateral nature of modifications).
794. See id. The Federal Circuit observed that a cardinal change
occurs when the government effects an alteration in the duties so drastic that it effec-
tively requires the contractor to perform duties materially different from those bar-
gained for. By definition, then a cardinal change is so profound that it is not redress-
able under the contract, and thus renders the government in breach.
Id. (quoting AT&T Comms., Inc. v. Wiltel, Inc., 1 F.3d 1201, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
In a dissent,Judge Newman expressed concern that the majority had injected a requirement
of duress into the cardinal change doctrine: "The panel majority offers the theory that since
Amertex did not allege duress in accepting the contract modification, it can not argue that it
did not waive its claim." Id. at *5 (Newman, J., dissenting). Noting further that "[d]uress, al-
leged or not, is not at issue," Judge Newman concluded that "[a] business decision to continue
to perform does not waive a contractor's recourse to remedy on a theory of cardinal change."
Id.
795. No. 97-1032, 1997 WL 488745 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 25, 1997).
796. Seeid.at*1.
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entity.77 The Federal Circuit disagreed and affirmed the ASBCA.78
D. Cost and Pricing
In Aydin Corp. (West) v. Widnall, Aydin appealed the decision of
the ASBCA denying its request for reimbursement of commission
costs on a foreign contract pursuant to CAS 410.8'0 The Federal Cir-
cuit had addressed the issue under CAS 402 in an earlier ruling and
remanded for the costs to be allowed, unless the Board could justify
its earlier ruling.8'° On remand, the Board again rejected the costs,
but this time under GAS 410.M2 The Federal Circuit reversed the
ASBCA, holding that its ruling was outside the scope of its remand
mandate pursuant to the law of the case doctrine.'O°
E. Damages
In Azure v. United States," the Federal Circuit provides an excellent
overview of the three methodologies used for the calculation of dam-
ages in government contract damage awards. Azure claimed that the
government had constructively accelerated its contract and sought an
equitable adjustment.8°5 The CFC found an acceleration but denied
any damages, citing the absence of any "method by which to award
plaintiff the damages to which he may be entitled."m6
On appeal, the Federal Circuit cited the three methods used to de-
termine the quantum of damages: (1) actual costs, which require de-
tailed documentation of the costs; (2) total costs, where an award is
based on the difference between the original bid and the total costs
incurred; and (3) the jury verdict, where the court arrives at a "rea-
797. See id. at *1-2. The court emphasized the government's position: "In effect, the gov-
ernment advocates a bright-line rule in which an affiliate of a debarred subcontractor would be
automatically debarred." Id. at *2.
798. See id. The Federal Circuit rejected the government's argument on the premise of
"innocent until proven guilty" and FAR 9.06. See id. In addressing FAR 9.06, the court ex-
plained that "[t]he government's argument that all affiliates of a debarred entity are de facto
ineligible is so broad as to swallow the notice requirements of FAR 9.06." Id.
799. No.96-1267, 1997 WL 13329 (Fed. Cir.July 24, 1997).
800. See id. at *1 (citing GAS 410, 48 C.F.R. § 9904.410 (1997)).
801. See id. In Aydin Corp. v. Widnall, 61 F.3d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1995), Aydin had sought the
recovery of commission costs, but the ASBCA had denied the costs under GAS 402, see id. at
1579, which requires "similar treatment for similar costs." 48 C.F.R. § 9904.402 (1997). Be-
cause the Board had no basis, other than their size, to reject the commission costs, the Federal
Circuit deemed the costs proper and remanded on that issue. See Aydin, 61 F.3d at 1579-80.
802. See Aydin, 1997 WL 13329, at *4.
803. See id. The government argued that, because the court had not addressed GAS 410,
the Board was correct in considering that issue on remand. See id. at *3. The Federal Circuit
rejected this contention, noting that it had specifically addressed CAS 410. See id.
804. No.96-5054, 1997WL 665763 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 24, 1997).
805. See id. at *34.
806. Id. at *6.
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sonable equitable adjustment after receiving evidence from the par-
ties. 80 7 The CFC had refused to base a damages award on the juryverdic ., ,808
verdict methoda. The Federal Circuit, however, ruled that such a
general exclusion of damages based on the jury method was legal er-
ror and accordingly reversed.8°0
In Penn Environmental Control, Inc. v. Brown,'0 the Federal Circuit
further demonstrated how it strives to ensure that contractors receive
adequate compensation for damages. In this case, the VABCA
awarded an equitable adjustment to Penn, but Penn appealed, seek-
ing a greater award.8 " In an earlier ruling, the Federal Circuit had
remanded with instructions to address the basis for the award in
more detail.1 2 In this second appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed.15
Although the Federal Circuit affirmed, this case nonetheless demon-
strates how, on occasion, the court takes the lower courts to task to
justify a ruling that may be open to dispute.
F. Rulings by the Supreme Court
Occasionally, the United States Supreme Court takes a government
procurement case on certiorari review from the Federal Circuit. In
1997, the United States Supreme Court took one such case. In
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States,8" the Supreme Court considered
the retroactivity of the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act
("FCA"), s  which permits suits by private parties on behalf of the
807. See id.
808. See id. at*l.
809. See id. at *6 ("The Court of Federal Claims erred in not employing the jury verdict
method to award damages to Azure."). This ruling is very important for government contrac-
tors, but unfortunately, and inexplicably, this ruling is nonprecedential.
Another interesting component of the Azure case deals with the execution of a "release of
claims" pursuant to FAR 52.232-5(H). 48 C.F.R. § 52.232-5(h) provides that the amount due
the contractor will be paid by the government following a "release of all claims against the
Government arising by virtue of [the] contract." Azure had not received its final payment be-
cause it refused to execute a release of claims under the contract. See Azure 1997 WL 665763,
at *8. In the appeal, the Federal Circuit held that this was improper, noting that Azure only
had to reference its claim to the constructive acceleration in order to protect its claims and si-
multaneously obtain final payment. See id. ("To obtain the amounts due under the contract, all
Azure has to do is to execute the release, excepting its claim and describing its claim with some
particularity. Certainly a reference to this case number and the amounts claimed herein will
suffice.").
810. No. 96-1289, 1997WL 252322 (Fed. Cir. May 14, 1997).
811. See id. at *1. The Board had awarded Penn an equitable adjustment in the amount of
$19,602.53. See id. On appeal, Penn sought an additional adjustment based on hours that were
allegedly not included in the Board's calculation. See id.
812. See Clifton v. United States, 66 F.3d 345 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
813. See Penn Envit, 1997 WL 252322, at *2 (finding substantial evidence to support the
Board's decision that the labor expended by Penn for speed tile was the total labor expended
by Penn as required by contract and not extra work required by presence of speed tile).
814. 520 U.S. 939 (1997).
815. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (1994).
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United States against any persons who, or any entities which, have
submitted a false claim to the government.
16
Hughes had, pursuant to a government contract, received a sub-
contract from Northrop Corp. for the development of a radar to be
used with the Air Force B-2 aircraft.17 Thereafter, Hughes received
another subcontract from McDonnell Douglas to upgrade the radar
of another Air Force aircraft, the F-15.8s 8 With the approval of the Air
Force, Hughes developed a joint component for both radar sys-
tems."'9 In allocating the costs of these two subcontracts, Hughes al-
lowed certain costs for the B-2 subcontract to be allocated to the F-15
subcontract. 20 Following a government audit and the issuance of a
series of audit reports between 1986 and 1988, the government ini-
tially decided to withhold $15.4 million from the B-2 contract be-
cause of this accounting practice.12' However, after concluding that
the practice actually saved the government money, the government
allowed the accounting practice and paid the $15.4 million.ss
In 1989, William Schumer, a former employee of Hughes, filed suit
against Hughes under the qui tam provisions of the FCA based on the
accounting practices used for the B-2 and F-15 contracts.823 Schumer
asserted that, between 1982 and 1984, Hughes had improperly
charged costs under the radar contracts for the B-2 and the F-15.
24
Hughes requested the dismissal of the suit for lack ofjurisdiction, ar-
guing that, pursuant to the government audit, the suit was based on
information that the government already possessed at the time the
suit was initiated.s 5 In response, Schumer asserted jurisdiction based
816. See id.
817. See Hughes Aircraft Co., 520 U.S. at 942. The B-2 contract was a cost-plus-award contract
("CPAC") that provided for Hughes to be reimbursed for its costs plus a reasonable profit. See
id.
818. See id. The F-15 contract was an FFP contract that provided for Hughes to receive a
fixed price, regardless of costs. See id.
819. See id.
820. See id. Because the B-2 contract was a CPAC contract and the F-15 subcontract was a
FFP contract, Hughes would benefit by charging the most costs to the CPAC contract, as
Hughes would receive reimbursement for those costs. See id.
821. See id.
822. See id.
823. See id. Schumer was formally the "Division Contracts Manager" for the B-2 contract.
See id.
824. See id. Schumer's complaint asserted that the accounting practice had resulted in a
$50 million net overcharge to the government and sought treble damages in the amount of
$150 million. See id.
825. See id. For qui tam actions before 1986, the FCA did not permit any suit based on in-
formation that was already in the government's possession. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (4) (1982)
("Unless the Government proceeds with the action, the court shall dismiss an action brought by
the person on discovering the action is based on evidence or information the Government had
when the action was brought.").
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on retroactive application of the 1986 amendments to the FCA,
which allowed a qui tam action based on information available to the
government at the time the suit was initiated.826 The district court
denied Hughes's motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds, but
later granted summary judgment to Hughes on the merits.*"
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, affirmed
the exercise ofjurisdiction, concluding that the 1986 amendments to
the FGA were retroactive to the actions allegedly made in 1982.
8
The court did, however, reverse the grant of summary judgment.8"
Although the Ninth Circuit held that Hughes had not committed
fraud, it ruled that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether Hughes had entered into unauthorized agreements regard-
ing its cost accounting practices. ° The court reached this conclu-
sion, in part, on the premise that a government audit is not a "public
disclosure" for purposes of a qui tam jurisdiction pursuant to the
FCA.
85 '
The Supreme Court's review was limited to the retroactivity of the
FCA. For Schumer, attorney Laurence Gold asserted that, pursuant
to Landgraf v. USI Film Products,3s the 1986 amendments to the FCA
did not satisfy the "influential definition ... of impermissibly retroac-
tive legislation."8 The Court rejected this contention." 5  For
826. See Hughes, 520 U.S. at 942. (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (4) (1982)). The 1986 amend-
ments permit a qui tam suit based on information in the government's possession, except for
information publicly disclosed and not brought by an original source of the information. See
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e) (4) (A) (1994). Hughes, of course, argued that the 1986 amendments were
not retroactive. See Hughes, 520 U.S. at 943. Alternatively, Hughes asserted that there was no
jurisdiction, even if the 1986 amendments applied, because the qui tam claim was based on an
administrative audit, thus, "information publicly disclosed." See id.
827. See Hughes, 520 U.S. at 944.
828. See id.
829. See id. (explaining that the Ninth Circuit held that a material factual dispute existed as
to whether Hughes had made misleading and incomplete disclosures about its commodity
agreements).
830. See id.
831. See id.
832. See id. at 945. The specific issue was "whether a 1986 amendment to the FCA partially
removing that bar applies retroactively to qui tam suits regarding allegedly false claims submit-
ted prior to its enactment and, if so, whether this particular action meets the requirements of
the amended Act." Id.
833. 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
834. Hughes, 520 U.S. at 946. The Landgraf court held that "'[e]very statute, which takes
away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes
a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already
past, must be deemed retrospective.'" Id. Relying on Landgraf Schumer alleged that only stat-
utes of such effect are subject to the presumption against retroactivity. See id.
835. See id. The Court explained: "[T]he Court has used various formulations to describe
the functional conceptio[n] of legislative 'retroactivity,' and made no suggestion that Justice
Story's formulation [in Landgraj] was the exclusive definition of presumptively impermissible
retroactive legislation." Id.
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Hughes, attorney Kenneth Starr argued that retroactive application
of the 1986 amendments would not reflect the original understand-
ing of the FCA.m The Court agreed, explaining, that "[a]s a class of
plaintiffs, qui tam relators are different in kind than the Government.
They are motivated primarily by prospects of monetary reward rather
than the public good." 7 Accordingly, in a unanimous decision writ-
ten by Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court denied retroactive appli-
cation of the 1986 amendments to the FCA.m Explaining that Con-
gress had made no provision for retroactive effect of the 1986
amendments, the Court applied the "time-honored presumption...
against retroactive legislation. """ Concluding that the Ninth Circuit
had misread Landgraf, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded. 40
Unfortunately, because the Supreme Court found that Schumer
had no claim under the FCA, it did not address the issue of what con-
stitutes a public disclosure. 84' Therefore, the Court did not have the
opportunity to address whether a government audit constitutes a
public disclosure under the FCA.s8 2  However, as a ruling was not
necessary on this issue, the Court's silence was not surprising. In-
deed, in cases before the Federal Circuit, the court similarly does not
address all the issues currently facing the government contracts
community, if resolution of the issue is not actually before the court.
836. See id. at 951-52.
837. See id. The Court further explained that: '[Qui tam statutes are] passed upon the
theory, based on experience as old as modem civilization, that one of the least expensive and
most effective means of preventing frauds on the Treasury is to make the perpetrators of them
liable to actions by private persons acting, if you please, under the strong stimulus of personal
ill will or the hope of gain.'" Id. (quoting United States ex reL Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541
n.5 (1943)).
838. See id. at 952.
839. See id. (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265, 268 (1994)). The
Court concluded that the 1986 amendment "essentially creates a new cause of action, not just
an increased likelihood that an existing cause of action will be pursued." Id. at 950.
840. See id. The Court remanded the case to be dismissed, because the 1982 version of the
FCA did not allow a qui tam action based on information known to the government when the
action was instituted. See id. at 952.
841. With the Ninth Circuit's ruling that a government audit is not a public disclosure un-
der the FCA, Hughes had argued that a resolution by the Supreme Court was needed, in view
of a conflicting ruling in United States v.John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318, 322-23 (2d Cir. 1992), in
which the Second Circuit held that a public disclosure includes information divulged to
.strangers to the fraud." The Ninth Circuit had dismissed the John Doe ruling as "unrealistic."
See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 63 F.2d 1512, 1518 (9th Cir. 1994), vac.ated, 520 U.S.
939 (1997).
842. See Hughes, 520 U.S. at 945. The Court explained: "Because we conclude that the
lower courts should not have applied the 1986 amendment and therefore that this action
should have been dismissed, we express no opinion as to the Ninth Circuit's 'public disclosure'
and 'public fisc' holdings, or as to the merits of respondents factual contentions." Id. In addi-
tion, the Supreme Court refused to consider the issue of the constitutionality of the qui tam suit
as a general matter.
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CONCLUSION
In 1997, the Federal Circuit made several important and notable
rulings. With regard to jurisdiction, in National Surety, the Federal
Circuit granted important new rights to sureties, such as extending
jurisdiction to sue on a government contract by subrogation; thereby
severely limiting Fireman's Fund. In Southwest Marine, the court ruled
that the two-year statute of limitations for a maritime case under the
SIAA does not apply to a CDA claim. Additionally, in Trauma Service
and Total Medical Management, the court disapproved of the use of
motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction where the issue was the
failure to state a claim.
With regard to contract formation, in LDG Timber, the court held
that the government has the burden of proving that it does not have
the requisite authority, in an authority dispute seeming to limit Fed-
eral Crop Insurance. In State of Montana, the court finally resolved and
established the applicable test for determining third-party beneficiary
status, adopting the Schuerman test. In addition, in AT&T, the court
also issued an incredible decision, ruling that, after a $34.5 million
contract had been fully performed, the contract was void from the
inception, and further, that there was no apparent basis for recovery
of damages.
With regard to contract administration, the Federal Circuit in Triax
made the astonishing announcement that a finding of a latent ambi-
guity and application of the doctrine of contra proferentem are "the
general rule," whereas a finding of a patent ambiguity, and applica-
tion of the duty of inquiry, is only "an exception." In Yankee Atomic,
the court issued a controversial ruling applying both the sovereign
acts doctrine and the unmistakability doctrine, considering these
doctrines for the first time following the Winstar ruling by the Su-
preme Court.
With regard to cost and pricing, the Federal Circuit specifically
considered the application of four cost principles: including FAR
15.205-6, FAR 15.205-15, DAR 15.205-17 (now FAR 15.205-20), and
FAR 31.205-41.
With regard to damages, the court in Satellite Electric further refined
the respective burdens of proof for obtaining Eichleay damages. In
Gargoyles, the court confirmed that lost profits are an available dam-
age remedy in patent infringement suits against the United States. In
Ed A. Wilson, the court recognized a broad category of parties enti-
fled to recover legal fees under the EAJA, perhaps even extending
entitlement to pro se litigants.
Therefore, the 1997 term has resulted in many interesting as well
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as important rulings from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit.
PROSPECTIVE
Significantly, with 1998, a new era has begun at the Federal Circuit.
Chief Judge Glenn L. Archer, Jr. stepped down as Chief Judge on
December 24, 1997 and took Senior Judge status. In his place, Judge
Robert Haldane Mayer succeeded as Chief Judge. Notably, Circuit
ChiefJudge Mayer was once ajudge on the CFC, and that experience
may inject some increased emphasis on government contract cases
before the Federal Circuit. Indeed, under the tenure of ChiefJudge
Archer, the number of government contract cases heard by the court
increased dramatically from earlier years. From 1994 to 1997, pub-
lished government contract cases increased from twenty-two to 115,
respectively. Under the tenure of Chief Judge Mayer, this trend is
expected to continue. As this occurs, government contract practitio-
ners may wish to become ever more active and visible in this court of
appeals bar, a bar that has traditionally focused primarily on patent
law. After all, due to the infrequency of Supreme Court review of
government contract cases, the Federal Circuit represents the court
of last resort for virtually all matters involving government contracts.
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